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ABSTRACT 
 
The Role of International Institutions in Identity Transformation: The Case 
of Turkish-Greek Conflict within the European Union and NATO 
Frameworks 
Oğuzlu, H. Tarık 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
August 2003 
  This dissertation analyses the impact of the dynamics of Turkey and Greece's 
institutional links with the European Union and NATO on the nature of 
Turkish-Greek relations from an International Relations theoretical 
perspective. In undertaking this task the main research interest is to uncover 
the impact of links with international institutions on the security identities of 
states. Relevant theoretical approaches, namely rationalist institutionalist 
theories of neo-liberalism and neo-realism and sociological institutionalist 
theory of social constructivism, are assessed in terms of their capabilities to 
explain the relationship between links with international institutions and 
security identities of states. In this regard, this dissertation mainly draws on 
the social constructivist approach for the main reason that the rationalist 
institutionalist theories fall short of offering convincing explanations as to 
the identity transforming effects of interactions within institutional 
environments.   
The main argument is that the contextual environment of Turkey and 
Greece’s interaction through the EU and NATO has contributed to the 
perpetuation of realpolitik security identities and practices in and around the 
Aegean Sea and Cyprus, rather than setting the stage for long-term 
cooperative bilateral relations based on non-realpolitik security identities. In 
this sense, the realpolitik kind bilateral security relations are ideational in 
nature and have been to a significant degree informed by the context of 
Turkey and Greece's joint membership in NATO and close relations on the 
margins of the European Union. This dissertation simply tries to unravel the 
mechanisms through which this outcome has taken place. Assuming that 
Turkey and Greece would have stable and long-term cooperative security 
relations if and only if their security identities and interests came closer to 
each other on the basis of the non-realpolitik security norms of the western 
international/security community, this dissertation argues that the way the 
dynamics of Turkey and Greece's institutional relations within the EU and 
NATO frameworks have unfolded has significantly curtailed this possibility.  
 v 
By way of conclusion, this dissertation has reached the following 
points: First, the social constructivist approaches are better equipped with the 
tools to highlight the identity-transforming effects of links with international 
institutions. Second, the alleged security community identities of the 
European Union and NATO have not contributed to the emergence of a 
security community between Greece and Turkey. This was so because 
NATO has been a collective defence organization of realpolitik kind since 
its inception. Besides, the European Union members have acted towards 
Turkey and Greece from an instrumental perspective, highlighting the costs 
and benefits of their true inclusion in the Union, rather than from the logic of 
appropriateness believing that their incorporation into the Union would be in 
accordance with the security identity of the Union.     
Third, for Turkey and Greece to develop a non-realpolitik security 
relationship within the framework of the European Union they should 
approach the EU from an ideational perspective, rather than an instrumental 
one. They should believe that the resolution of their territorial disputes in 
peaceful ways would be legitimate in order for them to be considered as real 
Europeans.  
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ÖZET 
Uluslararası Kurumların Kimlik Dönüşümündeki Rolü: Avrupa Birligi ve 
NATO Çerçevesinde Türk-Yunan Anlaşmazlığının İncelenmesi 
 
Oğuzlu, H. Tarık 
 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
 
Ağustos 2003 
 
 
Bu tez Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ının Avrupa Birliği ve NATO ile olan 
ilişkilerinin yapısının, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin doğasını nasıl etkilediğini 
Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri açısından incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken temel 
araştırma konusu bu kurumsal ilişkilerin iki ülkenin güvenlik kimliklerini ne 
yönde etkilediğidir. Tezde referans yapılan ilgili Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, 
isim vermek gerekirse "neo-realist", "neo-liberal" ve "sociological 
institutionalist" teoriler, uluslararası kurumlarla kurulan ilişkilerin devletlerin 
güvenlik kimliklerininin oluşmasını açıklamaları açısından değerlendirilmiştir. 
Bu bağlamda düşünüldüğünde, bu tez ağırlıklı olarak sociological 
institutionalist teorilerin metodlarını benimsemiştir çünkü neo-realist ve neo-
liberal teorilerin uluslararası örgütlerin kimlik dönüşümlerindeki etkilerini 
inceleme ya da bu etkilerin nasıl olduklarını gösterme boyutları sınırlıdır.  
 Tezin ana fikri şudur: Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Avrupa Birliği ve NATO 
bağlamında kurduğu ilişkiler ve bu örgütlerin temsil ettikleri durumsal şartlar, 
iki ülke arasında realpolitik güvenlik kimklilerine dayalı ilişkilerin oluşmasına 
ve zamanla pekişmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın 
NATO ve Avrupa Birliği çerçevesinde geliştirdikleri ilişkilerin doğası bu iki 
ülkenin "non-realpolitik" tarzda güvenlik kimlikleri üretmelerini engellemiş 
ve onların uzun vadeli işbirliğine dayalı ilişkiler kurma  becerilerini olumsuz 
yönde etkilemiştir. Bu bağlamda düşünüldüğünde Türkiye ve Yunanistan 
arasındaki realpolitik bazdaki güvenlik ilişkileri daha çok kimliksel ve fikirsel 
düzeydedir. Bunun böyle olmasında ise bu iki ülkenin Avrupa Birliği ve 
NATO ile kurduklari ilişkilerin doğası belirleyici olmuştur. Bu tez basitçe bu 
kurumsal ilişkilerin Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da hangi mekanizmalar sonucu 
realpolitik güvenlik kimliklerinin oluşmasına katkıda bulunduğunu 
incelemektedir. Bu tez Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında uzun vadeli işbirliğine 
dayalı ilişkilerin oluşmasında iki ülkenin güvenlik kimliklerinin Batı devletler 
topluluğunun non-real politik güvenlik kimliği ve normaları yönünde 
yakınlaşmasını ve evrilmesini şart gördüğğnden, yapmaya çalıştığı bu iki 
ülkenin bu kurumlarla kurdukları ilişkerin yapısının hangi süreçler sonucu tam 
ters istikamette neticeler doğurduğunu incelemektir. 
 Ulaştığı sonuçlar bağlamında bu tez asağıdaki hususları vurgulamaktadır. 
İlk olarak, "social constructivist" uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri, diğer teorilere 
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nazaran uluslararası kurumlarla kurulan ilişkilerin kimlik dönüştürme 
kapasitelerinin açıklamada daha başarılıdır. İkinci olarak, 'güvenlik topluluğu' 
oldukları farzedilen NATO ve Avrupa Birliği Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında 
bir güvenlik topluluğunun oluşmasına pozitif anlamda katkıda 
bulunmamışlardır. Bunun nedenlerinden birisi NATO'nun daha çok realpolitik 
güvenlik kimliği üzerine kurulu bir ortak savunma örgütü olduğudur. Buna 
ilaveten, Avrupa Birligi Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a karşı daha çok araçsal bakış 
açısıyla ve kar-zarar hesabı zaviyesinden yaklaşmış, iki ülkenin Avrupa 
Birliği'ne gerçek anlamda katılmalarını kimliksel ve fikirsel bazda öngörüp 
meşrulaştıramamıştır. Üçüncü olarak, Türkiye ve Yunanistan şayet Avrupa 
Birliği çerçevesinde non-realpolitik güvenlik kimliğine dayalı bir güvenlik 
topluluğu kuracaklarsa bunu ancak Avrupa Birliği'ne taktiksel ve araçsal 
açılardan yaklasmayı bırakıp daha çok fikirsel ve kimliksel düzeyde hareket 
ederek yapabilirler. Bu bağlamda her ikisinin de şuna inanmaları elzemdir: 
Yaşıyor oldukları sınır problemlerinin barışçı yollardan çözümü onların 
gerçek Avrupalı kimliklerinin tescil edilmesi için bir önşarttır.      
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 1 
INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation will mainly argue that the nature of the relationship between Greece 
and Turkey cannot be fully grasped without taking into consideration the institutional 
relationships which these countries have developed both with the European Union 
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This contextual 
environment has to a significant degree moulded the substance of bilateral relations 
since the onset of the Cold War era. Therefore, in accounting for the nature of 
Turkish-Greek relations, this dissertation does not analyse the impact of other 
possible indendent variables, such as the nature of domestic regimes in both 
countries, the personalities of the leaders involved in foreign and security policy 
making process, the systemic factors in the region measured in terms of the 
distribution of material capabilities, the historical legacy of bilateral relations. 
Neither is the goal to make a comparative analysis with respect to the weight of 
various independent variables on the nature of bilateral relations.  
The goal is simply to unravel the mechanims through which this contextual 
environment, which has transpired through Turkish-Greek interaction within NATO 
and on the margins of the EU, has contributed to the more conflictual - less 
cooperative bilateral relations in and around the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. Stated 
somewhat differently, the goal is to account for the reasons why this contextual 
environment has not produced a transformation of Turkish-Greek realpolitik security 
relations into non-realpolitik security relations based on the security norms of the 
Western international community.   
The argument is that instead of paving the way, and setting the stage, for 
similar and accommodating identity transformations between the two countries based 
on non-realpolitik security identities, their NATO membership and close 
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relationships with the EU have contributed to the perpetuation of their realpolitik 
security identities. Assuming that long-term cooperative relationships would most 
likely follow a collective identity formation between these two countries based on 
non-realpolitik security identities, this dissertation does not aim to explain the 
occurances of bilateral cooperation of realpolitik kind. Even if the above-mentioned 
contextual environment might have contributed to Turkish-Greek cooperation of 
realpolitik kind, this contextual environment will be analysed in terms of its 
cabapility/promise to engender Turkish-Greek cooperation of non-realpolitik nature. 
All the theoretical approaches to be referred to throughout the dissertation will be 
assessed in terms of their expectations of the role of 'links with international 
organizations' in the emergence of long-term cooperative relations between states 
based on non-realpolitik security relations.      
Viewed in this way, this dissertation makes a distinction between three 
ostensibly interrelated concepts, or dependent variables, namely 'absence of war', 
'cooperation', and 'identity transformation'. It is the third of these that this dissertation 
tries to account for. For example, the fact that Turkey and Greece has never fought 
since the inception of their institutional relationships with the EU and NATO, is not 
what is going to be explained here. Neither the emergence of a crisis-management 
culture nor bilateral cooperative schemes based on the convergence of conjectural 
national interests are the things that this dissertatin tries to explain.  
The point this dissertation will try to make is that Turkey and Greece were 
given chances to get rid of their negative interaction and mutual misperceptions 
through their links with the EU and NATO. However, they have squandered this 
chance. In this process, the EU and NATO themselves played also quite negative 
roles. While the traces of the realpolitik security culture have gradually evaporated 
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among the western European members of NATO and the EU, this has not been the 
case on the southeastern edge of the continent. Instead of contributing to the 
elimination of the legacy of the conflictual past and realpolitik security behaviour, it 
appeared that 'the nature of these links with these international institutions' have 
further contributed to the normalcy of ‘the conflict as inevitable’ thinking in Turkish-
Greek relations.    
 Seen as such, this dissertation seeks to problematize the social-constructivist 
expectation that both the 'EU's accession process' and 'membership in NATO' 
contribute to the emergence of a security community between the current members 
and membership candidates in the long-run by contributing to the transformation of 
their realpolitik security culture into a non-realpolitik one.  
By 'their institutional relationship within NATO and the EU frameworks', I 
mean, first of all, the contextual environment in which Tukey and Greece interact 
with each other. The assumption is that absent the European Union and NATO, their 
relations would evolve differently. Second, by 'their institutional relationship within 
NATO and the EU frameworks' I mean the aggregate outcome of three simultaneous 
relationships. The first concerns the dynamics of EU/NATO-Turkey relations, 
especially defined in security terms, whereas the second pertains to the dynamics of 
EU/NATO-Greece relations. The third one relates to the dynamics of Turkey-Greece 
relations defined in terms of their interaction and status within NATO and the EU. 
How have the EU/NATO approached/viewed Turkey and Greece? How have Turkey 
and Greece approached/viewed the EU/NATO? How has Turkey approached/viewed 
Greece in terms of Greece's status within NATO/EU? How has Greece 
approached/viewed Turkey in terms of Turkey's status within NATO/EU?  
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This dissertation will not argue that the main responsibility for the emergence 
and continuation of conflictual relationship in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus Island 
falls on the shoulders of the EU and NATO or the links these two countries have 
established with them. However, it is contended here that their links with the EU and 
NATO have not helped them resolve their disputes by developing cooperative 
relationships, based on non-realpolitik security cultures. This dissertation will not 
discuss the Aegean Sea disputes and the Cyprus conflict in detail with a view to 
providing a descriptive account of the developments. Therefore, there is no specified 
chapter devoted to the description of these issues.  
One who does not know the last half-a-century history of the Turkish-Greek 
relations in detail but is cognizant of the facts that they had no conflictual 
relationship in the aftermath of the Second World War, would most likely have 
argued that they must have ended up with a totally cooperative relationship by now. 
For example, Turkey and Greece could co-establish the Balkan Entente in 1934; 
settled many of the fundamental issues left over from the Lausanne Treaty of 1923; 
worked together in the revision of the Lausanne regulations concerning the straits in 
Montreux in 1936 (Bitzes, 1997: 307-323); promised to respect the territorial 
integrity of each other; promised to assist one another in case of an assault on their 
territories; could exchange high-level visits in the early 1950s during which many 
Greek and Turkish circles did even mention the possibility of any union between the 
two countries; co-establish the Balkan Pact of 1954 (Coufoudakis, 1985: 185-217). 
Turkey did not bow to the enticing tactics of the Great Powers during the course of 
the Second World War by laying claims to the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean 
Sea. The leaders of the neither country had invested important political capitals in 
Cyprus. While the Turkish leaders made it clear that Cyprus can never strain the 
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positive atmosphere of the bilateral relations (Bolukbasi, 2001; Uslu, 2000; Karpat, 
1975), the Greek leaders tried not to problematize the political and legal status of the 
island in their relations with Turkey and the western powers, mainly the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Markides, 1977; Xydis, 1969).        
So the question is how Turkey and Greece could not continue this less 
conflictual - more cooperative relationship since the early post-World War II years. 
Is the only reason for the emergence of the mutual conflict the Cyprus dispute? Or 
could one convincingly argue that Turkey and Greece would have been bound to live 
as enemies due to the legacy of their centuries-old hostile relations?  
This dissertation is partly historical and partly theoretical. While the historical 
part will consist of the analysis of the developments within the specified time span, 
the theoretical part will analyse different theoretical approaches in terms of their 
expectations as to the role of international organizations, or institutional 
environments, in the transformation of realpolitik security cultures into non-
realpolitik security cultures. Though it will be discussed later in detail, it is enough to 
point out here that there are mainly two kinds of IR theories, which interpret the roles 
of international institutions in different ways, namely the rational-institutionalist 
approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the sociological-institutionalist 
approach of social constructivism. 
The main reason why this dissertation analyses the impact of EU-induced and 
NATO-induced contextual environments on the nature of Turkish-Greek relations by 
utilising the same IR theoretical approaches, despite the fact that these two 
institutional environments show different chracteristics, relates to two factors: One is 
that NATO and the European Union are the two main institutional pillars of the 
Western international community and that many consider them as security 
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communties. The second pertains to the fact that while the research interest of this 
dissertation is to uncover the impacts of 'Turkey and Greece's memberships in 
NATO' and 'Turkey's accession/Greece's intergation processes with the EU' on the 
security relations between these two ocuntries, it seems that analysts can make use of 
the above-mentioned theoretical approaches in a comparative manner.    
The main reasons for focusing on Turkey and Greece's institutional 
relationships with the EU and NATO can be summarised as follows: First of all, 
since the onset of the Cold War both Turkey and Greece have attributed a significant 
place to their links with NATO and the EU in the formation of their foreign and 
security policies. This has been mainly due to the fact that both countries have 
attributed significant value to these institutions in their efforts to acquire Western-
European identities.  
Second, the dynamics of contemporary Turkish-Greek relations have been 
strongly informed by their links to NATO and the EU, particularly the latter. For 
instance, while it would be difficult to understand the EU’s Helsinki decisions, 
particularly concerning the clauses on Turkey’s candidacy and the Cyprus issue, 
without being aware of the parameters of Turkish-Greek relations, it would squarely 
be impossible to fully grasp Turkey’s current position on the Cyprus and the Aegean 
disputes without comprehending the gist of the EU-Turkey integration process. 
Third, an analysis of the institutional relationship between Turkey and Greece 
would be timely because the whole enlargement policies of the EU and NATO 
towards the Central and Eastern European Countries are based on the liberal hope 
that incorporation of these countries into the Western international community would 
contribute to regional peace and stability. However, it might not be automatic that the 
enlargement of these institutions to the peripheries of the European Continent would 
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lead to the emergence and consolidation of democratic regimes there. There might be 
lessons to be drawn from the Turkish-Greek example as such that these optimistic 
expectations would not come out right automatically but be contingent on many 
factors. 
The fourth and the final reason why international institutions, NATO and the 
EU, might possess a significant explanatory weight in the outcome of Turkish-Greek 
relations concerns the point that no solution today is conceivable outside the 
institutional framework of the EU and NATO. In other words, the major partners of 
Greece and Turkey within these organizations have a direct interest in the way the 
disputes are resolved once and for all. The way they approach Turkey and Greece 
each would mould the way Turkey and Greece would view each other.  
Before summarising the main contributions and chain of arguments of this 
dissertation, it is now the time to have a closer look at the contents of the following 
chapters. After presenting the chain of arguments within the introduction part, the 
first chapter will discuss the theoretical approaches that have a say on the 
transformation of realpolitik security cultures into non-relapolitik security cultures 
through the help of international institutions/organizations.  
The second chapter will analyze the Cold War and Post-Cold War era 
experiences of the NATO-Turkey-Greece triangle with a view to demonstrating that 
NATO's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations during the Cold War years was 
not helpful in the construction of cooperative bilateral relations between Greece and 
Turkey based on non-realpolitik security relations. What is meant by 'cooperative 
bilateral relations' here is not Greece and Turkey's abilties to develop a culture of 
crisis management, but their long-term cooperative interaction based on their non-
realpolitik security identities. Even though NATO appears to have at times 
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contributed to the emergence of Turkish-Greek cooperation of realpolitik kind, a 
postive thing in itself, it has in the long run delayed the surface of security 
cooperation of non-realpolitik kind by perpetuating realpolitik practices, not a 
promising thing in itself. As for the post-Cold War era, the impact of NATO on the 
nature of Turkish-Greek relations has been marginal and insignificant.  
The third chapter will focus on the role of the EU in the evolution of Turkish-
Greek relations from the early 1960s until the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999. This 
chapter will mainly concentrate on the post-Cold War era developments for the 
prime reason that the promise of the EU has been exposed to significant challenges 
in this new era due to two significant developments. While the re-construction 
process of the EU has on the one hand dictated new rationales in its approaches 
towards Turkey and Greece, Turkey's growing interest to join the EU on the other 
has sharpened the EU's role in determining the organising principles of Turkish-
Greek relations. The marginalization of NATO on the one hand and the increasing 
importance of Turkey-EU relations on the other have led me to devote a greater 
portion of the dissertation to the dynamics of EU-Turkey relations.  
The fourth chapter will analyse the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute 
with a view to demonstrating that the often-repeated 'catalytic' effects of the EU 
accession process have not taken place. Instead, the way the EU has involved in the 
dispute has produced nothing but further 'securitization' in and around the island, by 
contributing to the re-production of realpolitik security behaviours in the region.    
The fifth chapter will analyse the post-Helsinki period in EU-Turkey-Greece 
triangular relationship. It will be asserted that this era has been giving mixed signals 
as to the credibility and promise of the European Union. While a bilateral 
cooperation process has already been under way between Turkey and Greece, mainly 
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due to the factors emanating from the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations, it has still 
been the case that a major identity/interest transformation on the parties concerned 
has not been in the offing. Unless this situation changes, it will not be possible that 
Turkey and Greece would end up developing a security community in their region 
based on non-realpolitik security understandings that would eventually enable them 
to resolve their territorial disputes once and for all.  
The concluding chapter will summarize the main arguments of the 
dissertation, as well as discuss the reasons why the post-Helsinki Turkish-Greek 
relations within the EU framework might turn out to be fragile in the years to come.   
This dissertation mainly relies on secondary sources, such as academic 
journal articles and books. Reference to newspaper articles and interviews conducted 
with some prominent figures can also be put under this category. The only primary 
sources used in the dissertation consist of official documents of the European Union 
and NATO, such as conclusions of summit meetings and EU's Accession Partnership 
Document and yearly progress reports on Turkey.    
The main contributions of this dissertation to the existing body of knowledge 
on Turkish-Greek relations are as follows: First, this study aims at offering a partly 
theoretical and partly historical analysis on bilateral relations instead of relying on 
pure historical accounts, as has vastly been attempted by many others. Second, this 
study tries to analyse Turkish-Greek relations within the framework of their 
institutional relations with NATO and EU, a dimension of the bilateral relations that 
has not been covered from a theoretical perspective before. Third, this study seeks to 
explore the role of ideational factors, such as security identities/cultures, in the 
analysis of bilateral relations as opposed to pure material factors. In this way, it will 
be demonstrated that institutional relationships, depending on their nature, might 
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create the conditions under which states' realpolitik security cultures and behaviours 
can be re-constituted. Fourth, this dissertation is a timely study given that the 
enlargement of the European Union and NATO is generally assumed to contribute to 
regional security and stability. This dissertation demonstrates that this may not be so.  
In explaining the conditions under which Turkey and Greece could not 
experience bilateral cooperation of non-realpolitik kind through their institutional 
links with the EU and NATO, this dissertation will stress the following points: The 
first main factor (variable) to probe into in this regard is the approach the EU and 
NATO have adopted towards the inclusion of Turkey and Greece into the western 
international community. The degree of their commitment towards Turkey and 
Greece's incorporation into the western international community would affect the 
promise of their efforts to socialize these countries into non-realpolitik security 
cultures. Depending on their logic of action towards Turkey and Greece, they would 
either adopt teaching and persuasion type socialization strategies (as foreseen by the 
logic of appropriateness) or conditionality and rhetorical action type socialization 
strategies (as foreseen by the logic of consequentiality). In the first case they would 
deem Turkey and Greece's memberships in their security communities appropriate 
(in conformity with their security cultures) and thus actively work for their 
socialization. In the second case, they would demand Turkey and Greece to 
internalize the non-realpolitik security culture of the western international 
community on their own. Here the main responsibility for the socialization would fall 
on the shoulders of Turkey and Greece. While the first case would prove more 
promising for the transformation of Turkey and Greece's security cultures from 
realpolitik into non-realpolitik, the second case would always carry the risk of 
contributing to the re-constitution of realpolitik security cultures in Greece and 
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Turkey. In uncovering the EU and NATO's approach towards Turkey and Greece's 
true inclusion in the western international community, the dissertation will stress the 
degree of compatibility between the security cultures of these institutions and those 
of Turkey and Greece. The claim is that in case there is compatibility, these 
institutions will adopt teaching and persuasion strategies.      
The second main factor (variable) concerns the fact that the way the EU and 
NATO each conceptualizes Turkey and Greece's place within the Western 
international community would not only affect the nature of their relations with these 
countries but also the ways how Greece and Turkey would view each other. In one 
way or the other, Greece and Turkey's perception of each other would be to a great 
extent linked to the way these institutions would view them.  
 For example, what is significant in this regard is the impact of a particular 
relationship between any community of states (here the European Union) and an 
important outside state (here Turkey) on the relationship between the latter and any 
marginal state within the community (here Greece) that shares common borders and 
territorial disputes with the important outside state. The way the European Union 
defines its mission (whether or not to construct a particular community of states) and 
the way it interacts with Turkey would certainly affect the way Greece, a marginal 
insider, would define its identity and interest as well as its policies towards Turkey. 
The more the EU acts as an agent in the construction of the western international 
community on the basis of collectively shared identities and the more it adopts an 
exclusionary attitude towards Turkey, the more Greece would try to distance itself 
from Turkey in order to legitimize its own European identity within the EU. In such 
a case Greece and Turkey would continue to view each other through realpolitik 
lenses and the EU's identity-construction policies would not help Greece and Turkey 
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develop a collective identity in their region based on the EU's norms. This would 
militate against the formation of cooperative relations between these two countries, 
based on non-realpolitik security cultures.       
 As far as NATO is concerned the picture is somehow different because both 
Greece and Turkey are already members of this alliance. Here what would matter are 
the ways NATO defines its identity and the way Turkey and Greece each is 
attributed a role in the re-construction and representation of this identity. Their 
representational modes and weights within the Alliance would affect the tone and 
quality of their bilateral relationship, the particular security culture prevalent in the 
region. The more Turkey and Greece are attributed complementary roles and the 
more the resolution of their territorial disputes constitutes a must for the re-
construction of NATO's institutional identity, the more likely they would come to an 
everlasting reconciliation within NATO framework.       
The third main factor (variable) in this regard is the degree of credibility of 
Turkey and Greece’s attempts at internalizing the institutional identity of the western 
international community and meeting the required conditions of membership. To 
what extent are they willing to become members of these institutions and therefore 
internalize their security cultures? To put it another way, what are the particular 
Turkish and Greek approaches towards the European Union and NATO? How do 
they view them and how do they situate them in the materialization of their security 
interests? What would matter in this regard is the fact that the degree of their 
willingness to internalize the security norms of these institutions would be dependent 
on the domestic salience of those norms. If those norms contradict their own security 
norms, the process of their socialization into the EU and NATO's security norms 
would last long and pass through tumultuous stages. The possibility of Turkey and 
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Greece coming closer in terms of their security identities and interests along their 
institutional relationships with NATO and the EU and to develop cooperative 
relations would also depend on their conceptualization of membership in NATO and 
the EU. The degree of their commitment towards meeting the constitutive norms of 
the western international community would not only affect their chance of being 
included in the West but also the promise of these institutions in paving the way for a 
cooperative relationship between Greece and Turkey. I will assume that the chances 
for an everlasting settlement in and around the Aegean Sea would vary with the 
degree of internalization of the institutional identity of the EU and NATO by Greece 
and Turkey, especially in terms of foreign and security policies. In other words, the 
more Turkey and Greece get socialized into the normative environment of the EU 
and NATO, the more prospects for everlasting cooperative relationships will take 
place. However, one thing needs to be made clear: for the cooperation-generating 
effects of internalization to take place, there should not be significant differences 
between the performances of the two countries in getting socialized into the 
institutional identity of the EU and NATO. If one of them edges out the other in this 
process, the net result might be just the opposite of what would be otherwise.  
For example, it is a major argument of this dissertation that the EU accession 
process as a mechanism has fallen short of becoming conducive to the resolution of 
the Turkish-Greek disputes, particularly over Cyprus, mainly because of the fact that 
the involvement of the EU has contributed to the re-construction of conflictual and 
exclusionary identities on the side of the parties concerned. Let alone contributing to 
the emergence of non-realpolitik security cultures in Greece and Turkey, the way the 
EU has been involved in the bilateral relations has contributed to the perpetuation of 
realpolitik security cultures. 
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Two arguments can be put forward in this regard. The first is that the 
credibility of the European Union to play a positive role in the resolution of the 
Turkish-Greek disputes has decreased in the 1990s as the diverging security 
cultures/identities between Turkey and the EU has made Turkey's accession to the 
EU a distant possibility. Owing to this, the EU approached Turkey from the logic of 
consequentiality that has eventually curtailed its efforts to socialize Turkey into non-
realpolitik security cultures. When the European circles have gradually viewed 
Turkey's admission to the Union as threatening the post-Cold war era security 
identity of the EU, Turkey's traditional elites have increasingly interpreted the EU's 
demands as threatening and incompatible with Turkey's security understanding. The 
fact that Turkey's membership would not become a reality soon (due to both EU and 
Turkey-induced factors) has further decreased the willingness of Turkey's political-
security elite to reach an everlasting settlement with Greece along the EU accession 
process. When the nature/quality of Turkey-EU interaction process in the 1990s has 
reinforced Turkey's gradual estrangement from the EU, despite the confirmation of 
Turkey's membership candidacy and Customs Union with the EU, the Greek-Turkish 
relations have been negatively affected by this outcome. In such an atmosphere, the 
incentives for Turkey and Greece to transform their conflictual relations into 
cooperative relations have remained highly limited.  
Second, in the face of decreasing EU commitment towards Turkey's 
accession, the successive Greek governments of the last three decades could 
approach the EU from a strategic-instrumental perspective in their attempts at 
gaining influence over Turkey. Despite encouraging signs, Greece's post-1999 logic 
towards Turkey and the European Union has not been a significant exception to this 
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well-established strategic/instrumental tradition. This instrumentality on the part of 
Greece has further curtailed the promise of the EU.    
Even though this dissertation will regard NATO and the EU as the two most 
important components of the western international community, one needs to make it 
clear that a process of gradual differentiation has been already under way between 
the two since the early decades of the Cold War era. It seems that this process has 
accelerated with the advent of the 1990s. The way NATO conceptualizes security 
problems and the means to deal with them does not always overlap with those of the 
EU. The stress on militarization of security and the existence of a wide range of 
external threats, both in conventional and nonconventional senses, is more visible 
within NATO than the European Union. This factor is particularly important because 
if NATO and EU's logics towards Turkey and Greece differ from each other to great 
extents, then their total promise in the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes would 
decrease because diverging logics would hamper the synchronization required for 
success.    
A security culture-oriented analysis is hoped to enable analysts to assess the 
impact of Turkey and Greece’s links with the EU and NATO on their foreign and 
security policy identities and interests. It is significant to know whether Greece and 
Turkey have defined, and still define, their national preferences and select foreign 
and security policy options on the basis of their identities shaped by their links with 
the EU and NATO. In this regard the differences between EU-imposed/implied and 
NATO-imposed/implied identities are of fundamental value. It is also of utmost 
significance that whether the EU and NATO had, or still have, the same level of 
impact on the identity formulations in both Turkey and Greece.  
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CHAPTER 1: Theoretical Background 
What is the relevance of the IR theories to the research interests of this dissertation? 
How are the identity-transforming functions of international organizations theorized 
in International Relations? Under which conditions is socialization of realpolitik 
security cultures into non-realpolitik security cultures more likely? These are the 
questions this section tries to analyse (Duffield, 2002; Martin and Simmons, 1998: 
729-757; Keohane, 1998: 82-95; Cortell and Davis, 1996: 451-478; Cortell and 
Davis, 2000: 65-87; Alderson, 2001: 415-433; Checkel, 2000; Checkel, 2001). The 
analysis of the effects of Turkey and Greece’s memberships in NATO and their 
institutional relationships with the European Union on the outcome of their bilateral 
relationships, especially their propensity to come to a mutual understanding over the 
Aegean and Cyprus disputes, based on non-realpolitik security behaviours, would be 
bound to vary with the particular theoretical approach an analyst adopts.  
One of the things that would matter in this regard concerns the degree of 
institutionalization of an international environment. This would become particularly 
relevant as far as different conceptualizations of international organizations are 
concerned. The role of an international organization within a loosely institutionalized 
international environment would be regulative and functional (Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger, 2000: 3-33). Membership in those organizations would be respected 
as long as states continue to feel that they benefit from cooperation.      
A tightly institutionalized international environment would predict more 
constitutive roles for international organizations rather than causal and regulative. 
Being a member of an international organization in such an environment would 
imply that members of that international organization share in the fundamental norms 
and rules of that environment. They would feel constrained in their dealings with 
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each other by the normative requirements of that particular international 
organization. A high degree of convergence would be expected in their both 
domestic regimes and foreign policy identity and interests, for their membership in 
the same international organization would be based on the commonality of political, 
social and sometimes economic values and principles. In such international 
environments, institutions act to radiate the well-internalized norms and rules to 
states, which aspire to join. They perform socializing functions (Schimmelfennig, 
2000: 109-139).   
Another issue of importance is how international institutions are generally 
assumed to contribute to interstate cooperation. In an encompassing way, Russet and 
Oneal (1998: 441-468) summarize the main functions of international institutions as 
such. According to them inter-governmental organizations constitute the third leg of 
the Kantian project of world peace. Inter-governmental organizations, in association 
with democratic domestic regimes and highly interdependent economic interactions, 
prompt states to have more peaceful and cooperative relationships. There are 
basically five ways for international organizations to lead to cooperation and peace 
among states. First, they coerce the members, which break norms and rules. 
Alliances are better equipped with tools to enforce their norm-breaker members than 
other organizations, which lack effective enforcement mechanisms.  
Second, international organizations mediate among their conflicting 
members. Third, they help reduce uncertainty by conveying information. Given that 
the lack of reliable information about the capabilities and intentions of states 
constitutes the major barrier before cooperation, international organizations rectify 
this handicap by circulating sensitive and credible information about the capabilities 
and intentions of their members.  
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Fourth, international organizations create norms and rules, which govern 
interstate relations in more efficient and cooperative ways. In one way or the other 
international organizations are the sites for socialization to collectively held and 
accepted rules and norms. They help socialize their members to their norms. Finally, 
and related with the previous point, international organizations generate narratives of 
collective identification. Put another way, they might contribute to the emergence of 
collective identities among their members. As time goes by, members of an 
international organization will develop collective understandings of what is the right 
thing to do.  
Now a comparative analysis is in order in regard to the different 
conceptualizations of international organizations as they make up different 
international structures. Here the main goal is to imagine different pictures/models of 
the western international community, as represented and re-constructed by the EU 
and NATO. The potential role of the EU and NATO to contribute to the Turkish-
Greek peace, through their socialization into non-realpolitik security cultures, would 
depend on the particular reading through which one would view these institutions 
(Jervis, 1999: 42-63).   
 
1.1. Neo-realism 
Built on Waltz’s arguments that the anarchical structure of the international system 
would highlight the significance of the distribution of material capabilities in foreign 
policy behaviours of states and that anarchy would lead states to look after their 
survival as the ultimate goal, structural realist accounts are not optimistic about the 
role of international institutions in providing states with avenues to cooperate. States 
formulate their foreign policy behaviours in reference to the global distribution of 
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material power. The informational environments of international institutions do not 
act as independent or intervening variables in the determination of states’ interest. 
Their roles are ephemeral (Waltz, 1979). The capacity of international institutions to 
change the security understandings of their members is highly limited, for all states 
behave similarly under the conditions of anarchy. The talk of different security 
cultures determining states' different security strategies would be meaningless, for all 
states get socialized into the same realpolitik security behaviours.      
According to neo-realists, institutions are not capable of lengthening the 
shadow of the future just because states act on the basis of the distribution of power 
and material capabilities in the system (Waltz, 2000: 24). Within this logic, 
international institutions are nothing but mere tools of foreign policy implementation 
at the hands of statecraft. The more powerful actors in the system establish them in 
the hope that they would help them realize their national interests defined in terms of 
power. International institutions do not have independent variable status, let alone 
intervening variable, in the formulation of states’ foreign policy choices 
(Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 5-49). They are the mere reflections of the distribution of 
power within the international system and serve the interests of the most powerful 
state. The gains from cooperation would depend on power disparities among 
members.  
The role of any international institution to contribute to cooperative relations 
between any two of its members would only be possible if the most powerful country 
within the institution deemed that such cooperative relations would constitute a 
necessity for it to materialize its interests. To the neo-realist thinking, international 
institutions do not play significant roles in the re-constitution of national identities of 
their members.   
 20
When the fundamental goal of states were to survive in the anarchical 
environment of international system, cheating would not be the only impediment 
before cooperation but concerns about the relative power positions of other actors 
would also matter. Defined as ‘defensive positionalists’, states would pay utmost 
importance to the relative gains of others. If a cooperative scheme promises 
incremental changes in the absolute gains of any particular state as yet yields far 
greater benefits to the other side, that particular state would be discouraged to 
cooperate, since no one can guarantee that today’s friend would not turn out to be 
tomorrow’s enemy (Grieco, 1993: 116-140). Neo-realists contend that even if 
international institutions help allay states' fear of cheating, they would be incapable 
of assuaging concerns for relative gains. However, neo-realists admit that concerns 
for relative gains might be relaxed among a group of states, which share a 
relationship based on common domestic regimes and joint destiny for the future. The 
highly industrialised and democratic states of the European Union might not feel 
constrained by the concerns for relative gains in the presence of the highly 
institutionalized regional environment, which indisputably lengthens the shadow of 
the future in Western Europe. (Snidal, 1993: 208) 
 To the neo-realist logic, states join international institutions and perform pro-
norm actions out of necessity. It is neither because of the common interests shared 
with any particular state nor the belief in the moral necessity in taking part in any 
particular international organization that a state aspires to join any particular 
international institution. It is all due to the selfishly formulated and externally 
imposed national interests that propel a state to take part in any international body. 
The necessity to survive in the anarchical international system might lead a particular 
state either to ally with an outside power against the sources of external threats or to 
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bandwagon with the sources of the threat. There is no choice. Either way, states 
would join international organizations due to existential concerns. The stakes are so 
high, either to survive or to perish. As soon as the external threat disappears, 
incentives for a state to maintain its institutional relationship with any particular 
international organization, or to cooperate with other states within the same 
international institution, decrease.  
Cooperation within an alliance defined in terms of external threats would not 
lead to transformation of states' security cultures from realpolitik into non-
realpolitik, for both the decision to join such an alliance is driven by realpolitik 
mentality and that allies' cooperation is directed towards outside states.     
 
1.2. Neo-liberal (Rational) Institutionalism 
Based on a materialistic and rationalistic view of anarchical structure, neo-liberal 
institutionalist insights endeavour to explain how to overcome the conflict-producing 
effects of anarchy through the creation of international organizations/institutions 
(Stein, 1993: 29-69). Even though neo-liberals share with the neo-realists 
individualism and rationalism as the basis of state interests and actions, they part 
with them in their claims that the international structure does not only consist of 
material factors but also some elements of social reality (Wendt, 1999).     
 Rather than the ‘distribution of power’, neo-liberals claim that the 
international structure is informed by the ‘distribution of information’. 
Conceptualized as rationally egoistic ‘utility maximisers’ states care about only their 
absolute gains (Powel, 1991: 701-26; Stein, 1990). The only impediment before their 
cooperation, provided that they share in common interests, is the problem of 
cheating. Who would ensure that states will keep their promises and will not defect? 
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The lack of an internationally centralized authority to enforce rules elevates the 
verification problems and the uncertainties about others’ intentions to the main 
hurdles before coordination and collaboration to take place. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism considers international institutions and regimes as somehow 
intervening variables between the constraining structures of anarchy and foreign 
policy behaviours of states.  
 “The primary functions of institutions, in this framework, are to 
allow reciprocity to operate efficiently. Institutions perform this 
function by providing information about others’ preferences, 
intentions, behaviours, and standards of behaviour. They also 
reduce transaction costs, which are the costs of reaching and 
maintaining agreements. The primary effect of institutions is an 
efficiency effect, in that they allow states to reach agreements that 
move them closer to the Pareto frontier (An equilibrium outcome 
from where none of the parties want to switch to other possible 
combinations of preferences). Institutions, in this rational model, 
do not modify underlying states’ interests. Instead, by changing the 
informational environment and other constraints on states, they 
contribute to the change of states’ strategies in such a way that self-
interested states find it easier to cooperate reliably with one 
another.” (Martin, 1997)  
 Rationalist approaches to international institutions assume that states turn to 
institutions in an attempt to solve cooperation problems. These cooperation problems 
are defined by patterns of state interest. Institutions change patterns of state 
behaviour not by changing fundamental state goals, in this perspective. Instead they 
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change the two key features of rationalist model: strategies and beliefs. By changing 
the rules of the game, and so increasing the costs of particular courses of action and 
decreasing others, institutions lead states to change their strategies in the pursuit of 
consistent goals, such as wealth and power. Institutions also change the informational 
environment. They provide information about others’ preferences, behaviours, and 
intentions. They can also provide information about means-ends relationships, i.e., 
how particular policies will lead to different outcomes.  
 Thought of this way, the impact of international organizations on particular 
security cultures of their members will remain limited because neo-liberal 
approaches assume that states' security identities and interests are taken for granted. 
Therefore, the possibility of change from a realpolitik security identity into a non-
realpolitik one is meagre.    
 States create international institutions in their efforts to overcome barriers 
before their cooperation. The main motivation to do is that states gradually realize 
that they can no longer attain their national interests individually and decide to act 
together with other states, which share the same interests. The subjectively defined 
common national interests dictate the formation of international institutions. If their 
interests coincide, they establish institutions, which would in turn have impact only 
on their strategies, excluding identities and interests. (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 39-
51)        
To the neo-liberal accounts, the reasons for states to join international 
organizations are not confined to the external constraints of the anarchical 
international system. Foreign policy choices do generally follow a process of 
cost/benefit calculation. The benefits that accrue to states are measured in tangible 
terms and the logic that guides states’ actions is instrumental. If there were nothing to 
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gain in financial and material terms, there would not be any legitimate reason to 
remain as a member. Here behaviours would only change due to the material 
costs/benefits calculations.  
What matter here are the side-effects of institutional memberships on 
behaviours of states. Socialization is weak in this situation because states decide to 
cooperate through international organizations out of domestically formed national 
interests. The prospect of collective identity formation is weak here because what 
unite different states are not their collectively held values and identities but their 
common interests defined in material terms. Nevertheless, the impacts of institutional 
affiliation on the interstate relations would be positive. It might be claimed that these 
institutional links would act as constraints on the conflict-producing effects of 
anarchical international system. Transparency, issue-linkages and information 
providing mechanisms of institutions would turn the international system into a more 
predictable place to live (Keohane, 1984: 246). 
In neo-liberal institutionalist explanations of socialization the capability and 
credibility of international institutions to induce cooperative and pro-norm 
behaviours on the part of member-states would be insignificant, for the states in 
question would not feel convinced enough to comply with the behavioural 
requirements of that organization in the absence of identity transformation. Pure 
strategic thinking would prevent them from undergoing a process of identity 
transformation that might otherwise enable them to reap the benefits of institutional 
cooperation in further occasions. In rational-choice understanding of international 
institutions, institutions do not have any significant impact on the formation of 
national preferences, which are influenced either by the structural constraints of 
anarchy or the internal negotiation process between domestic actors. Institutions are 
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regarded as mere tools, which states can utilise in order to materialize their national 
interests.   
According to Risse-Kappen (2000)  
“institutional effects are mostly confined to influencing the 
behaviour of others, while the underlying interests and identities 
are exogenized. Institutions constrain behaviour by affecting cost-
benefit calculations of actors and their preferences over strategies 
to reach one’s goals. Once their fundamental interests change 
and/or rule compliance becomes too costly, however, they are 
expected to defect or to change the institutional rules, if they are 
powerful enough.”  
Actors would comply with norms as long as doing so would help them realize 
their self-interests. The combination of expected material benefits and sanctions 
would induce actors to take institutional constraints into account as factors in 
calculating national preferences. For example if their material and social interests in 
joining an international institution continues, they would adapt to the security norms 
of that institution. However, this adaptation would hardly evolve into full 
socialization since the institution itself would neither teach its norms nor persuade 
the state in question to the legitimacy of its norms. It would only put into place a 
conditionality strategy according to which it would either reward or punish the state 
in question depending on its performance to meet the accession criteria. Because the 
main responsibility would rest with the outside state, this process would not result in 
a successful socialization process. Absent the help of the institution, the upper limits 
of outside state's efforts to comply with the norms of the institution would only imply 
temporal and short-lived adaptations.        
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As articulated by Keaohane and Nye some 30 years ago, countries, which 
develop interdependent relationships among themselves through economics and 
other means, would thrive on peace and cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The 
more they get interdependent, especially through institutional mechanisms, the more 
they would stop seeing each others as rivals and enemies but friends who have a 
stake in the preservation of this interdependency. Transparency, issue linkages and 
increments in the level of trust and certainty regarding intentions would 
automatically lead to the emergence of cooperative relationships. It would be 
assumed that institutional links would lengthen the shadow of the future by 
increasing the level of trust between each other, thus making calculations for short-
term economic and geo-political benefits redundant (Kydd, 2001: 801-828). The 
argument would go that each of them would cooperate in the short-term hoping that 
the other side would reciprocate in the same way. Therefore, a tit-for-tat strategy 
would prevail in the foreign policy implementation.  
The institutional environment as conceived by neo-liberals would be of 
technical in nature. Its social attributes would be weak. NATO and the EU would be 
international platforms where states would exchange their interests and bargain over 
final outcomes. As explained by Moravcsik in his articles on the EU’s integration 
process, the inter-governmental character of the EU would be far ahead of its social 
and supranational features. Maximization of national interests through international 
institutions/organizations would constitute the mode of state behaviour (Moravcsik, 
2000: 473-524; Moravcsik, 2001: 611-628). The EU would be an inter-governmental 
organization that is constructed to serve the collective interests of the member states. 
Accession to the EU would be evaluated from a materially conceived cost/benefit 
perspective in the sense that the membership of any would-be member would 
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become likely if its benefits would exceed its costs. Economic logic would mould the 
way the EU would deal with outside states. Aspirant countries that may prove their 
usefulness to the EU in terms of economic consideration might be let in the club. In 
such a case the economic aspects of the so-called Copenhagen criteria would 
dominate the rationales of the parties concerned.    
NATO would appear here as an inter-governmental alliance, which came into 
being as its members united around the common security interests against external 
threats and dangers. The conclusion that they would not be able to defend their 
externally defined security interests on their own seems to have led to the 
construction of NATO at the first instance. Here the boundaries of collective 
identification would be confined to the cooperation against external threats. Members 
would not be assumed to hold on to similar domestic identities and governing 
structures. Neither would they be presumed to solve their bilateral territorial 
problems as a prerequisite for their membership.  
From a neo-liberal perspective, the promise of NATO in contributing to 
cooperative neighbourly relations, particularly between Turkey and Greece, would 
take place in the following way. As Turkey and Greece would continue to live as 
allies within NATO, the degree of interdependence, transparency and issue-linkages 
would gradually thin down the sources of conflictual relationship between the two 
countries. They would cooperate more easily within NATO so as to solve their 
territorial disputes because the mechanisms of the Alliance would inject them enough 
confidence not to feel suspicious of each other. Their collective security interests 
would also require them to settle their bilateral disputes because living with their 
disputes would negatively affect their capability to stand up to the common threat. 
The degree of their mistrust towards each other would gradually diminish as their 
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joint membership within NATO got solidified. Participating in joint military 
exercises and having access to each other's military capabilities would lead them to 
develop a confident climate in their region, free from doubts on their future 
intentions. Their attention would mainly focus on the common external threat and the 
strategic interests of the Alliance would play far greater roles in the 
conceptualization of their national security interests.  
However, their cooperation within NATO would continue as long as their 
collective external threat lingers on. Once their common threats evaporate, they 
would stop cooperating, for their institutional cooperation within NATO would not 
be dependent on their re-construction of security cultures and identities in such a way 
that they would stop viewing each other as potential rivals and enemies.                
 
1.3. Social Constructivism, Sociological Institutionalism  
The theoretical perspective, which is of significant importance for the structuring of 
this dissertation, is social constructivism (Onuf, 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 
391-416; Checkel, 1998: 324-348; Wendt, 1995: 71-81. These are good summaries 
of constructivism). Common to all constructivist variants are that domestic and 
international structures consist of social (ideational) and material realities and that 
those structures do not only constrain and shape states’ behaviours but also constitute 
their identities and interests. In one sense, constructivism holds on to ideational and 
structural (holistic) viewpoints. Without understanding the intersubjectively created 
social reality, one would not be able to grasp the essence of the material world. 
Meanings are social not material. The distribution of power and material capabilities 
in the system is not enough to explain everything, particularly interstate cooperation 
and conflict. What matters most of the time is the distribution of knowledge. States 
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act towards other states not only on the basis of the distribution of power among 
them. On the contrary, meanings, which are alluded to objects, govern states’ action 
(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 33-75). 
Constructivists claim that nothing is given by the distribution of power and 
material capabilities. In other words it is not automatic that structural variables or 
legacies of conflictual pasts would lead to self-help based realpolitik security 
cultures. Neither self-help system nor power politics is given by anarchy but (re) 
produced by the interaction process among states.  
Constructivists do not gainsay that self-interested actors do not cooperate. 
Instead, they point out that self-interested actors may start cooperating just for 
egoistic interests. However, what they claim further is that this initial cooperation 
arisen out of self-interested motives might later turn into a kind of cooperation where 
cooperative behaviour would take place due to the internalization of the cooperation 
norm by states. To put it another way, cooperation takes place at the first instance 
just for instrumental reasons but later on it starts to take a life of its own. This holds 
true for both states’ behaviour towards each other and towards international 
institutions. A state might think that cooperating with any other state either on a 
state-to-state level or through international institutions would serve its interest. So 
out of instrumental reasons, a cooperative interaction might start (March and Olsen, 
1998: 953). Assuming that this process of instrumental cooperation will continue for 
a long time, states might find themselves in an ongoing cooperative interaction based 
not only on their short-term self-interests but also their evolving belief that 
cooperation is the right thing to do.  
Constructivists attribute an important role to security cultures/identities of 
states in explaining their international behaviours, encompassing of course their 
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security strategies as well as conceptualization of international institutions 
(Katzenstein, 1997; Desch, 1999: 156-180; Berger; 1998). Constructivists point to 
the fact that particular security cultures do not stem from the distribution of material 
power within the international system. A state can display realpolitik/non-realpolitik 
security behaviours not because the anarchical international structure would dictate 
this but because its realpolitik/non-realpolitik security culture would not allow for 
something else (Johnston, 1995: 32-64; Duffield, 1999: 765-804; Banchoff, 1999). 
Depending on the nature of its interaction with other states or particular international 
institutions, representing a group of states, a state can develop a realpolitik security 
culture. For example, having excluded from an ideationally defined international 
institution, the excluded state would more likely view the outside world through 
realpolitik lenses, for what would matter for her would be its difference from others. 
If the interaction process of that state with other extra-state and intra-state actors 
culminated in a realpolitik security culture, the nature of the distribution of the 
material power would not matter a lot in choice of realpolitik security behaviours of 
that state (Lantis, 2002: 87-113).    
The main variable that explains the emergence of an international institution 
at the first instance and then its engagement with outside world is 'identity'. Thought 
of this way, an international institution that plays boundary-making roles within a 
particular community of states would have different characteristics from international 
institutions that operate in line with the expectations of rationalist theories. 
International institutions of the second type do not have such functions, therefore 
their engagement with outside states proceeds in a more problem-free way compared 
to the international institutions of the first type. Representing and re-constituting the 
identity of a particular community of states, such institutions would treat outside 
 31
states more critically, particularly if those states aspire to join the community of 
states in question. Whether they share the same ideational features with the current 
members of the community of states and whether they are willing and capable to 
acquire those traits would constitute the prime variables affecting their prospects to 
join the particular community of states. This process would entail tumultuous stages, 
if the aspirant state claims to represent the identity of the community of states in 
question as yet behaves reluctant to meet the required conditions. In such cases, the 
'otherness' of the outside states would become solidified and the aspirant country 
would likely be seen as a threat to the identity of the community of states, to which it 
aspires to join.     
The fact that what defines an international institution would be the 
collectively held norms and identities among its members such an institution would 
adopt the logic of appropriateness in its dealing with outside states. If their inclusion 
were to be legitimized on identity terms (meaning helping the institution reconstruct 
its identity), then the institution itself would try to do its best to facilitate the 
socialization of the outside state into its norm. In such a case, the institution would 
either teach its norms (assuming that the outside state already shares their legitimacy) 
or try to persuade the outside state into the supremacy of its norms (assuming that the 
outside state also initially argues for the supremacy of its own norms) (Risse-
Kappen, 1999: 529-560). An institution that acts on this logic would perform 
boundary-making roles. Both inclusion and exclusion would be determined by its 
own actions.   
Another important point in this regard is the constructivist view of 
international institutions and organizations as norm creators and norm enforcers. 
Finnemore’s book (1996) is a good example to the role of international organizations 
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in spreading norms. She shows that states interests’ are to an important extent 
influenced and determined by normative preachings of international organizations. 
According to her, international organizations are not only simple tools of reducing 
transaction costs as portrayed by neo-liberals but also purposive entities that are able, 
in some cases, to trump states and their power. They teach states how to value certain 
goals. Systemic norms propagated by international organizations provide states with 
direction and goals for action. However, the success of this process is also dependent 
on whether the outside states are willing to internalize such norms.      
These norms and rules draw the lines for appropriate behaviours. If a state 
were the member of any international community, she has to act according to the 
appropriate standards of behaviours collectively held within that particular 
community. As opposed to the neo-liberal expectation that common interests lead 
states to cooperate, and strategically adopt non-realpolitik security culture, 
constructivism holds that the presence (or lack) of common identities is the driving 
force behind either cooperative or conflictual relationships (Oneal ad Russet, 1998: 
441-468; Oneal and Russet, 1999). The prospects of cooperation based on common 
identities would be far greater than prospects of cooperation based on common 
interests. Thought of this way, if membership in common international institutions 
induced common identities among members, then the quality of their bilateral 
relations would be high with the prospects of cooperation based on collectively held 
identities and cultures increasing.  
International institutions are also sites of authority within the so-called 
anarchic international system. To the constructivist logic, collectively held meanings 
and understandings constitute the sources of authority and legitimacy in interstate 
relations. For authority to exist there does not need to be a centralized government as 
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one see within states. If state actors accord legitimacy to collectively held 
understandings, then authority would arise even in international structure where there 
is not any world government above states (Hurd, 1999: 379-409; Hall, 1997: 591-
622).    
Regarding states’ decision to join international organizations, social 
constructivists offer more detailed answers than the rationalist approaches of neo-
realism and neo-liberalism. To this interpretation, states join international 
organizations either because they have been well persuaded to the appropriateness of 
being there as a member or because the expected social benefits of being within that 
particular international organization would outweigh the social costs of exclusion.  
However, there is a significant difference between the socialization through 
‘full persuasion’ and socialization through ‘social influence’. In the former case, the 
logic of appropriateness would be implemented to its extreme and states in question 
would never problematize the legitimacy of acting in the way the membership 
requirements would dictate. There would be no instrumental logic here (Checkel, 
2001: 553-588). In the second case the instrumental logic would still prevail, even 
though in a different way. It would not be the material but social benefits that count 
(Johnston, 2001: 487-515).  
In socialization through social influence states generally seem eager to join 
international institutions in order to reap the benefits of membership in some 
exclusive clubs. Hoping that membership would bring to them additional prestige 
and increase their worldwide reputation in the eyes of others, states pursue an 
instrumental logic in asking membership in those platforms. As is clear with social 
rewards coming from membership, states also take into consideration the negative 
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consequences of being excluded from those platforms. The expected shame and 
opprobrium in the eyes of the others would motivate them to act pro-socially.  
Even though both of these rationalities better serve the socialization process 
than the logic of material costs/benefits, the end result would to a great extent hinge 
on the logic of action on the part of the institution itself directed towards outside 
states. Absent teaching and persuasion efforts on the part of international institutions, 
the efforts of outside states would not be enough for the completion of the 
socialization process in a successful way.  
States acting on the ideational logic would overvalue their long-term interest 
over their short-term losses. Believing that being recognized as a particular type of 
state would generate both social and material interests later, those states would not 
care much about their short-term losses if the process of socialization in to that 
identity entails some short-term material losses.   
 
3.3.1. Security Communities 
Looking from a social-constructivist perspective, one would define the western 
international community as represented and re-constructed by the European Union 
and NATO as a security community, whose potential role/capacity to contribute to 
Turkish-Greek cooperation would become higher than other conceptualizations of 
the same entity (Lucarelli, 2002). However, this would be so, if and only if both 
Turkey and Greece were to be considered as legitimate parties of this community 
(Moustakis and Sheehan, 2002: 69-85).  
As an extension of this benign liberal thinking into the literature of the 
discipline of International Relations, some scholars have convincingly argued that 
institutional relationships among states might even lead to the formation of pluralistic 
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security communities. Based on the path-breaking study of Karl Deutsch (1957), 
Adler (2001: 253) defines security communities as  
“ ‘cognitive regions’ or ‘community regions’, which are regional 
system of meanings, and not limited to a specific geographic place. 
They are made up of people whose common identities and interests 
are constituted by shared understandings and normative principles 
other than territorial sovereignty and (a) who actually communicate 
and interact across state borders, (b) who are actively involved in 
the political life of an international or transnational region and 
engaged in the pursuit of regional purposes, and (c) who, as 
citizens of states impel the constituent states of the community-
region to act as agents of regional good, on the basis of regional 
system of governance”   
These scholars contemplate that through a process of learning and functional 
integration a group of countries might end up having a security community among 
each other where it would become inconceivable even to think of resorting to arms in 
settlement of disputes. In other words, it is hoped that dependable expectations of 
peaceful relations would take place with furthering of collective identification 
process. It is assumed that as time goes by, the more states interact with each other 
through institutional mechanisms, the more likely they would proceed to the 
achievement of collective identification. So as to speak, a so-called moral community 
based on collectively shared values, interests and understanding would consist of 
states that would identify with the well-being of each other (Adler and Barnett, 
1997).  
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Those who adhere to such beliefs further argue that the anarchical structure of 
neo-realist forecasting advocated by Waltz would cease to exist with the elimination 
of uncertainty regarding the intentions of others and the collective identification with 
the well-being of the others in the system. Neither the relative gains concerns nor the 
uncertainty about the intentions of others would continue to impede the realization of 
cooperation. On the contrary cooperation would be easier with the surface of 
absolute gains and the lengthening of the shadow of the future. Peaceful settlement 
of disputes, coordination of policy choices, de-securitization of potential security 
issues, and de-militarization of security strategies will be the collectively held norms 
in security communities (Cronin, 1999: 13). Membership of two rival states in such a 
community would in the long run move them closer to each other in terms of their 
security identities, interests and behaviours.   
However, one should not obscure the fact that the above-mentioned positive 
impacts of security communities only take place among the members of such 
communities. Such effects would not apply to a pair of countries, one of which is 
already a member of such a security community whereas the other is excluded on the 
basis of identity-related considerations.  
In discussing the stages in the formation of security communities Barnett and 
Adler (1997: 29-65) place a great importance on the international organizations as 
factors facilitating the transition to a security community. The interest in examining 
how international organizations indirectly promote other factors that contribute to, 
and directly promote, mutual trust, shared identity elevates four reasons. First, 
security and non-security organizations can contribute to the development of trust 
among their members by establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms, 
and sanctions to enforce those norms. Secondly, international organizations make 
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possible state action by virtue of their trust-building properties. Organizations, in this 
important respect, are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors 
learn and perhaps ‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the situation and 
normative understandings are.  
Thirdly, international organizations may be conducive to the formation of 
mutual trust and collective identities, because of their often underestimated capacity 
to ‘engineer’ the very conditions – for example cultural homogeneity, a belief in 
common fate, and norms of unilateral self-restraint – that assist in their development. 
International organizations, for instance, may be able to foster the creation of a 
‘regional culture’ around commonly held attributes, such as, for example, 
democracy, developmentalism, and human rights.    
What is important as far as such communities are concerned is the 
replacement of the ‘logic of consequentiality’ by the ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
(March and Olsen, 2001: 943-969). In the former case states tend to calculate the 
possible consequences of their actions and on the basis of those consequences they 
opt for the strategy, which they think will give to them the most optimum result. In 
other words, a calculation of costs and benefits of possible courses of action prevail 
in policy formulation.  
In contrast to this, the logic of appropriateness  
"…assumes that states will undertake rule-guided behaviours. These 
kinds of behaviours differ from instrumentally rational behaviours in 
that actors try to ‘do the right thing’ rather than maximising or 
optimising their pre-given preferences. The logic of appropriateness 
entails that actors try to figure out the appropriate rule in a given 
social situation. Normative rationality implies constitutive effects of 
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social norms and institutions, since these rules not only regulate 
behaviour, i.e., have causal effects, but they also define social 
identities.” (Risse-Kappen, 2000) 
From a social constructivist view, what seems to exist in Europe today is that 
there is a security community there, whose main pillars are NATO and the European 
Union. They would act to re-construct the particular identity of this community of 
states. This approach assumes that the states that make up this community have come 
around the norms, rules, values and principles, which all collectively share and find 
legitimate. (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 491-517; Schimmelfennig, 1999: 198-234). 
Therefore, the process of outside states to join this community would become 
thornier than the rationalist theories would expect to be.   
A social constructivist might provide the following account in regard to 
NATO and its potential role to contribute to peaceful neighbourly relations between 
Greece and Turkey. There is consensus among constructivism-oriented academics 
that NATO has been one of the two pillars of the Western international community, 
which is based on the collective identity of liberalism and democracy. Risse-Kappen 
(1995), Schimmelfening (2000: 111), and Wallender (2000) argue that NATO was 
first established and then persisted with two purposes in mind: while the first has 
been to provide the territorial defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area against the 
communist threat whereas the second has been to preserve and promote the liberal 
democratic identity of the West. The so-called ‘Article 2’ and ‘Article 5’ missions of 
NATO were denoting these two complementary missions.* More than the 
aggregation of individual capabilities, the membership in NATO would imply that 
the member states are also ‘allies’, which would in turn lead to an understanding that 
                                                           
* One can see these article at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm  
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neither of the allies should be fearful or suspicious of any increase in the military 
capabilities of their partners.  
As to the security community character of NATO, Duffield (1994: 369-388; 
1994/1995: 763-787) discusses this issue within the context of NATO’s persistence 
into the post-Cold War era. He refers to the smoothing function of the Alliance 
membership on members’ behaviours and identities. Arguing that the presence of 
NATO in Europe helped stabilize the interstate relations Western Europe, Duffield 
implies that prospective members of the Alliance would enjoy peaceful inter-alliance 
relations.  
“By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional 
mechanism for the development of common security policies, 
NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations 
among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable”.  
He further claims that (1994/1995: 767) from very early in its history, NATO 
has played an important role in smoothing relations among its member. Through 
reassuring its members that they have nothing to fear of each other, NATO is 
claimed by Duffield to have eliminated the logic of security dilemma in Europe. Its 
presence is also claimed to have eliminated misperception and misunderstandings 
from the relations among its members.  
Wiping out suspicions and mistrust from the scene, NATO is claimed to have 
contributed to the emergence of security community in Western Europe mainly 
because it existed as a ‘democratic security community’ (Willimans and Neumann, 
2001: 357-387).  By providing a high-degree of intra alliance transparency, NATO is 
assumed to facilitate cooperation among its members in the European theatre. NATO 
is also thought of contributing to peaceful relations among its members through its 
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mechanisms to de-nationalise security policies. Intra-alliance consultation 
mechanisms, participation into jointly planned military exercises, and socialization 
into a NATO culture are claimed to have led to the emergence of a zone of peace in 
Europe.  
Risse-Kappen (1996: 357-399) refers to the liberal and democratic norms of 
the Alliance, which have been collectively held and shared by NATO members, in 
arguing for the success of the Alliance both in keeping peace in Europe during the 
Cold War era and in persisting into 1990s. He also argues that NATO has been a 
community of democratic states where the founding members externalised their 
democratic and liberal norms of domestic politics onto the level of NATO. That is 
why NATO was founded and persisted into the post Cold War Era surviving the end 
of the Cold War.  
Looking from this perspective, one would argue that coexisting within the 
same institutional environment, being integrated into NATO's unified military 
structure, participating in various activities as partners around the same table, 
undertaking regular high-level meetings and periodical gatherings in Brussels, 
Turkey and Greece would be able to develop a new understanding of each other 
based on friendship, not enemies. In other words their joint NATO membership 
would lengthen the shadow of the future in their bilateral relations.  
However, in contrast to these constructivist accounts of the Alliance, the 
Cold-War era suggested that the strategic culture of NATO was based on strategic-
security concerns rather than the ideational functions of the Alliance as defined in the 
Article four of NATO's founding treaty. To this understanding the central focus of 
the Alliance would be on the central Europe, particularly on the borders' of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The main functions of the Northern and Southern 
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flanks were to contribute to the defence of the central front (Kurth, 2001: 5-16). 
Second, the defence of Europe was based on the projection of the American power 
onto the continent. The US nuclear power was the linchpin of the NATO's efforts to 
defend and the preserve the western way of life (Aybet, 1997).  
Third, the conventional military capabilities of the European members of 
NATO were of great use for the realization of the strategic goals of the Alliance vis-
à-vis the Soviet Union. This became more visible following the adoption of the 
flexible response strategy in the early 1960s.  
Fourth, the collective security guarantee of the Alliance, the so-called article 
5 commitments, was not as certain as the text reads. The military capabilities of the 
European members of the Alliance had barely allowed those allies to look after their 
own security.  
Finally, being a part of NATO did not necessitate member countries to satisfy 
some political and ideational conditions as well as to internalize democracy and 
liberalism. Contribution to the Western security interests through military 
capabilities and geographical assets most of the time counted enough for 
membership. Though the preamble of the Founding Treaty and the Articles 2 and 4 
of the Washington Treaty of 1949 refer to the normative basis of the Alliance, the 
main priority of the alliance was to defend the territorial sovereignty of the members 
against the external threat, the Soviet Union. The characteristic feature of NATO was 
its being of a defence organization. When the Article 5 regulation was constituting 
the essential identity of NATO, neither intra-alliance disputes nor out-of-area 
contingencies were given significant emphasis. In case allies had territorial disputes 
among each other, the NATO scripture supported the view that they could take their 
differences anywhere except the North Atlantic Council.  
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Conceived in these terms, the identity transforming effects of NATO 
membership used to be meagre. Externally defined security communities, such as 
NATO, would be inadequate in transforming the identity of their members along 
collective internal characteristics. In such cases, member countries would be joining 
forces in order to resist an external threat without feeling the need to converge their 
domestic characteristics along common values and principles. When the security 
culture of the Alliance was defined in such a realpolitik manner so as to contain the 
communist danger through external balancing efforts and hard-core military 
capabilities, it would have been difficult for Greece and Turkey to transform their 
realpolitik security cultures into non-realpolitik security cultures.     
Although Reiter (2001) argues that NATO as an organization has nothing to 
do with promoting democracy and contributing to the establishment of liberal-
democratic regimes in members countries due to the lack of the policy of credible 
punishment and promising rewards, Wallneder (2000) attributes the reasons for 
NATO’s persistence into the post-Cold War era to its general and specific assets 
designed for the purposes of strengthening intra-alliance trust and stability and thus 
consolidating the liberal-democratic regimes in member countries.  
Similarly a social constructivist would likely regard the European Union as 
an international institution that has acted as a community-building agent in Europe 
and contributed to the emergence of a security community in the continent, at least in 
its western part, around collectively held liberal-democratic norms. This sort of 
accounts would also define the EU's integration process as a supranational activity, 
rather than strategic/rational interstate cooperation (Pollack: 2001: 221-44; Borzel 
and Risse-Kappen, 2000). In view of this particular account, the promise of the EU to 
contribute to cooperative and peaceful relations in Europe would be hight. 
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As the socialization and the EU-integration literatures in IR theory would 
assume, one should have witnessed a cooperation process between Greece and 
Turkey as they have proceeded with their integration process with the EU. 
Socialization into the collective European identity, particularly regarding foreign and 
security policy domains, would be presumed to lead both countries to converge both 
the processes and content of their foreign policy making on the EU level (Diez, 2000; 
Schimmelfennig, 2000: 109-139). Both of them would gradually internalize the 
‘coordination’, ‘de-securitization’ and ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’ norms of the 
European Union. The European Union, having a 'power of attraction' would radiate 
its norms both to member and candidate states and determine the confines of 
appropriate state behaviour in Europe (Manners, 2002: 235-58; Christou, 2002). 
Assuming that Greece and Turkey would converge on the norms of the post-modern 
European Union they would settle their disputes once and for all in ways short of 
threat and use of war.   
Besides, their Europeanization processes would result in the emergence and 
consolidation of democratic reigns in both countries and this would in turn lead them 
to adopt more cooperative and friendly attitudes towards each other (Epaminondas, 
2001: 161-175; Youngs, 2001). As democracies seldom, if ever, go to war against 
each other, Greece and Turkey would do their best to avoid the risks and dangers of 
aggravating their relations and sometimes escalating their tensions to the crisis points 
from where it would be difficult for them to escape (Pridham, 2002: 953-973).  
In parallel to their internalization of the democratic culture/norms and the 
gradual establishment of democratic political-institutional structures, their tendency 
to utilize peaceful methods of conflict resolution would increase and the increasing 
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weight of the public opinion would dictate more cautionary, less costly and more 
cooperative outcomes (Oneal and Russet, 1999: 1-37).  
As they become more 'European' in their national identities, they would more 
easily reach accommodating positions regarding their disputes. With the passage of 
time, they would internalize the idea that they need to solve their territorial disputes 
over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus in order to be counted as real members of the 
European political security community where the threat and use of force are treated 
as outdated and illegitimate state conducts.  
Gradually, the traces of realpolitik security cultures between each other 
would be replaced by a new cooperative logic that would enable them to view each 
other as more friends and allies than enemies and rivals. Their tendency to view their 
respective gains on absolute, rather than relative terms, would increase in parallel to 
the development of a security community between each other (Johnston, 2001: 487-
515).  
In general, the EU would contribute to this above-mentioned positive 
outcome through the twin processes of enlargement and integration, the first with 
respect to Turkey and the second with respect to Greece (Biscop, 2003: 183-197). 
Holding the key to the benefits of membership, the EU would be in an ideal position 
to help Greece and Turkey fundamentally alter their preference orderings in such a 
way that both countries would gradually believe that their gains from mutual 
cooperation within the EU framework would far outweigh the returns of their current 
conflictual approach towards each other. By conditioning Turkey's eventual 
membership to its performance in adopting democracy and friendly neighbourly 
relations, and by indirectly pressuring Greece to come to a settlement with Turkey in 
order to qualify for first-class EU membership in the Euro-zone, the European 
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Union, would be in a privileged position to enhance cooperative relations between 
Greece and Turkey (Smith, 2000: 33-46). When this conditionality policy combined 
with the Greek and Turkish aspirations to become part of the Union, the overall 
impact of the European Union on the development of cooperative Turkish-Greek 
relations would be significantly positive.  
The post-modern/post-national character of the EU's international/security 
identity would also increase the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-
Greek disputes in the 1990s in non-realpolitik ways (Stefanova, 2002: 156-181). 
Such a conceptualization of the European Union would certainly foresee Turkey’s 
eventual membership. Turkey’s exclusion from the EU on the basis of the logic of 
appropriateness would never be a reality given that the post-modern EU would not 
define its identity on spatial ways.   Member states would be required not only to 
harmonise their security and military policies but also the whole range of economic, 
social, interior and legal systems. A supranational integration process, the EU’s 
integration process would certainly imply that a far deeper common identity would 
percolate down the member states. In one sense the logic of Waltzian anarchy would 
cease to function within the EU given that externally and internally similar units 
would cooperate more than conflict with each other (Checkel, 2001: 553-88).  
Construed as such, Weaver’s conceptualization of the European Union’s 
integration process as the most important catalyst for the security of the continent 
merits a special attention (Waever, 1995: 389-432). Within the EU, member states 
gradually converged on common liberal and democratic norms. The EU's integration 
process started to change the rules of the old interstate game in the European theatre. 
At least within the new Europe, the EU acted as a security community that rendered 
the logic of balance-of-power politics redundant. France and Germany, the two 
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archrivals, could reach a secure and stable relationship within the EU as the 
integration process contributed to the emergence of an embryonic collective identity 
between each other.  
The role of the EU's integration process in the 'politicization' of the main 
security issues through the moving of them from the arena of 'security' to that of 
'politics' has been immense in the materialization of security in Europe. If potential 
‘security’ issues were framed as ‘political’ issues, then the need to solve them by the 
threat and use of force would drop out. The need to solve political problems would 
require a domestic discussion process with the procedures of engagement and 
consensus-building privileged over containment and use of force. The hope was that 
if Europeans achieved to ‘politicize’, rather than ‘securiticize’, the potential security 
issues in the domestic arena, then they would more easily repeat the same practice in 
the international arena (Waever, 1998: 45-63). With its norms of 'peace,' 'liberty,' 
'human rights,' 'rule of law,' and 'pluralist democracy' the EU environment would 
allow for a more inclusive 'self-other' relationship to take root among the members 
(Waever, 1997: 69-118; Smith and Timmins, 2000: 80-90).  
In contrast to highly centralized political structures, in polities where 
sovereignty is diffused, possible security problems would be more easily seen as 
political issues because people would tend to reach compromise solutions to such 
problems through the processes of discussion and consensus building. Thus, 'more 
integration' and 'EU centralisation' at the Brussels-level would result in greater 
collective identity, which would in turn result in the emergence of 'diffusion of 
sovereignty' and greater security. The passage from 'security government' to 'security 
governance' within the EU would erode the primacy of 'state' and 'military issues' in 
conceptualizing security and this would in turn contribute to the formation of 
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collective identities around similar norms and common functional interests as the 
best possible means to deal with the security challenges of today's globalized world. 
The promise of the EU's 'security governance' model would increase when the 
aspirant countries are required to internalize this model (Krahman, 2003: 5-26).    
The promise of the EU would be facilitated by the allegedly post-modern 
character of the European Union, particularly within the context of EU's accession 
criteria and enlargement strategy. To this conceptualization, the EU has not clear-cut 
frontiers and it expands to include countries that meet the requirements of the 
accession process in a technical way (Grabbe, 2001: 1013-1031; Grabbe, 2002: 249-
268). If countries, which aspire to join the EU, meet the EU's technical conditions, 
then accession will follow immediately. The fact that the EU's past is not defined in 
geographical-spatial manner but by temporal ways would be seen encouraging in this 
regard. The fact that the EU's other is its past, not any non-EU state, would make it 
likely for such countries as Turkey to accede to the EU once they meet the admission 
criteria (Waever, 1998: 250-88). The post-modern understanding of the EU's 
accession process also holds that the EU treats currently non-EU members as 'less-
European' rather than 'non-European'. If so, there does not exist any taken for granted 
reason not to join the EU, except rationally unconceivable cases, once aspirant 
countries internalize EU's international/security identity.  
The lack of a pure state-centric/realpolitik security culture within the EU 
would certainly shape the EU's engagement with the third states, as the accession 
criteria is understood as an EU attempt at dealing with the security challenges around 
the EU's periphery. Rather than erecting walls and excluding potential conflict-areas 
from its security community in a neo-realist inspired realpolitik security 
understanding, the EU engages such areas through a detailed accession process 
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(Cameron, 1998; Emerson, 2002). When the ultimate goal of this process were 
defined to contribute to the EU's self international/security identity by making the 
incorporation of such places into the EU's security community conditional on their 
transformation along the EU's terms, Turkey's accession to the EU would be only a 
question of 'when', not 'if'. If so, the incentives on the part of Turkey to bury the 
hatches with Greece along the EU accession process would increase.              
In view of the above-mentioned theoretical accounts, the following sections 
of the dissertation will critically analyse these theoretical expectations, particularly 
those of the security community approach that defines the European Union as a post-
modern entity. It is going to be demonstrated that the expected positive impacts of 
the post-modern EU on the outcome of Turkish-Greek relations have not taken place 
simply because the way the EU has approached Turkey prevented them from taking 
place.  
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CHAPTER 2: The NATO-Turkey-Greece Triangle  
2.1. The Cold War Era 
This chapter seeks to explore the reasons why their joint membership in NATO could 
not help Turkey and Greece resolve their long-standing territorial disputes in a 
problem solving win-win framework, based on the transformation of their realpolitik 
security cultures into non-realpolitik one. It is the main contention of this chapter 
that neither Turkey and Greece succeeded in adjusting their behaviours to the needs 
and expectations of each other, nor could they develop collective identities and 
interests that might in the final analysis have enabled them to form a security 
community in their region and solve their disputes once and for all.  
From a theoretical perspective, in measuring the role of NATO to contribute 
to the resolution of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes and to the maintenance of 
bilateral cooperation, one could safely argue that the expectations of the sociological-
institutionalism would hold more value than the rationalist-institutionalism. As the 
former theoretical approach assumes, Turkey and Greece would gradually converge 
their national identities and interests on the basis of the collectively held norms 
within the Alliance. They would gradually internalize the idea that it would be the 
most appropriate thing for them to hold on to the cooperative security approach and 
to settle their territorial disputes in a win-win framework by utilising the peaceful 
methods of conflict resolution. Long-term cooperation on the basis of friendship 
would be assured. They would also adapt their foreign and security policy doctrines 
to those of the Alliance and this would in turn prevent them from viewing each other 
as threats to their security. They would also share in the idea that living with 
territorial disputes within a NATO, defined as a pluralistic security community, 
would no longer be justified.                                    
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2.1.1. The Reasons for Failure  
The role of the Alliance during the Cold War era in helping Greece and Turkey 
establish a long-term cooperative relationship did not prove promising for a number 
of reasons. First, the international/security identity of the Alliance did not necessitate 
a concerted and committed approach on the part of the United States, as the most 
powerful country in NATO, towards the resolution of their disputes. The NATO of 
the Cold War era was mainly a military alliance that came into existence around the 
US goal to contain Soviet communism (Rupp, 2000: 153-176). While the security 
culture of the Alliance was based on the realpolitik security strategy of containment, 
it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to think of the possibility that 
membership in NATO would spread the norms of non-realpolitik security culture. 
The Alliance did neither have intra-alliance conflict-resolution mechanisms nor 
strongly emphasised the necessity of the resolution of territorial disputes among 
members as a precondition for the continuation of their membership. Turkey and 
Greece were simply admitted to membership because of their strategic and military 
contributions to the security interests of the Alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
(Kuniholm, 1980). The rhetorical usage of normative arguments by the then US 
President, Truman, only aimed at convincing the reluctant US Congress and some 
European allies to the need of Turkey and Greece's incorporation into the Alliance 
(Frazier, 1999: 229-251). 
The Alliance's major area of concern remained to be Western and Central 
Europe and the security concerns resulting from the Eastern Mediterranean region 
did not receive the high attentions of the Alliance. Neither the alliance could devote a 
concerted action to territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey nor a 
comprehensive approach has been developed independent of the Cold War era 
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strategic limitations. The technical and mechanical approach of the Alliance towards 
particular Turkish-Greek disputes did not contribute to their ever-lasting resolution 
(Stearns, 1992: 8-24). All Turkish-Greek disputes gained meaning in Washington 
only in terms of their possible implications on the struggle with the communist threat 
(Slengesol, 2000: 96-129). The costs of sorting out comprehensive solution packages 
seemed to be higher than adopting a low-key attitude in an effort to defuse the 
tensions. The consideration was that it would have cost the alliance the most if one of 
the parties felt aggrieved by a specific set of propositions of the Alliance and in turn 
left the Club.   
As long as their military commitment towards the defence of the Euro-
Atlantic security community against the Soviet threat was in place, the damaging 
repercussions of their disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus were somehow 
tolerated. The most important concern of the US governments during the Cold War 
era was to prevent Turkey and Greece from fighting each other, as well as to forestall 
Soviet attempts at meddling in any intra-NATO dispute (Wilkinson, 1999). 
It was assumed by many NATO officials that any undertaking to resolve 
Greek-Turkish differences is a no-win proposition for the Alliance. Besides, if 
NATO proved its impartiality by maintaining an attitude of detached concern, it was 
sometimes argued, Athens and Ankara would eventually realize that the alliance is 
not going to bail them out. Only then would they accept the responsibility for 
resolving their own differences (Stearns, 1992).  
 Second, the dynamics of Turkey and Greece's relationships within the 
Alliance have delayed, if not prevented, the process of democratization in both 
countries in the liberal-pluralist sense (Vamvakas, 2000). The American 
governments of the Cold War era did not hide their desire to work with anti-left and 
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royalist governments in Greece. They were also content with the miliary coups in 
Turkey, for they thought that the generals would keep Turkey on the orbit of the 
Alliance while eradicating the roots of communism and internal instability within the 
country. For example, while the European Union members froze Greece's association 
agreement during the 1967-1974 junta era, the high level US figures did not hesitate 
to visit Athens in order to lend legitimacy to the military regime (Danapoulos, 1983: 
485-507). In the same manner, while the EU members suspended their relations with 
Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the Americans expressed their 
satisfaction with the regime and could strike a defence and economic cooperation 
agreement with Turkey in 1983 (Dagi, 2001: 51-68). They thought that it would have 
become easier for them to work with such governments because their legitimacy 
would have been emanated from the close relations with the Allies in NATO. To 
Americans, such governments would have become more predisposed to take care of 
the interests of the Alliance, rather than pursing their own national priorities.  
 NATO memberships of Greece and Turkey resulted in the prevalence of 
military elites in both countries. When this was the case, the security elites 
considered the membership of their country within the western international 
community, as represented by NATO, on the basis of internationalism and strategic-
security cooperation (Karaosmanoglu, 1993). They also got used to think militarily in 
the formulation of foreign and security policies. This enhanced the primacy of 
realpolitik thinking.    
  Third, the US' involvement in the bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes was 
predicated on the assumption that if the United States wanted to see a stable 
environment she would have to value the military balance between Greece and 
Turkey, taking utmost care not to discriminate one against the other. This was, and 
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still is, a realpolitik way of reaching peace or stability in interstate relations. When 
the US viewed the mainstay of Turkish-Greek stability based on military balance in 
the region, Greece and Turkey were strongly affected by this in the formulation of 
their security policies vis-à-vis each other. This approach decreased the credibility of 
the Alliance in both countries. The Turks tended to interpret the US' 7 to 10 policy in 
terms of military sales to Turkey and Greece as the confirmation of the Turkish 
threat by the Americans. The fact that it was the Greeks, who first pleaded the 
Americans with adopting such a stance on the basis of the so-called menacing 
Turkish threat in the East, the Turks did not see the US logic towards the region as 
impartial but lopsided in favour of Greece. Likewise, the Greeks would have also 
interpreted any whatsoever inaction on the side of Americans as the US' acquiesce in 
Turkey's greater geo-political value, as well as the legitimacy of Turkish arguments.      
Fourth, the fact that geo-strategic position and military power of members 
defined their bargaining powers within the Alliance did shore up Turkey's relatively 
more important status over Greece. Internal mechanisms of the Alliance made the 
power disparity between Greece and Turkey very clear, particularly to the Greeks. 
This has contributed to the Greek thinking that any NATO-framed solution of the 
Cyprus and the Aegean disputes would likely favour Turkey at the expense of Greece 
(Papacosma, 1985: 189-213).  
Another factor affecting the power disparity between the countries was that 
the way Turkey was accepted to the Alliance showed some differences from the way 
Greece was let in. It was the feeling of necessity that led the Americans to argue for 
Turkey's incorporation into the Alliance, particularly in order to convince some of 
the reluctant European states (Leffer, 1985: 807-825). The Greeks also thought that 
the Alliance valued Turkey's membership more than that of Greece (Conalis-Kontas, 
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2001: 385-405). To the majority of the Greeks while the choice to elevate Turkey’s 
status to membership in the Alliance from a bilateral security guarantee was radical 
in the eyes of the Americans, Greece’s NATO membership on the other hand was 
regarded by the same Americans as the continuation of the vassal-lord relationship 
dating back to the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The Greek politicians of the time did 
also regard Greece’s NATO membership as the continuation of the American 
patronage in Greece (Legg and Roberts, 1997: 55-71). 
 Although it was argued that NATO in general and the United States in 
particular embraced a kind of low-key policy in order not to offend both Greece and 
Turkey, it is generally the case that Turkey appeared as the country that the western 
community did not want to antagonize the most. For instance, when the Turkish 
government was somehow implicated in the September 1955 events in Istanbul, that 
took place in response to the news that Ataturk’s house in Greece was bombed by the 
Greeks, the US Secretary of State Dulles preferred to send identical telegrams to the 
leaders of both countries. When this was heard, the Greeks were infuriated. They 
thought that although the Turkish government was the real responsible for the events 
in Istanbul, why putting both countries under the same basket (Stearns, 1992).  
 In the face of such allegedly pro-Turkish leanings of the Alliance, the major 
dilemma for the Greek foreign policy makers within the Alliance was how to strike a 
balance between the two competing strategies, to favour better Turkish-Greek 
relations in accordance with the strategic priorities of NATO on the one hand and to 
work for the realization of the unification of Cyprus with the mainland Greece in 
accordance with the Hellenism ideology on the other (Coufoudakis, 1985: 185-217). 
While the rightist Greek governments leaned towards the first option, the leftist ones 
tilted to the second.    
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Fifth, right from the beginning of their membership in NATO, the more 
bilateral-less multilateral character of the security relations within NATO made 
Turkey and Greece feel doubtful about the collective security guarantee of the 
Alliance. The main reason behind their skepticism emanated from two factors. The 
first concerns the way how some northern European were so reluctant as to see 
Turkey and Greece within NATO. The second pertains to the fact that the military 
dominance of the US within the Alliance catapulted the Americans to the position of 
final arbiter to decide whether or not to offer security guarantee.   
Besides, just as the United States established strong bilateral security 
relations with other members of the Alliance, Turkey and Greece also signed such 
treaties with the United States. Such a character of NATO membership made the 
resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes difficult for the main reason that the United 
States became a natural party to the conflict as both countries lobbied their cause in 
Washington. This trilateral character of the disputes made their resolution difficult 
(Kurth, 2001: 5-16). When it was the case that the continuation of the alliance’s 
functions in the Eastern Mediterranean were made possible in the face of lingering 
Turkish-Greek problems, no need aroused in the Western circles to come up with 
serious and detailed solution proposals. 
 Sixth, the Turkish and Greek feeling that the United States and other major 
members of the Alliance did not care about their problems and were content with the 
maintenance of their conflictual relationship at the tolerable and manageable limits 
seems to have put Greece and Turkey into a position in which they tended to vie for 
the resources and benefits of the alliance in order to strengthen their bargaining 
positions via-a-vis each other. Because the importance of allies within NATO, 
particularly in the eyes of the Americans, varied according to their military 
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capabilities and geo-political significance, such kind of thinking fuelled rivalry in 
and around the Aegean Sea. This was a clear realpolitik outcome caused by the 
constitutive principles of the Alliance. The mentality that I could better represent the 
Western interests in the region had inevitably pitted Turkey and Greece against each 
other as contenders and rivals (Tayfur, 2002: 13-51). 
 Both Greeks and Turks, in other words, considered that NATO undervalued 
their membership, albeit for different reasons.  Paradoxically, the alliance's hands-off 
policy, although intended to project NATO’s impartiality and encourage Athens and 
Ankara to settle their own differences, seemed to have had the opposite effect. Both 
capitals were led to interpret NATO’s attitude as proof that the organization did not 
take them seriously and, accordingly, to see less prospects for rewards from the 
alliance, should they adopt more flexible policies, or penalties, should they fail to do 
so. It is also logical to suppose that what Greeks and Turks alike viewed as the 
relatively low priority accorded to the southeastern flank gave them little reason to 
place NATO priorities above their own when it came to force planning and 
deployment, weapons procurement and other aspects of their national defence policy. 
Seventh, the American guarantee that the alliance would defend them against 
the Soviets made them concentrate on regional foreign and security policy issues. 
When the first priority of their foreign policy, e.g. the security guarantee against the 
Soviet Union, was met by the Americans, Greece and Turkey became able to pay 
their attention to their regional security issues more easily. They did not feel the need 
to resolve their disputes as part of their effort to resist the communism. This shows 
that Turkey and Greece did even fail to cooperate with each other within NATO on 
the basis of their collective interests. The neo-liberal expectation of cooperation in 
times of collective interests did not materialize in and around the Aegean Sea. This to 
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a great extent led them to view the Alliance as a strategic instrument to serve their 
pre-conceived national interests, rather than as an institutional platform to materialize 
their collective security interests (Krebs, 1999: 171-201). They gradually believed 
that their support to the US's efforts to contain the Soviet Union in Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean region would in return beget a holistic US support to their 
every single security policy.  
 Examples to the instrumental usage of NATO’s platforms for the pursuit of 
national interests abound. The first of such examples took place in 1954 when 
Greece argued for the establishment of a NATO patrol-boat base in the island of 
Leros, one of the Dodeconese islands. When NATO headquarter in Brussels tilted 
towards this idea, Turkey rejected this plan by arguing that such kind of an 
establishment would be in breach of the 1923 Lausanne and 1947 Paris treaties, 
which stipulated that the Dodeconese Islands would remain under the Greek 
sovereignty provided that they be demilitarized (Iatrides, 2000: 32-46). 
  In this vein, the most important reason why Greece wanted to re-join the 
Alliance in the late 1970s was to check Turkey's growing influence within NATO 
and to prevent the strategic balance in the Aegean Sea from favouring Turkey. 
Rather than helping Greece join her forces with Turkey against the Soviet threat in 
the North, the Greek governments evaluated Greece’s NATO membership as the 
main external security guarantee against any possible Turkish threat (Loulis, 1985: 
375-391). This was made evident in the late 1970s when the Karamanlis government 
came to the conclusion that Turkey’s continuing NATO membership in the absence 
of Greece would only damage Greek security interests. Indeed, one of the significant 
benefits of NATO membership to the Greek government was that it ‘Europeanized’ 
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to some extent the small but controversial US military presence in Greece (Stearns, 
1992). 
 Both countries tried to control the strategic area of the Aegean Sea through 
the strategic and military plans of the Alliance. Turkey did not agree to the inclusion 
of Lemnos and other Aegean islands in the strategic plans of NATO and argued that 
if Turkey were given the operational control over at least the half of the Aegean Sea, 
then she might better preserve the interests of the Alliance. Besides, Turkey made the 
case that fortification of the eastern Aegean islands would be in breach of the legal 
texts that regulate the status of those islands. By constantly vetoing the inclusion of 
the Lemnos Island in the planned military exercises of the Alliance in the region, 
Turkey hoped to prevent Greece from materializing her goals through NATO 
(Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 85-118). 
Greece, on the other hand, was captive of the same mentality and tried to 
demonstrate to the Allies, other than Turkey of course, that the fortification of the 
eastern Aegean islands would provide a strategic depth to Greece in defending 
Greece’s (therefore the Alliance’s) territory against threats coming form the North. 
The Defence Doctrine of 1985 made the essential points of the Greek strategy very 
clear. If those islands were fortified, the defence of NATO’s interests against threats 
coming from either the North through land operations or from the Soviet’s Fifth 
Escadra in the Aegean Sea would be materialized in a much better way. However, 
one should not obscure the point that if NATO agreed to these strategic 
considerations, Greece would have also been able to deter any Turkish threat coming 
from the East. Irrespective of the existence of any serious Turkish threat coming 
from the other side of the Aegean, the main underlying motivation behind Greece’s 
attempts at selling out its ‘defence in depth’ strategy to the Alliance was to deter 
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Turkey (Coufoudakis, 1988: 35-44; Varvitsioitis, 1992: 11-14; Veremis, 1988: 236-
286). 
Greece and Turkey lobbied against each other as bitterly in Brussels as they 
did in Washington and often used the same arguments in disputing NATO’s 
allocation of infrastructure funds that they apply to the apportioning to US’s military 
assistance. They objected to NATO’s plans to provide infrastructure funds to each 
other. They vetoed each other’s share (Brown, 1991).  
The deadlock in NATO became so implacable that since 1984 Greece and 
Turkey vetoed each other’s ‘national chapters,’ the yearly inventory of forces 
assigned to NATO, which serves as a basis for NATO planning and also, in the past, 
for the alliance’s annual ‘Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces,’ a 
document that for this reason was not issued after 1984.  
Since spring 1982 until 2000 Greek and Turkish forced did not participate in 
NATO’s military exercises in the Aegean Sea together due to the controversy over 
the political status of the Lemnos/Limni Island. Greek-Turkish antagonism disfigures 
the military structure of the Alliance (Schmitt, 1997: 1-25). 
 For example the Greek Defence Minister Papandreou, in a NATO defence 
ministers meeting in December 1981, asked NATO to issue a formal security 
guarantee that it would protect its borders against Turkey. When the US objected to 
this, Papandreou, as the defence minister of Greece did not sign the final 
communique, the first ever seen in the history of the Alliance (Dimitras, 1985: 134-
150).  
 Successive Greek governments did also try to get a formal security guarantee 
from the United Stated against Turkey while the two sides were discussing the details 
of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries. 
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For example in 1990, in response to US’s access to military bases and other facilities 
in Greece, the Greek government asked the US to give the above-mentioned 
guarantee (Staphopoulos, 1992: 16-19).   
 When Turkey observed that the arms embargo put on herself was in part 
activated with the efforts of the Greek-American lobby in the United States’ 
Congress; that the seven to ten ratio in American military aids to Turkey and Greece 
was in part forced by the attempts of the Greek government, then a future NATO 
involvement in Turko-Greek dispute was not seen favourable to Turkey. When the 
United States agreed to the continuation of the seven to ten ratio in the military aids 
delivered to both countries, it meant that the US concurred with Greece that Turkey 
posed a threat to Greece in the Aegean Sea. In fact, it was Greece, which argued that 
the road to peace in the Aegean Sea would have to go through the balance of power 
between the arsenals of the countries and the US military aid shipped to them.  
The same logic also applies to Greece. When the Greek governments 
witnessed to NATO’s passivity during the Cyprus crisis in 1974 and the subsequent 
de facto partition of the island; NATO’s refusal to include the Lemnos Island in the 
military exercises in the Aegean Sea, an anti-NATO feeling might have developed in 
Greece in relation to its involvement in Turkish-Greek disputes.        
Eighth, where NATO met the number one security consideration of Greece 
and Turkey, the flow of arms from the United States and other western European 
members of the Alliance to Turkey and Greece contributed to the emergence and 
perpetuation of a security dilemma situation (Collins, 1997; Glasser, 1997: 171-201) 
in the Aegean because they no longer shared in the collective interest to cooperate 
against the Soviet threat (Krebs, 1999: 171-201). This is a pure realpolitik outcome 
caused by a particular NATO policy. Furthermore, when the Alliance armed Turkey 
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with a view to helping her defend its (the Alliance’s) borders against the Soviet 
Union, the main purpose behind the flow of arms to Greece was to buttress Greece’s 
capability to check the communist threat within the country. When this was the case, 
the military disparity between Turkey and Greece manifolded as the Cold War years 
passed by. The logic of NATO inadvertently contributed to the widening of the gap 
between Turkey and Greece in terms of their military capabilities.  
Ninth, Turkey and Greece were never asked to settle their disputes and 
internalize the security norms of the western international community before their 
accession to the Alliance. The detailed and comprehensive membership criteria were 
missing during the Cold War era enlargement of NATO. This might have indirectly 
curtailed the promise of the Alliance in contributing to the transformation of Turkey 
and Greece’s realpolitik security cultures into non-realpolitik ones.  
Finally, under such conditions, the transparency NATO’s internal 
mechanisms provided did not prevent Turkey and Greece from perceiving the 
military instruments of each other as threats. Indeed, the more Greece became aware 
of Turkey’s superior military capabilities within NATO, the more she adopted an 
exclusive attitude towards Turkey. The sheer military power of Turkey did not lessen 
the Greek fears of Turkey even though Greece could monitor Turkey's military 
capabilities through the NATO channels (Krebs, 1999). Their joint NATO 
membership revealed the power disparities between Greece and Turkey more 
acutely. Therefore, the intra-alliance mechanisms made it time again clear that 
significant power differences exist between Greece and Turkey both in terms of their 
military potential and their representational force within the Alliance. Thought of this 
way, their NATO membership contributed to the perpetuation of the realpolitik 
security culture in the Eastern Mediterranean region.   
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2.2. The Post-Cold War Era  
The expectations that NATO would be a more reliable and credible institution in 
regard to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes came to naught as the 1990s 
unfolded. Neither the changing institutional identity of the Alliance nor the changing 
structure of the international system made NATO a credible actor in terms of 
Turkish-Greek disputes. The hope was that as the constraining effects of the bi-polar 
international system came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, 
NATO would be more able to propose detailed solution proposals to the particular 
Turkish-Greek disputes. The need not to antagonize either Turkey or Greece and the 
fear of losing any of them in the aftermath of a detailed NATO solution package lost 
its credibility as the Alliance's need to rely on Turkey and Greece's military 
cooperation decreased in the absence of the Soviet threat.  
It was also hoped that the elevation of the Eastern Mediterranean region to 
the top place in regard to the strategic focus of the Alliance would push the leading 
powers of NATO to actively work for the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes. 
The new conventional and non-conventional security threats, challenges and risks to 
the Alliance emanating from the Greater Middle Eastern region would necessitate a 
concerted NATO effort to help resolve the Turkish-Greek disputes. In a word, the 
loosening of the structural constraints of the Cold War era and the degrading of the 
realpolitik-based containment strategy; the re-construction of the Alliance's security 
community identity on the basis of the promotion of the western norms to the ex-
communist countries; the embrace of cooperative security strategy in dealings with 
outside states; and the designation of the Eastern Mediterranean region as the new 
Central Front of the Alliance would all constitute the very factors in explaining why 
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the new NATO would likely take a bolder approach towards the everlasting 
settlement of the Turkish-Greek disputes.   
 However, these expectations did not come true in the post-Cold War era, as 
NATO started to loose its magnet status for Turkey and Greece to define their 
collective western/European identities. Gradually, the Alliance ceased to become the 
platform, under which Greece and Turkey could reach a collective western/European 
identity that would have enabled them to accommodate their territorial disputes in a 
problem-solving win-win manner, based on non-realpolitik security understandings. 
This section of the dissertation is an attempt to analyse the reasons why NATO has 
increasingly lost its power of attraction in the eyes of these two countries that might 
have otherwise led them to end up with common identities and interests.  
Thought of this way, what follows is an account of the factors that have led to 
the decreasing promise/credibility of NATO in bilateral relations. Before doing this, 
a few words are needed on the conditions that might have theoretically enabled 
NATO to play promising/credible roles in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek 
disputes by accelerating the process of collective identity and security community 
formation in and around the Aegean Sea.   
 
2.2.1. The Theoretical Expectations from A Sociological Institutionalist 
Perspective for A Promising NATO Role     
Looking from an ideational perspective, there seem to exist some preconditions for 
NATO to have credibility/promise in the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes. The 
first concerns the way NATO constructs its identity. The more the Alliance 
continued to exist on the basis of intersubjectively shared norms/rules and the more 
'European' NATO remained in the post-Cold War era, the more leverage it would 
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have on Turkey and Greece (Moore, 2002: 1-34). The more the United States and the 
European Union members of the Alliance concurred on the 'European-ness' of the 
Alliance, the more encouraged Turkey and Greece would feel to solve their disputes 
within the NATO framework. This would be so because Turkey and Greece would 
be content with their membership in a NATO, which remains the prime security 
organization in Europe and whose main security priorities lay in Europe. In such a 
case, the degree of necessity for Turkey and Greece to resolve their problems would 
increase because the tone and quality of their bilateral relations would likely 
determine the quality of their relations with the Alliance, as well as the credibility of 
their claims to 'European-ness'.  
Theoretically speaking, the degree of NATO's 'European-ness' would 
increase, or retain its Cold War era level, provided that the following conditions are 
met. First, the United States remains involved in the European security issues to the 
extent it was the case during the Cold War years. Second, the geographical 
boundaries of the Alliance are limited to Europe. Third, the Alliance defines its 
mission as to deal with the threats that emanate from either within Europe or 
Europe's very-near abroad. Fourth, the European Union members of the Alliance 
continue to regard NATO as the main institutional platform that offers security to 
themselves.  
The second main factor that might increase the credibility of the Alliance 
pertains to the reason d’etat of NATO. If the main goal of NATO turns out to 
promote the western values of ‘liberal democracy, free-market economy, peaceful 
relations among neighbours, the resolution of territorial disputes as urgently as 
possible through pacifist means’ to the Central and East European countries at the 
expense of NATO's prime function, collective defence, then the Alliance might not 
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exert strong pressure on Turkey and Greece to settle their territorial disputes in the 
short-run. The danger would be that if the collective defence function of NATO 
erodes soon, without the members of the Alliance firmly internalizing and sharing 
the idea that the new NATO would be based on common norms, rather than common 
externally defined security interests, then the promise/credibility of the Alliance will 
diminish. If the collective defence character of the Alliance remains undisputed, with 
the continuation of the Europeans' commitment to Greece and Turkey's security 
interests and territorial defence, and if the collective security functions of the new 
more-political/less-military NATO foresees credible sanctions for those members 
that derail from the track of democracy and peaceful neighbourly relations, than the 
promise/credibility of the Alliance would radically improve (Waterman, Zagorcheva 
and Reiter, 2002: 221-235).        
Third, if the alliance in general and the United States in particular sees the 
solution of the Turkish-Greek relations over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus ‘necessary’ 
to the realization of their security interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East regions, then the likelihood of NATO to act as a credible enhancer 
would definitely increase.  
Fourth, if NATO turns out to become a loosely constructed global security 
organization under the leadership of the United States, its degree of leverage over 
Turkey and Greece would probably decrease. In such a case the main mechanism of 
security cooperation between the US and other countries would be organized on a 
‘more bilateral-less multilateral’ basis. Such kind of an arrangement would increase 
the bargaining powers of smaller states vis-à-vis the United States, and erode the 
institutional cohesiveness of the Alliance (Risse-Kappen, 1995). If the Alliance 
remains as a collective-defence organization with its members credibly identifying 
 66
with the security interests of each other, then its credibility will increase in Turkish 
and Greek eyes.  
Fifth, the success of NATO would vary with the level of internalization of its 
security community identity, based on cooperative security and non-realpolitik 
security understanding, by Greece and Turkey. If one of them regards NATO as the 
most important link to the western security system and seems to have adapted its 
foreign policy orientation to the priorities of the Alliance whereas the other does not 
accord to the institutional link with NATO the primary role in formulation of its 
foreign policy preferences, then it would be difficult for NATO to involve credibly in 
the solution process of the bilateral disputes. For NATO to appear as a credible 
forum, both Turkey and Greece must abandon their practice of viewing the alliance 
as a tool in the pursuit of their national interests vis-à-vis each other. Both of them 
should regard their membership in NATO as legitimate and necessary for the 
maintenance of their security interests as well as the conformation of their 
western/European identities. For NATO to retain its credibility, it should remain the 
main security link tying the western security community of the post-Cold War era to 
Turkey and Greece. The degree of transatlantic divisions should not damage the 
leading position of NATO as the prime security organization of the western 
democratic security community, particularly in the European theatre.  
 
2.2.2. The General Factors of NATO's Low Promise/Credibility in the 1990s  
Set against the theoretical conditions outlined above, this section will only succinctly 
mention the main factors that have diluted NATO's credibility to act as a promising 
third party in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes. First, the new priority of 
the Alliance has been to enlarge to the ex-communist countries of the post-Soviet era 
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in a political fashion, rather than to extend security guarantees of a collective defence 
organization to insecure places. This partially reduced the attention of the Alliance to 
the Turkish-Greek relations. Both countries have gradually become marginal to the 
new identity and missions of the Alliance.    
Second, the erosion in the European identity of the Alliance, mainly 
stemming from the division of the West into two, gave boost to Turkey's efforts to 
join the EU in its goal to prove its 'European-ness'. This has gradually diminished the 
leverage of NATO on Turkey.   
Third, the Alliance has gradually come under the domination of the United 
States as the process of 'Americanization' of NATO has speeded up over the last 
decade (Layne, 2000: 59-92). In parallel to the increase in the United States' relative 
power vis-à-vis the European members of the Alliance, the post-Cold War era NATO 
has mainly remained as a political instrument of the American government. The 
decisions to enlarge, to define the new missions of the Alliance and to determine the 
geo-political boundaries of the Alliance mainly reflected the concerns and priorities 
of the successive US governments in the 1990s (Kurth, 2001: 5-16).  
It was somehow a tacit bargain between the Americans and the Europeans 
that the former asked the latter to recognize the global character of the Alliance in 
return for US's military involvement in European security affairs. The Europeans had 
to acquiescence in the US' involvement in European security, lest the fears of 
renationalization of security policies were awaken among themselves (Art, 1996: 1-
39). Such conditions enabled the Americans to determine the identity of the Alliance 
as well as the main strategies of NATO's enlargement to the ex-communist countries. 
Rather than agreeing to the non-European, global and out-of-area character of the 
Alliance, the Europeans simply wanted the Alliance to remain as the main security 
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institution in Europe in order not to see that the old realpolitik security practices 
revisit them (Croft, 2000).         
Fourth, the multilateral and transatlantic character of the Alliance 
dramatically eroded as the European members of the Alliance tried to establish 
autonomous 'European Foreign and Security Policy' and 'Common European 
Security and Defence Policy' structures within the European Union. In parallel to 
American efforts to globalize the Alliance and to turn NATO into an organization, on 
which they could rely in their efforts to compose US-led 'coalitions of the willing', 
the European Union members have gradually grown unsatisfied with these 
developments and resolved to set into motion their own security institutions that 
would eventually help them meet their 'European-way' security concerns (Walt, 
1997: 156-179, Walt, 1998: 5-44). With the 'selective solidarity' and the 'coalition of 
the willing' characteristics of the Alliance becoming more pronounced, the Article 5 
commitments of the Alliance was diluted.  
Fifth, NATO has gradually evolved into a collective security organization 
with the political functions of the Alliance being emphasised at the expense of the 
military and defence functions (Yost, 1998: 135-160). This mainly took place as the 
Alliance members found it difficult to converge on collectively held security 
interests. The Cold War era degree of cohesion no longer existed during the post-
Cold War years. There emerged significant differences between the United States 
and Turkey on the one hand and the EU members of the Alliance on the other in 
terms of security conceptualization and the meaning of the Article 5 collective 
defence commitments. The EU members found it difficult to abide by their Article 5 
commitments towards Turkey because to them Turkey has increasingly appeared as a 
security liability rather than a security asset (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001: 271-299).    
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Sixth, the leverage of the Alliance over Turkey and Greece decreased 
following Greece's further Europeanization strategy and Turkey's preference for 
stronger-bilateral relations with the United States to weaker institutional relations 
with the European Union. As NATO has gradually lost its European character; as 
Greece sought its security within the European Union; and as Turkey felt that its 
European identity was strongly challenged by the non-Europeanization of the 
Alliance, the overall promise of NATO felt short of helping Greece and Turkey 
develop a collective identity between each other. NATO could not provide Greece 
and Turkey with common grounds to cooperate and transform their realpolitik 
security cultures into non-realpolitik security cultures.    
Seventh, the promise of NATO further decreased as both Turkey and Greece 
approached to the Alliance from an instrumental perspective. Greece's main concern 
has been to balance Turkey's growing influence and bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
United States through using the mechanisms of the Alliance, whereas Turkey's main 
motivation has been to consolidate/strengthen its European identity in the eyes of the 
EU members through working hard within NATO. Having felt rebuked by the EU's 
discriminatory and exclusionary attitude towards her membership aspirations, Turkey 
tried to increase the quality of her NATO membership as a counter-reaction. 
However, neither of these strategies led Greece and Turkey to share a 
collective/European identity within NATO.  
 
2.2.2.1. NATO's Emerging Identity/Interests/Missions and the Value of Turkey 
and Greece within the Alliance 
Initially, it was expected that NATO’s role in defining the basics of the security of 
the western international community would diminish as the main external other of 
 70
the Alliance disappeared with the collapse of the communist block. Being denied of 
her reason d’etat, it was speculated that NATO would certainly go out of business if 
the main rationale of the Alliance were not defined in a new fashion so as to adapt to 
the realities of the new world (Mearsheimer, 1990: 5-56, Rupp, 2000: 154-176). 
During the 1990s there seemed to exist four main factors leading the Alliance 
to survive the end of the Cold War era. The first of these can be well explained by 
the sociological institutionalist accounts. To this logic, the alliance has turned out to 
construct its main identity and mission in the 1990s on the basis of the idea that 
security could not be reached without the promotion of the normative ideational 
elements of the western international community to the Central and Eastern 
European countries, as well as engaging Russia in a cooperative mood. In one way or 
other the Alliance started to act as a pan-European cooperative security organization. 
Together with the European Union and Organization for European Security and 
Cooperation, NATO acted as one of the main pillars of the emerging European 
interlocking security arrangements. The new mission of the Alliance has been based 
on NATO's political functions, instead of military ones. In this new era, the Article 2 
and Article 4 commitments of the Alliance gained more importance than the 
traditional Article 5 commitments (Schimmelfennig, 1999: 198-234). In this vein, 
NATO undertook the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Program in 1991, the 
Partnership for Peace program in 1994, the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation program in 
1997, signed the founding act with Russia in 1997, widened the scope cooperation 
with Russia through a new treaty in 2002, admitted three ex-communist countries to 
membership in 1997 and extended membership to other Central and Eastern 
European countries in 2002 in the historical Prague Summit (Smith and Timmins, 
2000: 80-90).  
 71
Despite all the merits of the Alliance's cooperative engagement with its ex-
foes, the fact that NATO constituted only one significant part of Europe's 
interlocking security architecture gradually made it clear that membership in NATO 
was not enough to define the contours of 'European-ness' on its own. NATO was 
transformed from being 'the only European' security organization into 'one of the 
European' security organizations during the post-Cold War era (Aybet, 2000). 
Thought of this way, the claim of the Alliance to embody the European identity was 
seriously disputed by the EU's simultaneous enlargement process. This became 
increasingly relevant as far as the promise of the Alliance to help Turkey and Greece 
develop a collective European identity is concerned.      
Second, the continuation of the Alliance can be explained by the neo-realist 
accounts in the sense that this both constituted the most important mechanism to 
'Europeanize' the unified Germany, hence assuage the fears of greater Germany, and 
enabled the United States to remain the prime security actor in Europe. The fear was 
that in the absence of NATO in general and the Germany's non-presence in the 
Alliance in particular, Germany would turn out to become the most powerful country 
in the continent after the unification. In such a case, other European countries, 
notably France, Britain and Germany's neighbours to the east, would find themselves 
developing realpolitik security strategies to balance against Germany. Under such 
conditions, all the positive achievements of the European integration process might 
have been lost in a very short time period. NATO's primacy as the main European 
security organization would have simply alleviated such widespread fears in the 
continent (Duffield, 1994/1995: 763-787).  
Looking from this perspective one of the main functions of the Alliance 
during the post-Cold war era was to keep the United States in Europe, rather than to 
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keep the Soviets out and Germans down (Layne, 2003: 17-29). This particular 
mission of the Alliance was advocated to a great extent by the Atlanticist members of 
NATO, such as Britain and Netherlands, rather than France and Belgium, which on 
the contrary tried to balance the increasing German influence in Europe by locking 
Germany in the European Union.  
 Third, in accordance with the neo-realist logic, the continuation of the 
Alliance became possible when the United States, the sole superpower of the 1990s, 
wished so. Both the preservation of the Alliance intact and its enlargement to the 
Central and Eastern European countries were in the interests of the Americans in the 
sense that through this way the US would be able to preserve its prevailing power 
status in the continent and would be able to keep the growing influence of the 
European Union members under its control (Duffield, 1994/1995). Given that many 
of the Central and Eastern European countries concurred that their link to the United 
States within NATO would increase their security feeling vis-à-vis both Germany 
and the Russian Federation, such an enlarged NATO would enhance the dominant 
position of the United States within the Alliance.  
Besides the rhetorical foundation of the enlargement policy, which rests on 
the American desire to contribute to the construction of a Europe whole and free, the 
US governments of the 1990s have mainly supported the enlargement of the Alliance 
on the ground that the enlarged NATO would also legitimize/justify the Americans' 
involvement in Europe as the main security actor in the post-Cold War era (Sloan, 
1995: 217-231).  
As the harmony between the American and European security interests 
started to erode, the application of Article 5 commitments became a distant 
possibility. In such a case, the Alliance turned out to become a state-centric platform 
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for the Americans to enlist possible allies to their global-scale security initiatives and 
undertakings.  
The process of Americanization occurred through some significant 
developments. First, the new identity and missions of the Alliance mainly reflected 
US' interests. The Alliance as a 'coalition of the willings', as well as an American 
instrument in 'out of area' operations, were consistent with post-Cold War era US 
strategic interests (Stuart, Howorth, Terriff and Webber, 2000). The concepts of 
'selective solidarity', 'selective engagement' began to define the main character of the 
Alliance better than the concept of 'Article 5 commitments.'  
Second, all peacekeeping operations in the Balkans demonstrated the 
American dominance of the Alliance, as well as the need to rely on the United States 
for the protection of European security interests. Third, the stress on the Balkans, the 
Caucaus, the Central Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf regions as the 
possible areas of deadly crises attests to the process of Americanization, for these are 
the places where the respective US governments of the 1990s put a great premium in 
terms of the security interests of the United States. Furthermore, the Americanization 
of the Alliance was made easier when the need on the part of the Americans to seek 
Europeans' help in Europe-wide and global-wide security arrangements decreased 
due to the widening capability gap between the two sides of the Atlantic (Chalmers, 
2001: 569-585). 
With the end of the Cold War, the relatively fair partnership between the US 
and the European countries of the Alliance began to evolve into a situation in which 
the US had the upper hand within the Alliance. Rather than being an institutional 
forum where the transatlantic members of the Alliance used to formulate common 
positions through intra-alliance bargaining and consultation processes, NATO of the 
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post-Cold War era started to serve as a pragmatic togetherness between the 
Americans on the one hand and the Europeans on the other and as a legitimizing 
institution for the unilateral US military actions. The degree of leverage the European 
members of the Alliance used to have within NATO has decreased to significant 
degrees. This seemingly led to a gradual lessening of the importance of the Alliance 
as an institutional platform where intra-member cooperation process would result in 
the mitigation of the anarchical effects of the international system (Duffield, 2001: 
93-115). 
While the European members of the Alliance turned inward to Europe in the 
1990s, the scope of American global security interests expanded to various parts of 
the globe, of which Europe became a less important one. While the Europeans 
wanted the Alliance to remain mainly as a European security institution operating on 
a multilateral basis, the Americans wanted NATO to widen its scope and horizons 
beyond Europe. While the Europeans wanted the Alliance to deal with the security 
challenges emanating from Europe and its near abroad, the Americans wanted 
NATO to act as a global security actor with war-making capabilities in any part of 
the world. While the Europeans desired to influence the American security and 
foreign policies through their institutional leverages within NATO, the Americans 
tended to ignore European views so long as the Europeans remained a dwarf in terms 
of their military capabilities and geo-political horizons. While the EU members tried 
to modify the role of the Alliance in such a way as to dovetail the main principles of 
security cooperation within NATO with the particular 'power of attraction' model of 
the EU, the Americans tried to transform the Alliance in such a way as to make it 
more capable to deal with hard/soft global security challenges (Heisbourg, 1992: 
665-678; Daalder, 2001: 553-567).         
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In line with American grand visions, starting with the Roma summit in 1991, 
and then through the historic 1997 Madrid, 1999 Washington and 2002 Prague 
Summits, the Alliance has gradually defined its security mission in such a way that 
the main responsibility of the alliance has now become to act as an effective crisis-
management institution in out-of-area/out-of-Europe missions.*  
In regard to the relevance of the Americanization of the Alliance to the nature 
of the Turkish-Greek interaction process, one could offer both optimistic and 
pessimistic accounts. As for the first, one could say the followings. Interestingly 
enough while the enlargement process of the Alliance to the CEECs diminished 
Turkey and Greece's relative positions within the Alliance, the emerging security 
concerns in the Balkans and the Greater Middle Eastern regions once again made it 
clear that the nature of Turkish-Greek relations could seriously affect the 
performance of NATO as a security institution (Larraabee, 1999: 131-147; Lewis, 
2001: 22-42).  
For example, catapulted into a position of 'front state', Turkey's significance 
within the Alliance began to increase from the second half of the 1990s onwards, as 
the Alliance members came to the conclusion that new threats to Alliance's security 
would likely come from the peripheries of the continent in the Balkans and the 
Greater Middle Eastern region.  Such kind of geographical shifts in Alliance's 
strategic perspectives initially held out the promise that NATO would finally start to 
deal with the Turkish-Greek disputes in a committed manner, for the lingering of 
territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey might likely scutter Alliance's efforts 
to contribute to security in the region.  
                                                           
* One can reach NATO’s strategic concepts as understood by the Rome Summit, Madrid Summit, 
Washington Summit and Prague Summit at the following addresses in order: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.  
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The post-September 11 era developments have once again reinforced the 
more American and less European character of the Alliance as the historic Prague 
Summit confirmed the incorporation of pro-American Central and Eastern European 
countries to the Alliance as well as defined the new mission of the Alliance as being 
the fights against global-transnationalised terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction. These steps have been in total line with the American thinking (Say, 
2003: 106-112; Talbott, 2002: 46-57).     
As for the pessimistic accounts, one could offer the following explanation. 
The more Americanized the Alliance became, the more difficult it became for 
Turkey and Greece to reach a collective identity within NATO. This was the case 
mainly for the reason that neither Turkey nor Greece was happy with this 
development and both of them wanted the Alliance to preserve its European 
character and to act on 'a more multilateral and less bilateral' basis. Faced with 
increasing Americanization of the Alliance, Greece gave impetus to its 
Europeanization efforts and tried to identify its security interests with those of her 
partners within the EU (Tsakonas, 2001: 145-159; Stivachtis, 2002: 35-53), whereas 
Turkey, rebuked by the EU's gradual exclusionary/discriminatory policies, had to 
improve the quality of her strategic security relations with the United States within 
NATO, though on a more bilateral-less multilateral basis (Kirisci, 2000: 68; 
Larrabee, 1997: 143-173; Harris, 2000: 189-202).         
Even though one might convincingly argue here that the change in the 
direction of NATO’s threat perceptions from the centre of Europe to its peripheries 
in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean region made it more urgent for the 
Alliance to contribute to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, this should not 
obscure the fact that the Cold War era communist danger directed towards the 
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Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean region used to pose far greater 
'threats' to the western security interests than the contemporary security 'risks' and 
'challenges' emanating from the same areas.  
Furthermore, that the new central front of the Alliance gradually turned out to 
become the Eastern Mediterranean should not obscure the fact that this mainly took 
place at the insistence of the Americans rather than out of a compromise between the 
European members of the Alliance and the United States (Blank, 2000: 24-48). 
Given the diverging security interests between the Americans and the Europeans in 
regard to the Mediterranean region, an increase in the qualitative emphasis on this 
region did not contribute to the credibility/promise of the Alliance in the Turkish and 
Greek eyes. It only enhanced Turkey's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Americans 
on a bilateral basis. This is an ideational factor affecting Greece's approach towards 
NATO as far as NATO's role in Turkish-Greek relations is concerned.    
The apparent bifurcation of the West during the post-Cold War era, into an 
‘American West’ and a ‘European West’, seems to have complicated the prospects 
for the resolution of the Turkish-Greek problems by affecting the promise of the EU 
and NATO to this effect. In contrast to the Cold War era, during which both Turkey 
and Greece interpreted their institutional relationships with the European Union as 
additional glues binding them to the Alliance, as represented mainly by their 
membership in NATO, in today’s conjecture membership in the EU means 
something radically different from membership in NATO.  
For example, while Turkey tried to reconstruct its European identity by 
actively participating in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Partnership for Peace 
initiatives, Greece preferred to prove its 'European-ness' on the basis of active 
involvement in the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process. 
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While Turkey more easily identified its security interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region with those of the Alliance/Americans and saw the western 
Mediterranean as marginal to its security concerns (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; 
Morali, 2002: 51-62; Bazoglu-Sezer, 1995: 149-172), Greece adopted a more pro-EU 
profile in determining its security interests in the whole Mediterranean region and 
tried to act as the agent of the EU in the region (Demestistichas, 1997: 215-227).  
The importance of the Americanization of the Alliance in terms of the 
dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations also became more evident as the character of 
the interdependency relationship between the US and Turkey changed dramatically. 
The new period saw that Turkish-American and Greek-American relations mainly 
revolved around bilateral mechanisms, rather than the institutional platforms of 
NATO. The more Turkey gained importance within NATO, the more Greece felt 
estranged. The more Greece integrated with the European Union, the more Turkey 
felt alienated from the EU. These are all ideational considerations.  
In regard to the survival of the Alliance into the 1990s, one could also offer 
an explanation based on the theoretical prisms of neo-liberal institutionalism and 
organizational theory.  To this logic, the institutional bureaucracy of the Alliance in 
Brussels argued for the continuation of the Alliance on the ground that the costs of 
maintaining the Alliance would be far less than the costs of dissolving the Alliance 
and lay the ground for other alternatives to achieve security in Europe (Mc Calla, 
1996: 445-475). In addition to this, as the neo-liberal institutionalists expected, 
NATO remained to operate as an Alliance in the 1990s because the collective good it 
offered could not have been reached by the individual attempts of its members. After 
all, the institutional cooperation within NATO reduced the transaction costs among 
members; increased the level of transparency; offered credible and reliable 
 79
information about members, particularly in regard to their military organizations and 
capabilities; and facilitated the formation of collective identity on the basis of shared 
liberal and democratic norms (Wallender, 2000: 705-735).    
All in all, the new identity of the Alliance sent mixed signals as for the 
promise of NATO in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek problems. While the 
emerging collective security identity of the Alliance at the expense of its collective 
defence identity and its concentration on the enlargement to the CEECs seem to have 
led to a decrease in the attention, which the major powers of the Alliance should 
have shown to Turkish-Greek disputes, the new directions of the Alliance's strategic 
focus seem to have increased the risks of any inadvertent military clash between 
these two countries to the materialization of NATO's interests in the Greater Middle 
Eastern region (Lesser, 2001; Stilides, 2001; Wilkinson, 1999; Norton, 2001).  
As NATO turned out to become less cohesive with the inclusion of new 
members; more political-less military oriented collective security entity; more non-
European with the elevation of the Greater Middle Eastern region to the most 
important area of concern; and more Americanised with the growing influence of the 
United States in the decision-making mechanisms, its ability to contribute to a 
Turkish-Greek cooperation based on the transformation of their realpolitik security 
cultures into non-realpolitik one decreased.   
 
2.2.2.2. The Turkey-NATO/US Dynamics  
The post-Cold War approach of the US towards Turkey made it more difficult for the 
Americans to actively encourage, and sometimes put pressure on Turkey to 
accommodate Greek claims over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. The fact that the US' 
need to Turkey's cooperation tremendously increased in the 1990s eroded the 
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credibility of the US/NATO to act as a promising actor in the resolution of the 
Turkish-Greek disputes.   
The point is that the degree of possible American pressure on Turkey so as to 
encourage her to act more flexibly towards Greece in the resolution of the disputed 
issues dwindled as the bargaining position of Turkey significantly increased in the 
eyes of the Americans. This was mainly due to the fact that the Americans felt the 
need to cooperate with Turkey over as much areas as possible in order to materialize 
their national interests (Makovsky, 2000: 219-265). Just to give an example, it would 
be enough to have a look at the strategic-military plans of the United States prepared 
for the contingencies in the Greater Middle East Region during the first decade of the 
post-Cold War era. The discussions during 2000-2001 concerning the missile 
defence shield, which the United States wants to build against the possible threats 
that are likely to come from the rogue states located in the Middle East Region, 
attests to the importance of Turkey in territorially defined security conceptions in 
NATO circles (Kibaroglu, 2003).  
The continuation of Turkey's strategic relations with the United States on a 
bilateral level, rather than through NATO, seems to have resulted in the gradual 
decrease in the credibility of NATO to act as an institutional platform where Turkey 
and Greece may come closer to each other. The more the 'European' character of 
NATO was diluted, the less Turkey felt the need to come to terms with Greece 
through NATO. The more Turkey’s membership in NATO was conceived of within 
the context of the Greater Middle Eastern region, the less leverage the Alliance had 
on Turkey to negotiate with Greece.                       
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey increased her efforts to internalize the post-
Cold War identity of the Alliance (Karaosmanoglu, 1995). It appears that there are 
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two main factors that explain Turkey's penchant for internalizing the post-Cold War 
era identity of the Alliance and adapt the basics of its security and defence policies to 
those of the Alliance. The first is the neo-realist connection. Even though both the 
elimination of the Russian threat and Turkey's increasing military capabilities 
enabled Turkey to deal with the post-Cold War era security challenges and risks in 
more confidant and efficient ways, Turkey continued to value its link to NATO, for 
this constituted the best possible way to secure the continuation of the American 
security guarantee to Turkey's external security (Karaosmoglu, 2000: 199-217). A 
bilateral US-Turkey security relations, outside the framework of NATO, might in the 
final analysis have weakened Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the Americans. 
Despite the fact that the degree of European commitment to Turkey's security within 
NATO decreased in the 1990s, what mattered for the Turkish security elites was the 
preservation of American guarantee to Turkey (Karaosmanoglu, 2001: 65-69).   
However, even though the membership in NATO remained the main security 
guarantee for Turkey during the 1990s, the degree of Turkey's dependence on the 
Alliance, in terms of both conventional and non-conventional threats, decreased. 
Turkey became more able to cope with these challenges on its own, mainly 
emanating from its neighbours to the south. When the non-European character of the 
Alliance combined with Turkey's decreasing need to rely on the Alliance for its own 
security, the leverage of the Alliance on Turkey dramatically decreased. 
The second is the ideational link. Faced with the Europeans' refusal of her 
membership in the EU and the gradual erosion of the Europeans commitments to 
Turkey's security, the internalization of NATO's post-Cold war era identity seemed 
to be the only way for Turkey to register her European/western identity. However, 
this process only resulted in the increase of Turkey's bargaining power and 
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significance in the eyes of the Americans rather than the confirmation of Turkey's 
European identity. The main cause of this was that the post-Cold War era NATO 
turned out to become 'more-Americanized and less-Europeanized'. As the post-Cold 
War era developments demonstrated, the image that Turkey was a vital country for 
the European security was seriously contested. The more Turkey’s partners within 
the Alliance, particularly the western European ones, perceived Turkey’s security 
role in terms of the Greater Middle Eastern region, rather than Europe, the more 
doubtful Turkey’s 'European-ness' turned out to become (Snyder, 1995: 58-63). In 
parallel to NATO's efforts to engage in Russia, Turkey's suspicions about the 
European character of the Alliance, and therefore its European security identity, 
increased. Turkey's suspicions on the Europeans' commitment to Turkey's security 
became evident during the two Iraqi crises, one in 1990 and the other in 2003. On 
both occasions, the European members of the Alliance did not adopt Turkey's 
security perceptions vis-à-vis Northern Iraq and hesitated to assure Turkey that 
NATO would come to Turkey's help in case Iraq-originated concerns damages 
Turkey's territorial security.   
Looking from this perspective, some of the Turkish elites expressed worries 
about the enlargement of NATO towards the Central and Eastern European countries 
given that Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, was no longer in a position to 
threaten these countries and that many of these countries have already been stable 
and secure (Karaosmanoglu, 1999: 213-224; Karaosmanoglu, 1998: 55-64). 
Furthermore, another Turkish concern was that the enlarged NATO would likely 
dilute the cohesiveness of the Alliance with the credibility of the Article 5 
commitment eroded. In such a NATO Turkey would not feel so secure of 
American/European commitment to its security (Eralp, 1997). Moreover, the Turkish 
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public opinion was hesitant to see the Alliance enlarged because they worried that in 
such a case the democratization/westernization process in Russia might halt with the 
ascendancy of more nationalist and anti-Western fractions to power. Besides if 
Russia had felt aggrieved by NATO's enlargement to the central and eastern Europe, 
then it might have felt emboldened to act in a more realpolitik security manner and in 
a more aggressive mood in Caucasus and regions around Turkey. Such kind of an 
eventuality would likely damage Turkey's security because Turkey and Russia would 
likely find themselves in opposing blocks trying to contain each others' power 
through realpolitik security tools. Eventually Turkey adopted a pro-enlargement 
policy and strongly supported the memberships of the Central and Eastern European 
States, for the main reason Turkey could find a good opportunity to prove its western 
identity by contributing to the spreading of NATO's norms to these places.          
Paradoxically, as Turkey actively participated in NATO's cooperative 
security activities in the Balkans and other parts of the world, this did not radically 
enhance Turkey's European identity but bolstered its image in the eyes of the 
Americans as a staunch ally. As long as Turkey seems to have remained as a security 
liability, rather than a security asset for the Europeans and as long as NATO reflected 
more American and less European concerns, the fact that Turkey strived to prove its 
western identity by internalizing NATO's post-Cold War era security identity did not 
help her prove its 'European-ness' in the eyes of the European Union members.      
  On the agency level Turkey showed willingness to internalize the new 
identity of the alliance in the post-Cold War era. In addition to providing the alliance 
with hard military power in risky locations of the world map, Turkey also tried to 
adapt to the new changing identity of alliance by taking part in many of the NATO-
led peacekeeping and peace-making operations in and around Europe and by 
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redesigning its defence policy in line with the defence reforms in NATO. Turkey 
proved to be an ardent participant of the Partnership for Peace Program and to this 
end hosted a PfP education centre in Ankara (Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu, 2002: 
131-164).  
Turkey's bargaining power within NATO increased in the aftermath of the 11 
September event. From a flank state Turkey evolved into a front state as NATO 
turned out to become more non-European with the placement of the war against 
global terror on top of the agenda of the Alliance. Prague summit is a case in point.  
 
2.2.2.3. Greece's post-Cold War Era Instrumental View of NATO Membership  
The incentives on the part of Greece to welcome any NATO or US initiative on the 
resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes today would be less than the Cold War 
times, for Greece seems to have turned her face to the European Union as the latter 
offers to her a more credible ticket for the membership in the western international 
community. Unlike the case that the leverage of the Alliance decreased on Turkey 
due to the fact that Turkey's bargaining power increased in the eyes of the Americans 
within the Alliance, the leverage of the Alliance decreased on Greece due to the fact 
that Greece's bargaining power within the Alliance decreased in the 1990s.  
In parallel to the deepening process within the EU, Greece seems to have 
shared in the belief that the EU should acquire an international actor status in as 
many areas as possible, most important of all being the areas of foreign and security 
policy (Tsoumis, 1988: 91-114 and Platias, 2000: 61-86). Today’s Greece embraces 
a more European and less American foreign and security policy outlook in 
comparison to the Cold War times. The Greek governments of the 1990s saw their 
links with the EU as the most important security guarantee against external threats, 
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Turkey ranking the number one among them. The US leverage on Greece’s foreign 
and security policy felt dramatically in the post-Cold War era (Maniatis, 2002: 48-
52; Michas, 2002: 94-102).  
Evidences to Greece's alignment with the European Union, rather than the 
United States, were abundant in the 1990s. During the wars in the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia, both Bosnia and Kosovo, Greece sided with the main European 
policies, if not embracing a parochial stance (Iatrides, 1999: 265-299; Papacosma, 
1999: 47-67; Zahariadis, 1996: 303-327). When the United States brought the issue 
of 'national missile defence' to the agenda of the transatlantic relations, Greece again 
sided with her partners within the EU and argued against the rationale of the 
Americans arguments. Lastly, Greece decided to support Germany and France's 
points of view during the Iraqi crisis in post-September 11 era. Rather than backing 
the Americans' rationale on the need to use of war against Saddam's regime, the 
Greeks synchronised their views with those the Germans and French by arguing for 
the utilisation of the UN framework to the extent possible (Greek Foreign Ministry 
homepage).   
In conformity with the Cold War era logic, Greece continued to see the 
Alliance from an instrumental perspective. To this end, the Greek governments of the 
1990s generally succeeded in embracing the post-Cold war security identity of the 
Alliance. Although much Greek effort was invested in the Europeanization processes 
in the fields of foreign and defence policies, Greece soon came to the conclusion that 
NATO remained essential both to the security of the continent in general and the 
country in particular (Moustakis and Sheehan. 2000: 95-115). The reasons for Greece 
to nevertheless continue to value her membership in NATO can be summarised as 
follows. First of all, Greece could not succeed in securing a formal territorial 
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guarantee from the members of the EU and the WEU vis-à-vis her relations with 
Turkey (Valinkis, 1002: 52-68; Valinakis, 1993: 99-113). Neither the European 
Union nor the Western European Union became collective defence organizations of 
the NATO kind. However, this should not mean that NATO offers a security 
guarantee towards the territorial integrity of Greece in case of a war between Greece 
and Turkey. The attempts of the Greek government at securing such a guarantee 
from the United States seemed to have yielded positive results in 1990 when Greece 
was negotiating a new Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the 
United States. The inclusion of such words as to offer an implicit and covert US 
guarantee to Greece’s territories was harshly criticised by Turkey and in the end the 
US government had to announce that the meaning of those words did not imply 
whatever Turkey seemed to have understood.  
Nevertheless, membership in NATO is valued for the single reason that 
Turkey would have to think twice before formulating her policy stance towards 
Greece if the latter is firmly anchored in the western security structures, of which 
NATO is the most important one. In addition to membership in the EU and WEU, 
Greece's membership in NATO was thought of contributing to Greece's soft power 
vis-à-vis Turkey. A Greece, that is a staunch NATO ally and wields instruments to 
influence American policies towards the Eastern Mediterranean Region in general 
and Turkey in particular, would be able to check Turkey's power within the Alliance. 
The concern that the Americans respect the military balance in the region and do not 
contribute to Turkey's armament in such a way that might unbalance the military 
equality between Greece and Turkey seems to have shaped the Greek rationale 
towards NATO. It is the common thinking in Greece that only NATO has been able 
to keep the military balance in the Aegean Sea, at least by the time the European 
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Union evolves into a collective defence organization protecting the common 
boundaries of the Union against third parties (Dakos, 2001: 81-99).   
It has been a significant component of Greece's post-Helsinki strategy towards 
Turkey that Greece relies on its NATO membership and the preservation of the 
balance of power in the Aegean Sea in her efforts to prevent Turkey from 
undertaking any fait accompli either in the Sea or in Cyprus. The fear is that if 
Greece did not counter-balance Turkey through such means, Turkey might abuse 
Greece's cooperative approach towards Turkey within the framework of the 
European Union's accession process. The way to prevent Turkey from interpreting 
Greece's cooperative gestures along the EU accession process as evidences of 
Greece's weakness, the Greek security and policy making elites continued to value 
Greece's links to Alliance (Couloumbis and Ifantis. 2002: 1-25).    
Secondly, Greece could not see the EU and WEU developing successful 
military capabilities and acting as collective defence organizations with clear 
boundaries to defend. The possibility that the European Union might decide to 
remain neutral in case of a war between Greece and Turkey might turn out to be a 
reality as the negotiations continue between Turkey and the European Union in 
regard to the use of NATO’s assets by the EU in only EU-led military operations 
(Please see the section on ESDP in the EU-Turkey-Greece triangle in chapter 3).   
The Cold War came to an end for Greece in 1996 when Simitis came to power 
in Athens and set into motion a new foreign policy aimed at regaining lost power and 
prestige. The new government approached to the United States from a more 
rationalistic perspective in the hope that Greece, the only EU and NATO member in 
the Balkans, would be in a much better position vis-à-vis Turkey if she did not derail 
from the Alliance to greater extents. Free from the ideological constraints of the Cold 
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War era, the Greek decision-makers seem now to be able to construct more balanced 
relationships with the United States within NATO, and therefore to constrain 
Turkey's influence within the Alliance and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Based 
on this reasoning Greece took part in nearly all of the peacekeeping activities of the 
alliance in the periphery of Europe and elsewhere (Mathiopoulos, 2002: 297-304).  
A significant development in this regard is that Greece vociferously argued 
for the transformation of the Alliance into a collective security organization in the 
post-Cold War era. It seems that there is a positive relationship between Greece's 
efforts in this regard and the degree of Turkey's characterisation of Greece's main 
external threat. The more Turkey remained Greece's main security threat, the more 
Greece advocated the transformation of the Alliance into a collective security 
organization. Given that the probability of Turkey being cast as a threat to Greece's 
security is all time low due to Turkey's membership in 'NATO the collective defence 
organization' and that such a NATO would have no internal mechanisms to resolve 
intra-alliance territorial disputes, Greece could not benefit from this NATO against 
Turkey. However, in a NATO, which is re-structured as a collective security 
organization, membership would not imply that a member state could never be 
labelled a future security threat. Not based on a clear-cut insiders/outsiders 
framework, a current member of 'NATO the collective security organization' can be 
categorically viewed as security threat in future if the majority of the members think 
as such (Papacosma, 1999: 47-67).        
 
2.2.3. Examples to NATO's Positive Role in Turkish-Greek Cooperation   
The highest level of cooperation between Turkey and Greece through NATO could 
include the realization of a limited-transparent security regime in the Aegean, 
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composed of arms-race stability and crisis stability (Tsakonas and Dokos, 1999). 
However, in terms of the achievement of a comprehensive and everlasting security 
regime between the two, the promise of the European Union would be higher than 
that of the Alliance, since their Europeanization policies would foresee a radical 
transformation process leading them to share the basics of the EU's collective 
identity. More than the Alliance, it is the EU framework that would possibly lead 
them to share a common identity.    
 Even though the Alliance could not help Greece and Turkey develop a 
collective identity and resolve their disputes in a problem-solving win-win 
framework, it nevertheless played some positive role in the evolutionary process of 
the bilateral relations in the 1990s. This NATO contribution most of the time 
occurred in times of crisis in and around the Aegean Sea. Besides, these two 
countries could agree to some confidence building and tension reduction measures 
through the intermediary roles of high level US or NATO figures (for a complete list 
of such occurrences one could visit the web pages of Turkish and Greek Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs).    
 When Secretary General Solona offered his good offices for mediation in 
1996 in the aftermath of the Kardak crisis in January of the same year, Greece 
rejected his participation, as it would imply there was even something to negotiate. 
Turkey and Greece accepted the NATO-proposed confidence building measures in 
July 1997 on the margins of NATO’s Madrid Summit. They agreed on a 
convergence of views regarding outstanding differences in the Aegean Sea. In effect, 
Greece acknowledged Turkey’s interest in preserving international access through 
the Aegean, as well as the right of navigational freedom in the international airspace. 
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Turkey acknowledged the inviolability of Greece’s borders, and the need to refrain 
from the threat and use of force.               
NATO's role in the dissipation of crises took place during the Imia/Kardak 
crisis. Had they not cared about their requirements within the Alliance and had they 
not developed crisis-control regimes in the Aegean Sea over the last three decades, 
they might have easily fought each other. The latest Kardak/Imia crisis attests to the 
fact that an embryonic crisis-control regime is in the offing in the Aegean Sea. 
Neither of them mobilized their air forces but on the contrary made operational their 
navies, which are slow and easy to control (Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu, 2002: 
141). If one combines this crisis-control capability of both actors with the American 
determination to do whatever necessary to prevent them from fighting, then one 
could explain the reasons for no-war in and around the Aegean Sea (Hickok, Michael 
Robert. 1998: 118-136).  
In December 1997, Greece and Turkey agreed to the establishment of a 
NATO sub-regional command with headquarters in both countries. Greek and 
Turkish military officers now serve together, under each other’s command. This was 
an important step towards enhancing NATO operational planning and eliminating 
jurisdictional air control disputes in the Aegean for NATO purposes (Faith, 1999: 
273-292). In the summer of 1998 both countries agreed to revitalise the Confidence 
Building Measures, to which they had initially agreed in 1988. In this process, the 
role of the then NATO's Secretary General Solana was immense.  
In September 1998, Greece and Turkey, along with Italy, established the 
Balkans rapid deployment task force known as the Southeast European Brigade 
(SEEBRIG), to be used for peacekeeping operations in the region, as well as for 
potential deployment in nearby areas such as the Black Sea, in the vent of a crisis. 
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During the NATO war against Yugoslavia in spring 1999, the Greek and Turkish 
militaries cooperated regularly, especially to deliver supplies, reinforcements, and 
humanitarian assistance to the frontlines In Macedonia and Albania near the Kosovo 
border (Kay, 1998).  
Following in the footsteps of these historic developments, both countries 
joined a NATO exercise in the Aegean together first in the last two decades. While 
Turkish fighters landed on a Greek island during the Dynamic Mix exercise of the 
Alliance in May 2000, a group of Greek fighters landed on Turkish soil in October 
2000 during the Destined Glory exercise of the Alliance (Fiorenza, 2000: 66-69). 
Although Greece withdrawn from the Destined Glory exercise in response to 
Turkish accusations that the use of the air corridors above the Islands of Lemnos and 
Ikaria by the Greek fighters were in breach of the NATO’s plans, the fact that 
Turkish and Greek soldiers participated in a NATO exercise together after a long 
time period was something conducive to the regional peace and stability.  
Even though a substantial number of Greek MPs vacillated to ratify the latest 
Greek-Turkish agreements in the aftermath of the latest recriminations over the 
Destined Glory Exercise, the Greek Parliament did eventually ratified those 
agreements. In this way, the Greek MPs denuded the sceptics of Turkish-Greek 
reconciliation in both countries of the chance to be proud of their predictions that the 
latest reconciliation process would not last long.       
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CHAPTER 3: The European Union-Turkey-Greece Triangle  
3.1. The Cold War Era 
The impact of the European Union on the outcome of Turkish-Greek relations was 
marginal during the Cold War era. The institutional and security identity of the EU 
was not so much independent of the identity of the western security community as 
represented by NATO. The facts that the EU's security culture vis-a-vis the outside 
world envisaged the Realpolitik strategies of containment as well practiced by 
NATO; that both Turkey and Greece were thought of being parts of this western 
security community defined in terms of common external threats; that the European 
Union members did not see Greece as a true European country and therefore they did 
not hesitate to instrumentally use Greece as a bargaining tool in their relations with 
Turkey; and that the EU's enlargement strategy did not foresee the transformation of 
outside states along liberal-democratic norms have all contributed to the perpetuation 
of Turkish-Greek bilateral relations in a conflictual manner based on realpolitik 
security understandings.  
Since the onset of the Cold War era until the end of the 1980s, the European 
Union was not used to possess a significant role in the evolutionary process of the 
Turkish-Greek relations. On the one hand the international/security identity of the 
European Union did not necessitate a concerted EU attempt at the resolution of the 
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. The continuation of these maritime border 
disputes between Greece and Turkey did not level fundamental threats to the EU's 
Cold war era international/security identity. On the other, both Turkey and Greece 
tended to view their links to the EU from mainly an economic and inter-
governmental perspective. Membership in the EU in itself did not constitute a 
fundamental goal for both states to demonstrate their western/European identities. 
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This was already been achieved through NATO. In addition to these, Turkey's 
security culture was to a great extent compatible with that of the European Union. 
Despite Greece's sporadic efforts in making use of its EU membership against 
Turkey, these years were mainly non-problematic as far as the quality of triangular 
EU-Turkey-Greece relationships is concerned. The role of the EU in contributing to 
the estrangement of Greece and Turkey from each other on the basis of their 
European identity was not significant in this era mainly because the community-
building practices of the EU were not visible. On the contrary the compatibility of 
Turkey's security culture with that of the European Union prevented Greece and 
Turkey from diverging from each other and adopting conflictul relations in their 
regions.   
The cementing factors that used to unite the EU members were their common 
interests in resisting the communist Soviet threat in the East and in creating a 
security community in the western part of the continent along the principles of 
capitalist market economy and liberal democracy (Deighton, 2002: 719-741). During 
this era, the level of integration among the EC members did not develop in such a 
way so as to encompass political and identity-related issues. Therefore issues of 
democratization, human rights and peaceful neighbourly relations did not constitute 
benchmarks in the EU's attitude towards outside states. Moreover, the community-
building functions of the EU were not so significant so as to create clear-cut 
divisions between the EU members and outside states. The boundaries of the western 
international community were drawn by NATO, not the EU. The facts that the EU 
was somehow regarded as the economic component of the western European 
international community and that the lead of NATO as the main representative of the 
western international community in Europe was undisputed, the EU's attitude 
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towards Turkey remained cooperative and non-critical. The Turkish-Greek relations 
evolved in a less problematic way in this era due to the fact that Turkey was regarded 
as a European country.  
Construed as such Turkey was regarded as a natural part of the western 
international community, of which the EU was one of its two constituent 
components, together with NATO. Turkey's equal standing with the EU members 
within NATO against the common enemy in the East led the Europeans to view 
Turkey as a 'security asset/provider'. As long as Turkey held a very significant geo-
strategic position and prevented the Soviets from threatening Europe from the East 
and North by blocking the Soviet passage to the Mediterranean and tying down 
numerous Soviet divisions, Europeans did not argue against Turkey’s inclusion in 
Europe of the Cold War era and tolerated her exceptionalism and differences (Aybet 
and Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 567-582). The Europeans did not question Turkey's 
'European-ness' even though Turkey derailed from the democracy track many times 
during the Cold War years. The logic of security cooperation overwhelmed the logic 
of democratic peace (Dagi, 2001: 51-68). 'Democratization' did not constitute one of 
the indispensable elements of the whole 'Europeanization' process during much of 
the Cold war era. Neither the European powers asked Turkey to democratize more, 
nor Turkey displayed any further desire to move her Europeanization efforts beyond 
the realm of 'hard-security cooperation with the European powers'.  
 It seemed that the main logic behind the EU's attempts at constructing 
institutional mechanisms to anchor Turkey to the West was to make sure that 
strategic cooperation with Turkey would continue. This strategic mentality prevented 
the EU from embracing a holistic approach towards Turkey aimed at the 
transformation of Turkey's political, economic and social features into the model of 
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the EU countries. It was again the existence of such a mentality that prevented 
Europe from antagonising Turkey over Cyprus and other bilateral Turkish-Greek 
disputes. The aim was not to pave the way for Turkey's eventual accession to the 
EU/EC. The upper limit of Turkey's Europeanization was assumed to refer to the 
continuation of Turkey-EU strategic relations. When this was the case, the EU 
tolerated the lingering of the Turkish-Greek disputes, since this did not seriously 
hamper the EU's strategic relations with Turkey, as well as the EU's international 
identity. The costs of being committed to Turkey's accession to the EU through the 
resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes would have been higher than the costs of 
maintaining strategic relationship with Turkey, even though the problematic Turkish-
Greek disputes had at times appeared to have sabotaged EU-Turkey relations. The 
costs of maintaining Turkey's strategic relations with the EU appeared to be less than 
the costs of involvement in the resolution of Turkish-Greek problems. 
Turkey's European character was made easier because of the 'ideological 
geopolitics' of the period under consideration (Agnew, 1998). The continuation of 
Turkish-Greek territorial disputes was not considered as obstacles to Turkey's 
strategic cooperation with the European Union. The European Union members, 
rather than constructing a distinctive and detailed approach towards the resolution of 
the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes, preferred to streamline their views with those of 
the United Nations and the US-led NATO (Ugur, 1999: 161-198). During the Cold 
War era, the solution process of the Cyprus dispute used to operate within the 
framework of the United Nations. The EU's accession process did not influence the 
main parameters of the settlement.  
When the non-conformist, nationalist and purely inter-governmental Greek 
approach towards the EU's integration process combined with the 
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international/security identity of the EU, the latter did not fully adopt pro-Greek 
views on the Turkish-Greek disputes. For the sake of managing relations with 
Turkey, Greece was regarded as a state over which concession might be given to 
Turkey as part of general EU-Turkey relations. Exaggerated as it may seem to some 
extent, if the 1974 Cyprus crisis had not taken place, Greece might not have been 
granted accession to the EU. It is the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations that seemed 
to characterize the tone of EU-Greek relations, at least for the first ten-to-fifteen 
years following the Greek membership.  Greece’s strategic concerns vis-a-vis Turkey 
have been easily sidestepped for the sake of keeping Turkey on the EU track. For 
example, when the EU agreed to Greece's accession to the EU, it assured Turkey that 
bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes would not affect the tone of EU-Turkey relations. 
The EU did also ask Greece not to bring her disputes with Turkey on the EU-Turkey 
agenda. Furthermore, the EU Council of Ministers recommended the Greek 
government that it engages in a negotiation process with Turkey before she acceded 
to the EU. That is why Turkey and Greece undertook a negotiation process since 
1976 till 1981 (Tsalicoglou, 1995: 29-61). 
The facts that many high level EU authorities asked Turkey to lodge its own 
application with the EU alongside Greece and that some of them thought that a 
possible rejection of Greece's application would have been much easier had it been 
evaluated together with Turkey's application, demonstrate that there was not an 
ideational commitment on the part of the EU to admit Greece as a member. If the 
French government of the time had not acted as a patron and ardent supporter of 
Greece's membership, Greece might not have been let in the Club.  
Rather than becoming a credible magnet for Greece, the EU did deny Greece 
of all her demands for security guarantees. The important point in this regard is that 
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as long as Greece’s partners within the EU saw Greece as a country, located in the 
zone of conflict, they denied functioning as a credible security magnet for Greece. 
The EU politicians have been aware of the fact that because the Europeanization of 
the Turkish-Greek disputes would cost the EU a lot in its relations with Turkey, they 
did not want to extend a formal security guarantee towards Greece when the latter 
demanded this (Legg and Roberts, 1997: 55-71).  
However, the EU’s treatment of Greece as ‘a spoiler and awkward' country 
seems to have contributed to a decrease in the incentives on the part of Turkey to try 
to understand Greece. Believing that the EU could not easily put its relations with 
Turkey into jeopardy, especially because of the dynamics of the Turkish-Greek 
disputes, the Turkish elite might have come to a conclusion that there was no need to 
accommodate Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. If Turkey had believed that 
Greece was a true European Union member, with no difference from the others and 
whose veto power over its membership in the Union would play no less a role than 
those of the other EU members, than she might have felt the necessity to come to 
terms with Greece easily (Guvenc, 2000: 102-129; Onis, 2001: 31-47). The thinking 
that Greece's membership in the EU would not affect the main dynamics of Turkey-
EU relations was so evident in the late 1970s when the Turkish Prime Minister of the 
time, Bulent Ecevit, did not heed to the warnings of the Turkish ambassador in 
Brussels, Tevfik Saracoglu that Greece's possible entry to the EU would likely create 
problems in Turkey's relations with the EU (Kabaalioglu, 2001: 1-16). Turkey was so 
confident of its geo-political and geo-strategic value in the eyes of the Europeans that 
she had never imagined that the Europeans would have dared to antagonize Turkey 
over the bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes.   
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Even though, the EU followed the lead of NATO/US in valuing Turkey over 
Greece, the general EU attitude towards these two countries was based on the idea of 
'equal distance'. When this combined with the EU's failure to develop a truly 
distinctive international/security actor-ness independent of NATO and when the 
limits of the geo-political interests of the EU members of the Alliance were confined 
to the western Europe, the way the EU used to treat Turkey and Greece did not play a 
significant role in regard to the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations. This situation 
radically changed in the 1990s due to the factors that will be explained in the next 
chapter. The institution that contributed to the perpetuation of 'rivalry' between 
Greece and Turkey during the Cold War era was NATO.   
During much of the Cold War era, the European Union acted towards third 
countries on the basis of economic and security rationality. The ideational concerns 
or norm-governed EU actions were not observable in the EU's enlargement during 
the Cold War era. The EU had mainly acted as an inter-governmental organization 
by emphasising the economic interests of the existing members in regard to relations 
with third countries. Such kind of an approach curtailed the promise of the EU to 
contribute to cooperative and peaceful neighbourly relationship between countries 
lying on the peripheries of the continent. Because Turkey's membership would most 
likely serve as a huge drain on the EU's sources rather than as a net benefit to the 
EU's aggregate wealth and because Turkey's membership in NATO had already 
satisfied the EU's Cold War era security concerns, the EU had never felt so 
committed to Turkey's accession that it would have felt willing to undertake all the 
costs of Turkey's accession process. Thought of this way, the socializing capacity of 
the EU was marred from the beginning when the EU did not feel any reason to offer 
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credible incentives to Turkey to transform itself into EU's non-realpolitik security 
norms.      
 The main reason why Turkey did not interpret the EU's limited involvement 
in the Cyprus dispute as threatening during the Cold War era lies in the fact that 
Turkey's security culture/identity was mainly compatible with that of the EU. Or to 
put it other way, when the EU and Turkey viewed each other as 'security 
providers/assets', the EU's partial and ineffective involvement in the Turkish-Greek 
disputes did not seem threatening in Ankara. Below is a succinct account of the 
historical background of this compatibility. 
The Republican elites largely held to the idea that the overall security of their 
new state would be guaranteed only if the Europeans recognized the Turks as 
Europeans (Aydın, 2003: 163-184; Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 199-217). In other words, 
the more the Europeans recognized Turkey as 'European,' the more 'secure' Turkey 
would feel. And the more the Europeans saw Turkey as vital to European 'security,' 
the more the Turks thought of Turkey as 'European.' So, to the Turkish elite, as long 
as Europe and Turkey saw each other as 'security providers,' Turkey's 'European-
ness' would be uncontested. As a contributor to European security and peace, the 
Turkish elite could legitimately claim that Turkey was a 'European' country and its 
security would be assured. 
To be more concise, the ultimate goal of the founding fathers of the Republic 
was to ensure that the new state would live in security with the possibility of 
confronting the European states as enemies eliminated. The conviction that the geo-
strategic and geo-political assets of the country were the main factors defining 
Turkey's 'European-ness' was so helpful for the state elite both in legitimising their 
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rule inside the country and in pursuing relations with the EU on the basis of ‘strategic 
negotiations’, an insincere Europeanization.  
That logic suited the Turkey of the early 1920s when what mattered to the 
Turkish elite was successful nation-building along the 19th century positivist 
credentials of European nationalism. A strong state authority endowed with 
draconian instruments to keep it that way was deemed essential for this project, the 
main purpose of which was to root out the factors that had led to the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire, namely an Islamic social structure and a multi-ethnic society. The 
primary goals of the Republican elite - a homogeneous secular nation within a 
unitary state - were in close harmony with the prevailing European norms of the 
time. From this perspective, the 'Europeanization' attempts of the Turkish elites were 
mainly instrumental in nature; they were, after all, modelled on the European nation-
states of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hale, 2000: 44-77; Karaosmanoğlu, 
1993: 19-34).  
The well-established state elites were also aware that if they really wanted 
their project to come to fruition they would have to maintain peaceful relations with 
the European powers of the time. For the founding fathers of the Republic, an ideal 
security relationship between Turkey and the European powers would be built on the 
following principles: non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other; respect 
for the territorial integrity and normative cultural backgrounds of each other; non-
participation in rival camps; common alliances in the face of common threats; 
military preparedness for future contingencies; and, finally, Turkey, as the weaker 
entity, would oversee and help preserve European strategic interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean (Oğuzlu, 2003: 285-299).  
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Turkey's membership in NATO and many other European international 
institutions in the early 1950s was a direct result of this thinking. Even though the 
goal of westernisation stood as an ideational factor in the background, the decision to 
join the Atlantic Alliance and to establish an associate membership with the then 
European Economic Community was mainly of strategic in nature. Though the 
Turkish elites knew that the process of Europeanization would have two main 
dimensions - a domestic reform process aimed at internalizing the constitutive norms 
of the European international society and following a Europe-friendly foreign policy 
by participating in the European state system - they preferred to give primacy to the 
second one because this was the cheapest and the most cost-efficient way of having 
the European identity of the country recognized by the Europeans (Karaosmanoglu, 
2002). 
 The prevailing view in Turkey was that the European Economic Community 
was not radically different from the old European state system that embodied the 
Westphalian logic of balance-of-power politics. In this sense both the EU and Turkey 
held similar Realpolitik security understandings, particularly vis-à-vis the external 
world. Thought of this way, there was a similarity between the main security 
referents of the European members of the Alliance and those of Turkey. Both 
regarded their territorially defined nation-states as the main security referents. When 
this combined with the prevailing of military understanding of security of the time 
period under consideration, the Turks believed that the European powers would not 
antagonize such a Turkey that follows Europe-friendly foreign policies and is a 
strategic partner of the Europeans against common threats. It is due to this particular 
reading of Europe that the Turkish elite tended to put all the blame on Greece, rather 
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than the EU itself, when the latter had at times hinted that Turkey would need to 
solve her territorial disputes with Greece before joining the EU.  
 However, when the European Union members accelerated the process of 
integration in the second half of the 1980s, democratization and human rights 
concerns gradually replaced the sheer strategic-security concerns in the EU's 
attitudes towards third parties. The evolution of the EU's identity into more political 
forms has made its impact on the accession processes of the three Mediterranean 
countries to the EU, namely Greece, Spain and Portugal. Turkey was unable to detect 
these changes in the EU's identity and continued to see its 'Europeanization' process 
operating on economic and security levels. An accession strategy based on more 
trade relations with the EU countries, Turkey's adoption of the EU's trade regulations 
and Turkey's hard-core security cooperation with the EU members was assumed to 
eliminate the major obstacles before Turkey's journey to Brussels. Turkey has never 
shown the same level of commitment towards the EU as the many Central and 
Eastern European countries did in the 1990s. The idea that membership in the EU 
might necessitate an increased Turkish effort to come to a settlement with Greece 
over the Cyprus and Aegean Sea disputes has never become popular among the 
traditional Turkish elites.    
Following Turkey's application for EU membership in 1987, the linkages 
between the 'Europeanisation' and 'democratization' processes became more 
apparent. As the former has begun to include the latter, Turkey's Europeanization 
process has entered into tumultuous phases in the 1990s, making Turkey's Europe-
oriented foreign policy tradition a more difficult option to stick with.     
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3.1.1. Greece's Approach towards the European Union: A Bone in the Throat 
Even though its impact on the quality of EU-Turkey relations started to take place in 
the 1990s, it is important to note that Greece's Cold War era logic towards the 
European Union contributed to Turkey's misgivings on the credibility of EU's role in 
the resolution of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes, in a non-realpolitik manner.  
Since the foundation of the State in the early years of the 19th century, the 
Greek foreign policy aimed at enlargement of the Greek territories at the expense of 
the Ottoman Empire and the Greek security culture led the Greek politicians to view 
the European powers as possible allies, or external security guaranties, vis-à-vis their 
relations with Turkey (Goldstein, 1998: 154-169). This offensive realpolitik culture 
continued until the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor in the early 1920s. Since 
then, a kind of defensive realpolitik security behaviour could be noticed in foreign 
and security policy behaviour of Greece (Veremis, 1984: 1-40) This defensiveness 
has been overemphasised by the Greeks particularly in the aftermath of the 1974 
Cyprus crisis. The general conviction in the Greece of pre-1974 period was that the 
alliance link with the United States through NATO would have been the main 
external balancer in Turkish-Greek relations. Whenever Turkey might have pursued 
anti-Greek policies and whenever she might have tried to alter the regional balance 
of power in her favour, the Alliance would intervene and prevent Turkey from 
realising her aims. This is in fact what happened during the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus 
crises (Veremis, 1988: 236-286).  
As of 1974, Greece’s attempts at forging institutional links with the 
organizations of the western international community, particularly the EU, could be 
interpreted as ramifications of the above-mentioned alliance behaviour as foreseen 
by neo-realism: balancing the Turkish threat in the East through the alliance 
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relationship with the EU. The successive Greek governments viewed the EU as a 
'protector power' against Turkey, both in hard and soft terms (Ioakimidis, 1999: 169-
191). The main reason for Greece to view the EU as such is that Greece's well-
established security culture shaped Greece's conceptualization of the major European 
powers as sort of 'patrons' (Kourvetaris, 1999: 391-402). The way the Greek State 
was established in the 19th century and then the way how Greece could set into 
motion its well-known 'Megali Idea' policy against the Ottoman Empire determined 
Greece's post-1974 perception of the EU.  An evidence of this kind of Greek view of 
the EU could be found in Greece's advocacy of the EU's integration process in the 
areas of defence and security. Greece wanted to see the European Union to evolve 
into a kind of collective defence organization like NATO that would guarantee the 
external borders of the member states against all external territorial threats 
(Stivachtis, 2002: 35-53). 
Since Greece joined the EU in 1981 untill the second half of the 1990s, the 
majority of the Greek political parties converged on the foreign policy goal of 
Turkey’s exclusion from the EU's orbit and the confirmation of Turkey’s non-
European character by Greece’s partners within the EU (Tsakonas, 2001: 145-159). 
Such an exclusionary Greek approach towards Turkey was mainly made possible in 
such an atmosphere where the majority of the EU members were against Turkey's 
candidacy, not to mention its full membership. This negative EU attitude towards 
Turkey's membership and European character lent legitimacy to Greek efforts in 
manipulating the non-resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes as obstacles on 
Turkey's way to Brussels.  
Even though Greece's role had not been so strong as to mould the content of 
the EU's Cyprus policy, she was instrumental in leading the EU to have an interest in 
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Cyprus. Greece’s membership certainly led to a more active EU policy towards 
Cyprus, as various EU organs began to discuss the issue. Stemming from the high-
political character of the Cyprus dispute, Greece could have resorted to its veto 
power on other issues if her EU partners had not adopted pro-Greek stances on the 
Cyprus issue (Georgiadis, 2000: 421-430; Stephanou and Tsardines, 1991: 207-231). 
As will be clarified later on, against such an anti-Turkish profile of Greek 
foreign policy, it gradually become more difficult for Turkish politicians to believe 
that Greece really changed its perception of Turkey and started to act on the basis of 
a new cooperative logic since 1996/1999. The legacy of the first two decades of the 
Greek membership in the EU has not been so easy to put aside.                
Looking at the foreign policy behaviour of Greece towards Turkey and the 
European Union, one can notice a strong parallel between the two. As long as Greece 
was not so willingly committed to the integration process with the EU (Tsakolyannis, 
1996:186-207), she appeared to have formulated anti-Turkish foreign policies aiming 
at Turkey's exclusion from Europe. Paradoxically, the longer it took for Greece to 
Europeanize and to adopt more federalist and supranational logic towards the EU's 
integration process, the less support she could secure from her partners within the EU 
against Turkey (Mitsos, 2000: 53-89).  
All in all, Greece's efforts to make Turkey-EU relations more problematic by 
highlighting Turkey's non-'European-ness' in the eyes of the EU members did not 
strike a sympathetic chord among its partners, for the EU itself has not started to 
emphasise Turkey's non-European character yet. When Turkey was being considered 
a part of the western international community, where the EU used to follow the lead 
of NATO, Greece's attempts at damaging Turkey's relations with the EU were not 
seen legitimate and justified by her partners. When Turkey's Europe friendly foreign 
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and security policy orientation combined with Greece's US/Europe-sceptic external 
attitudes, the overall impact of Greece remained so marginal as to affect the main 
dynamics of Turkey-EU relations.      
In sum the promise of the European Union to contribute to cooperative 
Turkish-Greek relations was low during the Cold War era despite Turkey's inclusion 
in the Cold War era western international community. The fact that Turkey and the 
EU had a positive image of each other as their 'security providers' did only limit the 
success of the Greek efforts to utilise the EU mechanisms against Turkey.  In 
general, the facts that the EU was not an independent security actor of NATO; that 
the geo-political interests of the EU members were mainly confined to the western 
Europe; that Turkey and Greece did not view the EU from an ideational perspective; 
that Greece did mainly perceive its links with the EU from an instrumental 
perspective vis-à-vis its security relations with Turkey; that the EU's role in the 
drawing of the boundaries of the western international community was marginal and 
lagged behind that of NATO all contributed to the low promise of the EU's role in 
the Turkish-Greek relations.       
 
3.2. The Post-Cold War Era  
The characteristic feature of the post-Cold War era in the institutional relationship 
between Turkey and Greece through the EU and NATO has been that the EU has 
replaced NATO as the prime international institution of the western international 
community likely to affect the dynamics of bilateral Turkish-Greek relations. Due to 
a number of factors NATO lost its Cold War era importance in the bilateral relations 
and the EU replaced NATO in this regard. However the positive role of the EU in the 
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overall Turkish-Greek cooperative interaction process did not parallel the degree of 
EU's involvement in these relations.  
The possible role of the European Union to act as a credible actor in the 
resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes decreased in the 1990s despite the growing 
need on the part of the EU to involve in the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. 
Neither Greece ceased to view its relationship with the EU as an alliance relationship 
against Turkey, nor Turkey internalized the idea that its EU accession process 
constituted a legitimate ground for the resolution of its disputes with Greece. They 
did not cooperate on the margins of the European Union. This dissertation argues 
that this can be explained by the following factors: First, the credibility of the EU 
decreased in the Turkish eyes due to the deterioration of EU-Turkey security 
relations, which has eventually made Turkey's admission to the EU a difficult 
exercise. The decades-long 'security provider' images gradually gave way to 'security 
burden' images. The need and the legitimacy of Turkey's accession to the EU 
decreased on the EU side. The EU's so-called power of attraction did not produce 
cooperative outcomes on the part of Turkey towards Greece when the EU's post-Cold 
War era approach towards Turkey remained ambiguous, to say the least (Grabbe, 
2003). Thought of this way, the confirmation of Turkey's EU membership candidacy 
in December 1999 did not fundamentally change the dynamics of Turkish-Greek 
relations because the EU seems to have acted on an instrumental logic towards 
Turkey. The EU's approach towards Turkey did not lead Turkey to view Greece from 
a non-realpolitik perspective.  
Second, Turkey's approach towards the EU turned out to become more 
critical. The security elites gradually interpreted the EU's demands of membership as 
threatening the mainstays of the Turkish elites' decades-long security understanding. 
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Turkish security elites found it difficult to adopt the EU's security norms, for they 
thought the EU's norms were incompatible with Turkey's norms. This did negatively 
affect their willingness to socialize EU's norms. Third, the European Union did 
increasingly adopt a pro-Greek/Greek Cypriot view on the evolutionary process of 
Turkish-Greek disputes. This was made easier by Greece's efforts in further 
Europeanization since the second half of the 1990s. Fourth, Greece's well-established 
instrumental/realpolitik approach towards the EU and Turkey continued to operate 
over the last decade and that Greece's new openings since 1999 have not proved 
promising enough for any radical change on this approach.  
In the face of degrading Turkey-EU relations, Greece could more easily 
follow exclusionary anti-Turkey policies. Her efforts to legitimize her European 
identity became more sustainable when the EU seriously challenged Turkey's 
European identity. The facts that the EU generally viewed Greece from an 
instrumental perspective as bargaining tool in its relations with Turkey; that the EU's 
own view of Turkey did not go beyond the EU's attempts at constructively managing 
relations with Turkey; that the legacy of Greece’s realpolitik security culture all 
contributed to Greece's realpolitik approach towards Turkey. Unless the European 
Union viewed Greece as a true European country, rather than as a bargaining tool in 
its relations with Turkey, Greece did not even cooperate with her partners within the 
EU in the pursuit of EU's constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy vis-à-
vis Turkey. Before critically analysing the factors that made the EU as a non-credible 
actor in this process, one should first of all mention the reasons why the European 
Union increasingly became involved in the Turkish-Greek disputes and why the EU's 
involvement did radically affect the quality and tone of bilateral relations.  
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3.2.1. The Reasons for the EU’s Active Engagement with the Turkish-Greek 
Disputes  
First, the European efforts to reconstruct the EU’s post-Cold War identity on the 
basis of the promotion of the EU’s own security model to the conflict-laden places 
around the peripheries of the continent are important in this regard (Richmond, 2000: 
41-67). Cyprus has stood out the best case for the European Union to prove that its 
own security model could eventually lead to an everlasting peace in conflict-riven 
places. It would be a great success story for the EU's enlargement process if the 
Union could deliver a credible peace to the conflict-fatigued communities of the 
island. The EU's tarnished image as a conflict resolution actor might have been 
remedied after its failures in Yugoslavia.  
A related factor is that the post-modern and security community character of 
the EU would necessitate the resolution of border problems among candidates or 
between candidates and member states. It would have been an irrational action on the 
part of the EU to import such border disputes as Turkey and Greece have been 
experiencing in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus before their settlement (Tank, 1998: 161-
183). 
Second, the evaporation of the Cold War constraints made it possible for the 
EU to take a more active international profile in regard to the Turkish-Greek 
disputes. When the applications of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus combined 
with the loosening of the Cold War constraints, the EU could more easily deal with 
the Cyprus dispute. The need not to antagonize Turkey lost its currency when 
Turkey’s geo-political and geo-strategic value began to be defined in more non-
European ways (Bilgin, 2002). 
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The third reason why the EU became more active in the 1990s relates to 
Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus’s aspirations to further integrate with the EU. 
Had the EU continued to act as a bystander, both the EU's constructively managed 
deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey might have been negatively affected and 
the EU's enlargement and deepening process might have been sabotaged by the 
uncompromising Turkish and Greek policies (Brewin, 2000: 21-34). 
Finally, Greece's attempts at Europeanising the dynamics of Turkish-Greek 
relations along the opportunities opened by Turkey's accession process should not be 
forgotten. If Greece had not wanted to get the EU to establish a link between 
Turkey's EU membership and Turkey's policies on Cyprus, then the EU might not 
have elevated the Turkish-Greek disputes to such a significant status as it is today 
(Featherstone, 2001: 141-162; Zambouras, 1999: 114-127). 
In regard to the reason why the EU's involvement fundamentally altered the 
dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations, and contributed to the perpetuation of 
realpolitik security understandings in the region, one can argue that this has been so 
because of the changing character of the European Union in the 1990s. In contrast to 
the Cold War era, the EU of the post-Cold War era more increasingly acted as a 
community building institution. Over the last decade the policies of the European 
Union, particularly with respects to the enlargement process, defined the ideational 
boundaries of the 'European-ness'. Who would be regarded as European or not 
became to be linked to the way the EU engaged with outside states. Depending on 
the quality of the institutional relationship between the EU and an aspirant country, 
some countries were seen as more 'European' than others. The EU became the main 
European international institution determining the limits and terms of membership in 
the European international society (Diez and Whitman, 2001: 43-67). The 
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community building functions of the EU contributed to Turkey and Greece's 
estrangement from each other.   
This is important because the behaviours of the members of the EU-based 
European international society towards each other would somehow be different from 
their behaviours towards outside states that are labelled as non-European. Just as 
many of the CEECs tried to justify their European identities by referring to the non-
'European-ness' of the countries lying in their further east (Moiso, 2003: 89-116), 
some of the current EU members also tried to legitimize their European identities by 
differentiating themselves from the countries that the EU gradually excluded from 
the accession process. The density of this representational interaction process would 
become more between a current member of the EU, whose own European identity is 
already disputed by a great number of circles in Europe, and an outside non-
European country. The only strategy to be left for the former to prove its own 
European identity would be to do everything possible to contribute to the non-
'European-ness' of the latter.  
This was exactly the logic behind Greece's exclusionary attitudes towards 
Turkey and her claim to EU membership. Under such conditions it would have been 
futile to expect that Turkey and Greece could have developed a collective identity 
between each other along Turkey's EU accession process, which would in turn have 
engendered the resolution of their territorial disputes in problem-solving win-win 
framework.     
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3.2.2. Turkey's Gradual Exclusion from the EU Membership due to Diverging 
Security Identities/Cultures of the Parties  
In order to understand the fluctuations in the promise of the EU in contributing to the 
resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, through the transformation of realpolitik 
security cultures in the region into non-realpolitik ones, one should certainly have a 
closer look both at the EU's changing international/security identity and its impact on 
the EU's enlargement process in general and Turkey in particular. Without getting 
into the roots of the EU's post-Cold war security identity, one would not be able to 
grasp the logic of EU's enlargement process and the terms of the accession criteria 
that the EU required candidate countries to fulfil. It is the contention of this 
dissertation that the main reason why the European Union did not actively contribute 
to Turkey's socialization into EU's security norms is that the EU members did 
gradually find the idea of Turkey's inclusion in the Union as incompatible with their 
own security cultures. Therefore, they did neither try to teach their norms to Turkey 
nor persuade the latter to the legitimacy of the EU's norms; the only thing they did 
was to grade Turkey's performance whether the latter could adopt the EU's norms on 
its own. Thought of this way, this section simply argues the EU's power of attraction 
did not have a potitive impact on the overall Turkey-Greece relations when Turkey's 
chance to be incorporated into the EU gradually diminished as the EU increasingly 
found it difficult to justify Turkey's inclusion either on identity or economic 
rationality. This section holds that EU's security concerns vis-a-vis Turkey only 
allowed for Turkey's categorisation as a candidate country.    
When the European Union members accelerated the process of integration in 
the second half of the 1980s, democratization and human rights concerns gradually 
replaced the sheer strategic-security concerns in the EU's attitudes towards third 
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countries (Kuniholm, 2001: 25-53). The 1990s saw that the EU evolved into a 
mixture of civilian-normative-international actor, rather than a military one having 
strategic-security interests only.  
While the civilian dimension of the EU’s identity concerns the huge 
economic resources of the EU members at their disposal, its normative dimension 
stems from the its ability to determine the confines of ‘normalcy’ and 'appropriate 
state behaviour' in global international society. Possessing a ‘power of attraction’, the 
European Union is able to set the normative standards of the global society. It does 
this mainly through the mechanisms of the accession processes (Christou, 2002). The 
aspirant countries are in one sense encouraged by the European Union to adapt their 
socio-economic and political structures to the existing EU norms. Through this way, 
it is hoped that the structural causes of potential instabilities and conflicts would fade 
away.  
Despite all these, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that today’s EU 
possesses the traits of an embryonic military actor as well. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1991, the EU has taken some important steps on the way to becoming a 
global military actor. Following the failures in the territories of the Former Socialist 
Republic of Yugoslavia, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, the EU members 
increased their efforts to make the EU a military security actor able to speak and act 
with one voice. Since the Leaken Summit in December 2001, the European Security 
and Defence Policy dimension of the EU's integration process has been 
operationalized (Lizec, 2003: 32-51). 
However, on balance today’s EU is more of a normative-civilian actor than a 
global military one. It is still the case that there is not enough cohesion among the 
EU members as for geo-political and strategic issues (Van der Wusten and Dijkink, 
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2002: 19-38). In geo-political terms, it seems that each individual EU member, 
particularly those with an imperial legacy, has more actor-ness than the EU itself as 
an institution. For instance, France and the United Kingdom, two ex-imperial 
powers, led the way in the evolution of European Security and Defence Policy 
(Rasmussen, 2002: 39-60; Larsen, 2002: 283-302). The latest Iraqi war has once 
again revealed that there is not any cohesion among the EU members as to the scope 
and direction of the ESDP (Ortega, 2002).  
Despite the reinvigorated European efforts to turn the EU into a military actor 
with strategic-security interests around the peripheries of the continent, the fact that 
the EU members have been further scaling down their military spending seems to 
have blocked this initiative as well. The EU’s determination to activate a rapid 
reaction force of 60.000 by the end of 2003 might fail owing to the low military 
budgets and the lack of a common strategic outlook among the members (Muller, 
2003; Kapstein, 2002: 141-155; Gordon, 1997: 74-101). The enlargement of the EU 
will likely complicate this process as the cohesiveness within the EU might diminish, 
which has become evident during the latest Iraqi crisis (Ortega, 2002).  
During the post-Cold war years the geo-politic horizons of the European 
Union did not expand to include the Greater Middle Eastern region. The main area of 
interest of the European Union was confined to Western Europe, as well as the 
central and eastern parts of the continent (Lewis, 2001: 22-42). Even the Balkan 
region was marginally elevated to a significant status following the catastrophic wars 
in the territories of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (Kagan, 2002).  
Therefore, the need and legitimacy to incorporate Turkey into the Union on 
the basis of EU's security imperatives did not necessitate offering Turkey a credible 
membership prospect. The best possible means for the European Union to deal with 
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Turkey and the security concerns that might emanate from Turkey seemed to have 
been the placement of Turkey into an accession process, throughout which Turkey 
would remain in the EU's orbit and transform its security culture/identity along that 
of the European Union. While the accession of the EU into CEECs constituted a geo-
political necessity on the part of the EU, the continuation of the accession process 
with Turkey in an ambiguous way was legitimized by the EU's same international 
identity (Christiansen, Petito and Tora, 2000: 389-415).  
In addition to these security-related explanations, one can also claim that the 
pull of civilisational and cultural factors were not so high on the side of the EU to 
offer more promising/credible membership prospects to Turkey. When the cultural 
and ethnical factors gained importance in the EU's attempts at re-constructing the 
boundaries of the European identity, the Central and Eastern European countries 
received warmer treatment from the EU (Sjursen, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2001: 47-
80; Whitman, 1997)). For example, it was under such conditions that the CEECs 
could leap ahead of Turkey on the road to Brussels. Their performance in meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria was not so brighter than that of Turkey, particularly in the 
field of economic and in terms of their ability to adopt the EU's Community Law 
(Onis, 1999: 107-136). That is why the EU had to announce in December 1997 that 
the aspirant states would have to meet at least the political criteria to start the 
accession talks with the EU. The condition to meet the political dimensions of the 
Copenhagen criteria has become a benchmark since 1997 to measure the 'European-
ness' of aspirant countries.         
Turkey's placement in the EU's accession process became a necessity for the 
EU's own security interests in the wake of the Kosovo war in 1999 (Nicolaidis, 2001: 
245-277). That is why the EU offered Turkey candidacy status in December 1999 in 
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Helsinki. Before that date the EU did not feel the need to recognize Turkey as a 
candidate state in order to realize its security interests (Muftuler-Bac, 2000a: 489-
502; Muftuler-Bac, 2000b: 21-35).         
In analysing the post-Cold war era logic of the European Union towards 
Turkey from a security perspective, one needs to make it clear that the former acted 
towards the latter from two different time-perspectives. As for the short-term, it 
seems that there is a consensus among the EU members that while Turkey's 
accession to the EU would be to the disadvantage of the EU's international and 
security identity and delay the completion of the deepening and integration processes 
smoothly, the placement of Turkey on the EU's orbit within the framework of 
intensified EU-Turkey relations needs to be preserved. 
The Western European countries saw Turkey neither as ethnically nor 
ideationally similar to themselves (Neuman, 1999; Kahraman, 2000: 1-21) nor 
calculated that Turkey's accession to the EU alongside with the Central and Eastern 
European countries would be tolerable in terms of the costs it would incur on the 
EU's ongoing integration/identity-construction process. Based on this calculation, the 
EU did not want Turkey as a member before it could successfully digest the 
memberships of the first and second wave of applicant countries. Besides, the EU did 
not want to bind itself with a strong commitment to Turkey's membership when most 
of the EU members quarrelled among themselves about the future institutional 
structure of the EU and the legitimacy of Turkey's accession (Ozdag, 2002).  
It seems that the EU acted towards Turkey from a consequential logic with a 
view to eliminating possible Turkey-induced obstacles before it could successfully 
materialize its three important strategic goals. One was the continuation of EU-
Turkey relations in such a way that Turkey would never turn its face from the EU. 
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The second was that the Republic of Cyprus would join the European Union as a 
member in such a way that neither the Greek government would veto the whole 
enlargement process nor Turkey would integrate with the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (Eichinger, 1997: 197-203). The third strategic goal of the 
European Union was that the EU would have access to the military capabilities of the 
Alliance in such a way that both the EU would fulfil its goal of establishing the 
European Rapid Reaction Force in the shortest possible time and Turkey would not 
be able to sabotage this European project.  
 When these combined, it becomes really difficult to interpret the EU's long-
term objectives vis-à-vis Turkey. This dissertation argues that even if the EU's long-
term objective vis-à-vis Turkey entails Turkey's future accession to the EU from 
positive ideational concerns, the longer the short-term period lasts, the less 
promising/credible the EU's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations would 
become. The longer the short-term lasts, the more likely Turkey and Greece would 
move further away from each other and the more likely they would have a conflictual 
and realpolitik security environment in their region.          
 Looking from this perspective, one can safely argue that the EU allowed 
Turkey to be represented in the EU’s institutional structure to the extent that Turkey 
formed a part of the EU’s ‘near abroad’ in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Bilgin, 
2002). The EU-Turkey relationship within the context of ‘near abroad’ 
conceptualization aims at keeping Turkey under EU’s influence but denies to give 
her a fully respected seat in the EU (Webber, Terrif, Howorth and Croft, 2002: 75-
100). Such a relationship would resemble to a one-sided love affair with Turkey 
incessantly running after its EU membership and the EU refusing to give up its 
‘constructively managed deliberate ambiguity’ policy (interview with Seyfi Tashan, 
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25 April 2002). This conceptualization considers Turkey neither as a non-European 
nor European country, but located somewhere in the middle.  
The discursive practices of the EU to build its security identity on the twin 
processes of ‘integration-deepening’ and ‘promotion-enlargement’ seems to have 
constructed the tone of the post-Cold war EU-Turkey relations in accordance with 
the expectations of the pessimists in regard to Turkey’s place in the EU. While 
Turkey was not included among the Central and Eastern European countries, with 
which the European Union decided to initiate the accession negotiations mainly due 
to the strong pull of the civilisational logic, she was mentioned among the 
Mediterranean countries, with which the European Union decided to put into place 
the Euro-Mediterranean Process in order to contribute to the security and peace on 
the peripheries of Europe. Turkey was neither regarded as a part of the EU’s ‘Self’, 
as were the CEECs, nor considered as the ‘Other’ of the EU’s identity. In this era, 
civilisational geopolitics gained prominence over ideological geopolitics and 
political and cultural concerns began to mould the EU’s logic of action towards 
Turkey.       
It is only under this condition that Greece could successfully stir up Turkey-
EU relations. Without getting into this mental background of Turkey-EU relations, 
one could easily fall into the trap of blaming Greece for the EU’s approach towards 
Cyprus. If Turkey had expressed its satisfaction with the role that the EU seems to 
have offered her within the context of ‘near abroad’ conceptualization or if the EU 
had offered Turkey a promising membership prospect foreseeing the reality of 
Turkey's transformation into a real European country, then the increasing 
involvement of the EU in the Cyprus dispute would not have created such a great 
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havoc in the overall EU-Turkey relations (Interview with Gunduz Aktan, 3 May 
2002).  
Thought of this way, it can be argued that the EU did not agree to the 
improvement of relations with Turkey, through the institutions of Customs Union 
and Turkey's candidacy, because it started to think that Turkey should be a part of 
Europe’s Self. Even though the institution of candidacy improved Turkey's standing 
on the spectrum of 'European-ness', these were after all the steps, which needed to be 
taken by the European Union in order to continue its ‘constructive ambiguity’ policy 
towards Turkey in the age of enlargement (Interview with Seyfi Tashan, 25 April 
2002). Otherwise, the EU would have contributed to its insecurity through the 
alienation of Turkey from Europe (Kalaycioglu, 2002: 119-135). The EU's 
security/insecurity based policy towards Turkey did not contribute to the settlement 
of the Greek-Turkish disputes, whereas an identity-construction/consolidation policy 
towards Turkey would facilitate the settlement. 
However, if Turkey's candidacy were meant the EU's determination to 
actively contribute to Turkey's European identity with the real possibility of Turkey's 
eventual accession to the EU, then one might claim both that Turkey's ambiguous 
position vis-à-vis the EU started to lose ground and that Turkey's EU accession 
process did really become a promising framework for the resolution of the Turkish-
Greek problems. This would be so mainly for the reasons that neither Greece would 
be able to legitimize her realpolitik driven hostile policy towards Turkey within the 
EU nor Turkey would be able to resist the European calls for the settlement of 
Turkish-Greek disputes as part of Turkey's accession criteria and blame Greece for 
the Europeanization of the disputes as tactical manoeuvres against Turkey 
(Nicoliadis, 2001).  
 120
This dissertation argues that Turkey’s strangeness/otherness in the eyes of the 
EU members increased in parallel to a gradual differentiation between the security 
cultures of the two sides. This fundamentally curtailed the EU's influence to affect 
Turkey's behaviour through its so-called power of attraction. With the end of the 
Cold War era, Turkey turned out to become a rather ‘strange’ country for the EU as 
the former gradually lost her 'Cold War era meaning' in the eyes of the Europeans. 
Below is an account of the factors that engendered this differentiation, mainly on the 
part of the European Union.      
The first difference in the diverging security understandings of the EU and 
Turkey can be found in their attitudes towards NATO, transatlantic relations and the 
formation of the European Army as part of the EU's evolving 'Common Foreign and 
Security Policy' and 'European Security and Defence Policy'. For Turkey, 
membership in NATO was (and still is) its most important security guarantee. But 
more than that, what would matter for Turkey was the continuation of the European 
character of the Alliance. To Turkey, erosion in the European character of NATO 
would seriously challenge Turkey's 'European-ness', as well as its equal standing 
with the European members of the Alliance. Thus, Turkey's major post-Cold War 
security concern had to do with NATO's collective defence characteristic and the 
possibility of the dilution of the Article 5 commitments. In Turkey's thinking 
membership in NATO stood for Turkey's inclusion within the European international 
society. Would Turkey continue to feel secure and European in a NATO that 
included Russia and various Central and Eastern European countries and that has 
gradually become a collective security organization rather than a collective defence 
organization? Turkey assumed that NATO would evolve into a loose collective 
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security organization once it opened the way for new members from the east 
(Karaosmanoglu, 1999: 213-224; Eralp, 1997).  
Because the Turkish elite saw the emerging European army as part of an 
European attempt to construct an autonomous foreign and security policy identity 
that would transform the EU into a global geo-political security actor independent of 
NATO, it was imperative for Turkey to become a contractual party to it. In fact the 
Turkish security and political elite viewed the European' attempts in this regard as 
diluting the European character of NATO, and therefore Turkey's European identity. 
With this perception in mind, it was difficult for the Turkish elite to evaluate non-
membership in this new arrangement from a 'self-other' dichotomy (Orhun, 2000; 
Gozen, 2002).  
However, the Turkish elite misread the situation. This is mainly for three 
reasons. First, the reason why the EU members set into motion the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy was to prevent the re-emergence of balance of power politics 
among the EU members. In the face of the elimination of the Soviet threat in the 
East, the Europeans feared that their Cold War ally across the Atlantic might have 
decided to disengage from Europe. In such a case, they pondered that the balance of 
power politics might have revisited them. Thought of this way, construction of a 
common security and defence policy seemed to them the best possible way to 
prevent the continent from falling into the temptations of realpolitik security 
understanding.  
Second, the European Security and Defence Policy, which was set into 
motion in the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999, aimed at the establishment 
of a European Rapid Reaction Force, dubbed as the European Army, for the tasks of 
humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and conflict management (non-Article 5 
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missions). The low end of the Petersberg tasks did not foresee the creation of a 
European Army with war-fighting capabilities to be deployable in any part of the 
globe at short notice. Thought of this way, the primacy of NATO in European 
security structure was not radically challenged, for the EU members of the Alliance 
were aware of the fact that they would not be able to materialize even their above-
mentioned aspirations without the help/infrastructure of NATO. The major goal of 
the European Army was (and still is) to enable the EU members to respond to any 
future crisis of Yugoslavian-kind on the European continent (Rasmussen, 2002: 39-
60). 
Third, the EU members of the Alliance did not want to see NATO developing 
strategic and geo-political interests in different parts of the globe. To them, the 
Alliance was at the first instance created to find answers to Europe's own security 
problems. The end of the Cold War era should not have let the Americans to 
transform the strategic-outlook and horizons of the Alliance from being a European 
institution into a global security institution that would be in the service of the 
Americans. The Europeans did not want to get militarily involved in different parts 
of the planet just because they would have to follow the Americans in the pursuit of 
global American security interests. Thought of this way, Turkey's full-participation 
in the EU's evolving security mechanisms would have meant the possible/likely 
involvement of the EU-members in future American contingencies in the Greater 
Middle Eastern region. Put in another way, accepting Turkey's participation in the 
EU's own security structure would have meant the EU's approval of NATO's new 
global role in a new disguise. This would have certainly been in contradiction with 
the EU's Europe-limited security identity and interests. Somewhat in a contradictory 
way, Turkey contributed to the non-European character of the Alliance while 
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persistently asking for full membership in the EU's emerging security and defence 
policy mechanisms. Therefore, the EU members did not hesitate to reject Turkey's 
calls for full participation in these mechanisms, for such an eventuality might have 
implied that these emerging European structures would mean the continuation of the 
Alliance in a new guise.     
When the rationale for establishing an autonomous European army was 
attributed to these modest goals, the European Union would saw no reason to extend 
an invitation to Turkey just because Turkey was a NATO member with significant 
geo-political and sophisticated military assets (Webber, Terriff, Howorth and Croft, 
2002: 75-100). From this point of view, the EU members of NATO saw the 
Alliance's military capabilities as of great potential help for the embryonic European 
Rapid Reaction Force. They wanted NATO to function in the European theatre not to 
protect Europeans from a conventional source of threat but to intervene in possible 
crises that might erupt on the peripheries of the continent until such time as the 
European Union could mount its own army in the field.  
It is appropriate to devote here a relatively long section to the Turkish-EU 
quarrel over the ESDP issue, for this highlights the main reasons and the 
evolutionary process of the gradual deterioration in Turkey-EU security relations, 
resulting in Turkey's otherness and the perpetuation of realpolitik security 
understandings. The way Turkey was included within the post-Cold War era 
European security architecture is important because by analysing these modalities 
one could get a better picture of the EU's perception of Turkey and the EU's 
credibility in the Turkish eyes in regard to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek 
disputes.  
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 Turkey's equal standing with the EU members within NATO during the Cold 
War era gradually eroded as the European Union started to develop its distinctive 
foreign and security policy identity with the advent of the 1990s. This gradual 
change in Turkey's status did not come radically and abruptly. It was a step-by-step 
process, which started with the EU's decision to reactivate the Western European 
Union as the military pillar of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (Aybet, 
2000). Since 1992 Petersberg Declaration, where Turkey was defined as an Associate 
member of the WEU, till the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, where the EU took the first 
step to include the WEU in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy structure, 
Turkey's status within the European security architecture was somewhat satisfactory 
for her. Due to the intermediary position of the WEU between the EU and NATO, as 
defined the European pillar of the Alliance rather than the EU's military arm, 
Turkey's status in the eyes of the EU was defined in parallel to the dominance of the 
Alliance in European security architecture. Because the military capabilities of the 
EU members of the Alliance within the WEU were not strong enough to enable them 
to undertake Petersberg type (non-Article 5) military operations in Europe on their 
own, it became somehow a necessity on their part to rely on the military assets and 
the capabilities of NATO (Yikilkan, 2001). 
 The point that matters for the research purposes of this dissertation is that the 
less willing the EU members were to establish their distinctive security and 
international identity independent of NATO and the less militarily capable they were 
to undertake Petersberg type military operations, the less discriminatory they were 
towards Turkey's inclusion within the European security structures as a European 
country (Cebeci, 1999).  
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 A strong indication of the EU's less discriminatory attitude towards Turkey 
could be observed during the discussions between the EU and Greece on the impact 
of Turkish-Greek territorial disputes on the way how Greece would be accepted as a 
full member. In 1992, the WEU members agreed to Greece's WEU membership on 
the condition that the Article 5 commitments of the Modified Brussels Treaty would 
not be extended to Greece as far as its relations with NATO members, in particular 
Turkey, were concerned. Even though the WEU treated Turkey and Greece 
unequally, by admitting the former as an Associate member whereas the latter as a 
full member, it took utmost care not to extend a collective security guarantee to 
Greece in case the latter found itself in a war with Turkey (Platias, 1996: 33-54; 
Platias, 2000: 61-86). 
 Even though Turkey's status in regard to the WEU's military operations that 
would rely on NATO's assets was somehow satisfactory, this was not the case with 
respect to the WEU operations that would make use of only European sources. 
Turkey would not have a right to participate in the decision-making processes of 
such forces. Therefore, this could be interpreted as the first signs of the EU's 
discriminatory attitude towards Turkey. Turkey's 'European-ness' in terms of the EU-
only military operations was seriously challenged.   
 The danger for Turkey started to surface when the EU members decided to 
merge the WEU with the EU in their Cologne Summit in June 1999.* With the 
evaporation of the WEU, only two European security institutions with military 
components would have been left in place, one was NATO and the other was the EU. 
Since then, the linkage between the EU's approach towards Turkey's inclusion in the 
EU's security structure and the EU's view of NATO turned out to become more 
                                                           
* One can reach the EU’s Cologne presidency conclusions at: 
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htm  
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visible. The more the role of NATO in European security architecture decreased, the 
more discriminatory the EU approached towards Turkey (Cebeci, 1999). 
The degree of EU's discrimination against Turkey in the post-Cologne 
summit era increased. While the EU agreed to Turkey’s official candidacy on the one 
hand, she did also take the decision to establish a European Army of 60000 troops, to 
be deployable in 30 days, by the end of 2003 on the other. (Article 28 of the EU's 
Helsinki summit conclusions). While Turkey's official standing in the EU improved 
with the confirmation of its candidacy, the EU at the same time downgraded its 
standing in the EU's security and defence structuring (Howorth, 2001). 
The EU worsened its attitude towards Turkey after the merging of the WEU 
with the EU in late 2000. Following the Feira Summit in June 2000 and the Nice 
Summit in December 2000 the EU argued that Turkey had no legitimate right to fully 
participate in the decision-making process of the EU military operations even if that 
would rely on NATO sources because Turkey was not an EU member.* Rather than 
agreeing to the continuation of Turkey's associate membership rights within the 
WEU, whereby Turkey had a right to veto the use of NATO's assets by the EU on a 
case-by-case basis, the EU now argued that the EU should have an automatic access 
to NATO's assets. Turkey was allowed to participate only in decision-shaping and 
operational stages of EU-led military operations. Turkey's participation in such 
operations would be based on Turkey's wish to join. In regard to EU-only operations, 
Turkey could only participate if she were invited by the European Union and if she 
wanted to contribute forces. The logic on the part of the EU was that if Turkey 
wanted to join the EU, why questioning the legitimacy of the EU’s regulations that 
                                                           
* One can reach the EU’s Feira and Nice presidency conclusions at: 
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=62050&from=&LANG=1 and 
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=64245&from=&LANG=1  
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would make Turkey’s road to membership a more difficult exercise (Missiroli, 2002: 
9-26). 
In parallel to the EU members' efforts to endow their Union with a distinctive 
international and security identity independent of NATO, particularly in the 
aftermath of the EU's historic Helsinki summit, the non-European character of 
Turkey's security identity became more evident.      
 Looking from the Turkish side, the rationale was that if the EU were serious 
about Turkey’s membership and therefore would like to make use of Turkey’s high-
quality military capabilities in both types of military operations, why creating so 
much fuss about the inclusion of Turkey in the decision-making mechanisms. To the 
Turks, the half-a-century togetherness within NATO; Turkey's internalization of the 
same strategic culture of the western security community; Turkey's sophisticated 
military capabilities and Turkey's participation in many of the peacekeeping 
operations (cooperative security) alongside the Europeans should all have been 
enough to convince the EU members to the legitimacy of the idea that Turkey’s 
equal inclusion in the CFESP mechanisms would have been appropriate (Muftuler-
Bac, 2000: 489-502).  
In response to the EU’s negative stance on its participation in the decision-
making mechanisms of the emerging European Army as an equal party, Turkey long 
vetoed the EU’s right of assured access to the assets of the Atlantic Alliance 
(Missiroli, 2002). Two assumptions lied behind Turkey’s attitude towards this issue. 
The first was the possibility that the EU-NATO togetherness would further weaken 
in the years to come as the EU turned out to be an international actor of its kind with 
autonomous interests and military capabilities. The second was the possibility that 
Turkey’s European identity would be seriously disputed, for Turkey's membership in 
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the EU would not be likely in the foreseeable future. The dilution of NATO's 
European character and her possible exclusion form the emerging European security 
architecture would level strong blows to Turkey's claim to being European 
(Demirdogen, 2003: 52-59). Turkey simply behaved as a country that did not believe 
in the possibility of its EU membership in the short-run. It wanted to get as much 
concessions as possible from the EU. Any security role for Turkey, within the 
Middle Eastern context and based upon the strategic partnership with the United 
States on a bilateral basis (Karaosmanoglu, 1983), rather than through the NATO 
platforms where she would be treated as a European country and have a say on the 
European security, would in no way satisfy the establishment elite in Turkey (Candar 
and Fuller, 2001: 22-38). 
 The strange point in this regard occurred in the aftermath of the September 11 
era when the new international conjecture once again made it clear that NATO's 
(US') role as the main European security institution, at least concerning the hard 
security dimension of security understanding, was undisputed. When the failure of 
the EU members to increase their military spending combined with the increasing 
importance of the NATO's assets for the composition of the EU's military operations, 
it seemed that the bargaining power of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey diminished. 
Consequently, Turkey softened its position because the Turkish security elites 
thought that Turkey could strike a better deal with the EU while Turkey's geo-
strategic and geo-political value increased in the eyes of the western international 
community. The Turks might also have calculated that if Turkey had accommodated 
the EU over the ESDP issue, the EU would in turn have adopted less anti-Turkish 
stances on the accession of Cyprus to the EU. On the side of the EU, the need to rely 
on NATO's assets increased given the low military spending of the EU members due 
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to the reluctance of the European Public opinion to prefer guns to butter (Kasim, 
2002: 87-99). Besides, Turkey's exclusion from the EU's orbit in this new era might 
have been detrimental to the EU's security interests both in the continent and the 
EU's peripheries.        
The Ankara agreement was reached within such a strategic environment in 
December 2001. One can read this understanding as a successful manoeuvre of the 
European Union in constructively managing its relations with Turkey. Due to the 
strong Turkish resistance, the European Union appeared to have bowed to some of 
the Turkish claims. While the EU-led operations (using NATO’s strategic assets) 
would hinge on Turkey’s first-hand approval within the Alliance, the EU was given 
an assured access to the non-strategic assets of the Alliance. Regarding the EU-only 
(no use of NATO’s assets) operations, the EU promised to strongly take Turkey’s 
views into account and assured Turkey that she would have the right of first-refusal 
in the military operations that might take place within the sphere of Turkey’s 
influence. In other words, the EU promised not to take any military action around 
Turkey’s borders without the approval of the former. Therefore, one could rightly 
claim that the area of responsibility of the emerging European Army would not cover 
the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, for Turkey made it clear that it would in no way 
acquiescence in the employment of European Army there given that Greece might 
want to use it against Turkey (Cayhan, 2003: 35-54). 
Even though Greece did not let this agreement take a legal status for a year, 
the parties could finally come to a common understanding in late December 2002, on 
the margins of the EU's Copenhagen summit. The final arrangement reached in 
Copenhagen is similar to the Ankara agreement in the senses that both Turkey agreed 
to enhanced consultations rather than guaranteed participation in the decision-making 
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processes of EU-led and EU-only operations and that the EU promised to keep 
Cyprus away from the area of its responsibility (EU's Copenhagen Summit 
Conclusions). 
The second difference between Turkey and the EU in terms of their security 
cultures/identities concerns their threat perceptions and the means how to deal with 
them. Their objects of security did not always concur over the last decade. Turkey 
continued to regard developments in Russia, the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, particularly attempts by the latter to develop weapons of mass 
destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, as possible sources of 
conventional threats to its security (Sezer, 1992: 227-237; Sezer, 1995: 149-172). On 
the other hand, the EU members shared in the idea that today’s world pose no 
conventional threats to Europe’s security. To them, the greatest risks and challenges 
to the European security are posed by the undemocratic and unstable regions located 
on a rim stretching from the northwest Africa passing through the Balkans and 
reaching the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions (Xenakis, 2000: 75-
90). Cyprus and the Aegean Sea are such places where the vital security concerns of 
the European Union might be in danger if Turkey and Greece come to a collision 
course. Problems that might emanate from the unhealthy domestic structures of the 
countries located on these regions include immigration to the developed European 
countries, ethnic intra-state wars, environmental pollution, drug trafficking, 
organized crime and so on (Sjursen, 2001; Larsen, 2000: 337-356). Therefore, many 
European security analysts believed that Turkey's inclusion within the EU might 
increase 'conventional threats' to European security because Turkey lies at the 
epicentre of so many zones of instability, and its hard-security mentality might risk 
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bringing the EU into open conflicts with any one of Turkey's Middle Eastern 
neighbours (Muller, 2003; Buzan and Diez, 1999: 41-57). 
Third, they differed on their subjects of security. While the security referents 
within post-Westphalian Europe turned out to become 'society' and 'individuals', 
replacing the 'nation-state' (Manners, 2002; Waever, 1998: 45-63), in Turkey, on the 
other hand, the security elite continued to view the Turkish state and its territorial 
integrity as the main objects of security. Turkey's struggle with the Kurdish 
separatism and political Islam as the two most important security threats sharpened 
her non-European character (Ergil, 2000: 122-135). While the majority of the EU 
members gradually evolved into more democratic and pluralist entities where the 
source of states' legitimacy started to come from the protection of fundamental 
human rights, Turkey remained a different entity where the protection of the State's 
territorial and existential unity against the societal and external dangers constituted 
the most sacred ideal to die for.  
Fourth, the EU and Turkey also diverged in their approaches to terrorism. 
Turkey saw various kinds of terrorism as one of the greatest threats to its national 
security interests and prefers to rely on conventional military capabilities and 
military co-operation with the United States and Israel to 'contain' those threats 
(Guvenc, 2000: 131-163; Atesoglu, 2001: 26-32). The European Union adopted a 
rather more selective approach both towards the definition of terrorism and the 
means to deal with it. The EU refuses to treat all sort of anti-western (anti-US, anti-
EU) and anti-regime political activities in the ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states of the 
Greater Middle Eastern region as ‘terrorism’. In case the EU defines any activity as 
such, it tends to deal with it through ‘engagement’, not ‘containment’. Without 
initially rooting out the socio-political structure, which might (re) produce such 
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terrorist actions, the European circles ponder that terrorism could not be eradicated 
from earth (Hoffman, 1999; Lindley-French, 2002).  
It is within this spirit that the EU members long refused to incorporate the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and other leftist-oriented organizations into their list 
of terrorist groups, despite repeated calls from Turkey to do so. As long as such 
groups did not disturb the domestic order in EU member countries or abuse their 
right to express their claims peacefully within the plural democratic system of the EU 
area, the EU refused to see them either as terrorist organizations or as threats to its 
security (Eccarius-Kelly, 2002: 91-118).  
Fifth, their approaches to use of military force in dealing with both 
conventional and non-conventional threats also differed. The EU members 
considered the use of military instruments on the condition that such actions would 
contribute to the strengthening of the socio-political structures in unstable countries. 
For them, the use of military instruments did not constitute an end in itself in 
eradicating structural conflicts around the peripheries of the continent, but rather as a 
means to pave the way for the efficient implementation of the strategy of ‘structural 
development’. To this logic, efforts to endow the EU with a military body would not 
mean that the EU was inclined to evolve into a military security actor on a global 
scale, but rather a civilian power who might make use of military means in order to 
materialize its civilian goals (Solona, 2003). For the EU’s development aids to 
unstable regions around Europe’s peripheries to become successful in rooting out the 
structural causes of instability and terrorism, it became a necessity on the part of the 
EU to sometimes rely on miliary means (European Army). What the EU hoped was 
at least to provide for a minimum degree of internal stability in those areas, defined 
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as the absence of militarized warfare, before investing in structural development 
(Cornish and Edwards, 2001: 584-603).  
On the opposite side, Turkey both 'broadened' the range of issues that it saw 
as threats to its national security and 'narrowed' its perspective to deal with them to 
largely military means (Jung, 2001). The use of force as an instrument in dispute 
settlement became more likely, at least in initial stages. Ond could see this in 
Turkey's new military doctrine, which moved on from 'territorial defence' to 'forward 
defence.' One of the most important components of the doctrine is the 'forward 
deployment of Turkish troops in a pre-emptive manner.' (Hickok, 2000: 105-120) 
Sixth, the EU circles did also see Turkey as a problem just because of the fact 
that the majority of the Turkish political-security elite adopted a Euro-sceptic attitude 
towards Turkey's EU accession process. While believing in the necessity and 
legitimacy of undertaking the very reforms the EU demands, these Turkish circles 
also challenged this process in two main ways. While they on the one hand tried to 
bargain with the EU over the political terms of the accession process, they on the 
other hand insisted on their indigenous European identity and asked the EU members 
to admit Turkey as a member as it was. This kind of a Turkish attitude was totally 
different from that of the Central and Eastern European countries, which from the 
very beginning accepted the legitimacy and the supremacy of the EU's norms and 
thus endeavoured to internalize them as ardent door-knockers. Turkey's ambiguous 
approach towards the EU membership made the EU circles feel suspicious of 
Turkey's sincere intentions to join the EU. In the face of such Turkish ambiguity and 
counter-challenge, the EU circles did not feel committed to Turkey's inclusion and 
therefore did not lay down the mechanisms required for Turkey's smooth accession 
to the Union.   
 134
Seventh, not only have Turkey and the EU diverged on the definitions of 
threats to European security and stability from outside EU borders; they also felt out 
over the possible contributions of Turkey's membership to the distinctive security 
identity of the EU. While the majority of the Turkish elite argued for membership on 
the grounds that Turkey's inclusion would contribute to the multicultural and 
inclusive European identity, as well as its geo-political needs (Oguzlu, 2002/2003: 
51-83), a great many in European circles spoke loudly against Turkey's inclusion on 
the ground that its membership would seriously challenge the cohesiveness and 
homogeneity of the European identity. Turkey's membership would become a 
possible threat because to them the main security referent of the contemporary 
Europe was the highly interdependent and functionally well-developed integration 
process within the EU. As long as the EU integration project was regarded as the 
main security generating mechanism and based on efforts to forestall the 
'fragmentation' of the EU, Turkey's inclusion might seriously undermine those efforts 
(Winn, 2001: 19-48).  
A related issue in this regard concerns the EU's treatment of Turkey as a 
source of threat in terms of the issues if immigration and political asylum. The EU 
regarded Turkey's position on these two issues as threats in two senses (Boswell, 
2003: 619-638). First, the EU circles pondered that if Turkey did not liberalize 
(Europeanize) its immigration and political asylum rules, many people coming from 
Turkey's vicinity would like to come to the EU area, rather than Turkey. They would 
regard Turkey only as a gateway to Europe. The continuation of this situation would 
pose a threat to the EU because the EU area would become the number one 
destination for these people. Second, the EU circles calculated that if Turkey itself 
becomes an EU member, both the number of Turks, who would like to emigrate to 
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other EU countries, would increase and the number of other immigrants and political 
asylum seekers would more easily reach to the EU area. This situation would also 
pose a threat to the Europeans. The ideal situation from the EU's perspective would 
foresee that Turkey liberalised its regulations on these issues along the accession 
process; Turkey became a centre of attraction for many of these immigrant and 
asylum seekers originating from the Third World; and that Turkey remained on the 
EU's orbit rather than acceding to the EU (Kirisci, 2003: 79-106).   
Based on the account above, one can safely argue that Turkey’s accession to 
the EU over the last decade was not considered possible from a security perspective, 
for Turkey was thought of being a too hard security actor to be digested within the 
EU’s soft-security environment.  
 
3.2.3. Why Did the European Union Offer Candidacy to Turkey?  
The relevance of this part to the general argumentation of the dissertation lies in the 
reason why the European Union decided to elevate Turkey's status from being an 
'associate member-country' to a 'membership candidate' country, even though 
Turkey's performance in meeting the Copenhagen criteria was not promising during 
the last two years between December 1997 and December 1999. Did the EU circles 
come to the conclusion that Turkey would no longer be a security liability for the 
EU? Does the EU's change of decision imply the emergence of a serious EU 
commitment towards Turkey's full incorporation into the club in the years ahead? 
Have the doubts about Turkey's 'European-ness' and suitability to the EU 
membership been to a great extent evaporated with the confirmation of Turkey's 
candidacy in Helsinki in 1999? Or has the European Union acted on pure 
instrumental rationality in order to carry out with its well-established constructively 
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managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey? Could one claim that the 
confirmation of Turkey's EU membership candidacy had to happen otherwise the EU 
could not keep Turkey on the EU's orbit and therefore yield a significant influence on 
Turkey's policies?     
 
3.2.3.1. Instrumental Logic: Politics of Linkages 
The reason why the EU might have agreed on Turkey’s candidacy in December 1999 
seems to have resulted from the anxieties that Turkey’s intransigent attitude towards 
the EU membership of Cyprus and the use of NATO’s assets by the EU could 
sabotage the two fundamental EU projects, namely deepening and widening. 
Therefore, the European Union seems to have decided that the policy of offering 
candidacy to Turkey would be enough to break Turkey’s steadfastness on these two 
issues. Given that Turkey's non-conformist policies since December 1997 did 
militate against the EU's capability to influence Turkish politics, the EU might have 
decided to elevate Turkey's status to membership with a view to regaining its 
influence on Turkey (Nicoliadis, 2001: 245-275).    
 The developments in Turkish foreign policy between the Luxembourg rebuke 
in December 1997 and the Helsinki summit in December 1999 witnessed to a gradual 
nationalisation of foreign policy behaviour. The policies Turkey undertook in her 
environment most of the time did not reflect the Europeans' concerns (Yesilada, 
1999: 144-161). Either in response to the attempts of the Greek Cypriots at bringing 
in S-300 missiles to the island or in response to the increased Syrian support to the 
outlawed PKK terrorist organization, the way Turkey dealt with these developments 
were in direct conflict with the existing foreign and security policy norms of the 
European Union. In both occasions, Turkey did not hesitate to threaten with war if 
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her claims were not heeded (Makovsky, 1999: 92-113). To the surprise of some 
circles, Turkey’s politico-military assertiveness bare positive results as the Greek 
Cypriots had to agree to the deployment of the missiles in Crete instead of the island 
and as the Syrian government had to extradite expel Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, 
from Syria.                  
Another avenue for Turkey’s nationalised foreign policy behaviour took place 
in regard to Turkey’s intensified relations with Israel. In a direct breach of the EU’s 
norms, Turkey speeded up her efforts in seeking security through the formation of 
alliances (Altunisik, 2000: 172-191). While the 'coordination' norm of the European 
Union would expect Turkey to consult on the EU members before strengthening 
relations with Israel, the 'de-securitization' norm of the EU would envisage Turkey's 
efforts to gain security through the politicization of potential security issues, rather 
than formation of realpolitik security alliances. Neither of these happened as far as 
Turkey's relations with Israel were concerned.  
The significance of the re-nationalisation of Turkish foreign policy for the 
European Union came to the fore as far as the tension-producing character of 
Turkish-Greek relations was concerned. Between 1997 and 1999 the bilateral talks 
over the future of the Cyprus conflict ended as the Turkish Cypriots were 
emboldened by Turkey to opt for a more nationalistic, and intransigent to some 
European circles, attitude by making the restart of the inter-communal talks 
conditional on the prior recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(Eralp, 2000a; Eralp, 2000b: 173-188). 
The cease of the political dialogue between the EU and Turkey also resulted 
in the break up of the ‘Wise men process’ initiated by the Netherlands as a possible 
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platform for the Turkish and Greek high standing figures to come together to 
exchange views over the bilateral problems.    
In addition to her increased sensitivities over the EU membership of the 
Greek Cypriots, as representing the whole island, Turkey also adopted a less 
accommodating attitude towards the use of NATO’s assets by the European Union. 
In an effort to defy the deal reached in NATO’s Washington Summit in April 1999, 
the EU displayed its discontent with the continuation of the arrangements used to 
regulate the WEU-NATO relations. The NATO’s summit in spring 1999 allowed for 
Turkey to maintain her privileges arisen out of the NATO-WEU understanding. 
However, the European Union, particularly after incorporating the WEU into its 
institutional structure, was in a mood to alter those regulations in a way that would 
enable her to act more independently of NATO. While the arrangement between the 
WEU and NATO allowed NATO to say the last word in terms of the use of NATO’s 
assets by the WEU operations, the European Union preached for the autonomous EU 
operations even if the EU might rely on NATO’s military capabilities (Park, 2000: 
315-328). 
 
3.2.3.2. Germany 
Another significant factor that seems to account for the EU's volta-face in regard to 
Turkey's candidacy in 1999 concerns the governmental shuffle in Germany in 1998. 
If one took into consideration the opinions of the leading figures of the Socialist-
green coalition government on the enlargement of the EU and the character of the 
integration process within the EU, a clearer picture would surface. Instead of 
adopting a rigid and uni-track enlargement and integration process, those people 
argued for a multi-track mechanism in response to the challenges put before the 
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European Union as to the ideal method of dealing with problems arising out of the 
integration and enlargement processes. To this understanding the European Union 
should develop a new strategy, which would allow for the willing EU members to 
proceed with further integration while less reluctant EU members would be free in 
maintaining their reservations but not obstruct other’s intentions to further deepen the 
integration process. Applied to the enlargement process, this thinking would foresee 
that the European Union would proceed on different levels of expansion by admitting 
the most successful candidates into the first track of members while letting the others 
join the club on less intensive levels (Nicoliadis, 2001).  
This kind of two tracks deepening and enlargement processes would satisfy 
the needs of both the federalists and inter-governmentalists members by allowing the 
first group of countries to see the EU transformed into a more developed political 
actor while letting the second group of countries fulfil their conception of the 
European Union, that is something more than a confederation and less than a 
federation. If the German conception of the European Union allowed for any place 
for Turkey in the second track members of the Union, then one could trace back the 
reasons for the policy change in the aftermath of the government change in Germany.  
As far as the EU’s ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ processes were understood as 
constitutive of each other, the view of the Christian Democrats on Turkey’s 
membership would not have been compatible with this understanding. To Christian 
Democrats, the European Union is a civilisational project and based on the values of 
Christianity and distinctive western European values. Therefore, Turkey has no place 
within this entity. The best way to deal with Turkey would foresee the continuation 
of relations on economic and strategic dimensions. This would be the best approach 
for both sides mainly because it is lest costly one. The leaders of the Christian 
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Democratic Parties of the EU members met in Netherlands on the 3rd of March 1997 
and discussed the future shape of the EU. On the margins of these meetings, they 
also decided that Turkey could not join the EU as a member due to the significant 
cultural and ideational differences with the Europeans..              
 
3.2.3.3. Britain 
Another possible view accounting for the change in the attitude of the European 
Union towards Turkey is that the priorities of the British government led to a more 
inclusive European attitude in regard to Turkey’s future membership. The proponents 
of this view hold that the United Kingdom government saw in Turkey a militarily 
strong ally, which could help the Union materialize its goal of constructing an 
independent Common Security and Defence Policy. Because the EU failed once 
again in Kosovo, after the failures in Bosnia and Crotia, as a military actor first to 
prevent the deadly conflicts to arise and later to help put an end to them, the United 
Kingdom might have thought that if Turkey became an EU member, despite her 
structural deficiencies for membership, the EU might more easily transform into an 
international actor able to act militarily. This view is also shared by some Turkish 
observers, to whom the EU offered candidacy to Turkey because of the latter’s 
strategic capabilities emanating from her NATO membership in a volatile region, her 
strategic location, and her highly developed military capabilities (Muftuler-Bac, 
2000: 21-35). 
Another view that attributes Turkey’s candidacy to the British support holds 
that the UK supported Turkey’s membership because of her inter-governmentalist 
desires as for the future of the EU. To this view, the membership of Turkey in the EU 
would dilute the supranational character of the integration process. Turkey’s 
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membership would also serve the continuation of the American influence within the 
Union. In addition to the United Kingdom, the other country that has strong 
dependency relationship with the United States is Turkey. Therefore in case Turkey 
achieved membership, the inter-governmental character of the Union would go hand 
in hand with the continuation of the American influence on the European politics. 
This American influence would most intensely be felt in the areas of security and 
defence policies. Turkey and the United Kingdom would act as Troyan horses of the 
US interests within the EU.  
Another radical explanation for the British support to Turkey’s candidacy is 
that the UK wanted to make Turkey’s candidacy status as a bargaining chip in its 
relations with France. In order to demonstrate its pro-EU stance, the Blair 
government might have decided to support the embryonic Common European 
Security and Defence Policy. However, it was clear to Blair that the Americans 
would not easily give their consent to this project if its link to NATO were not 
overtly built. Therefore, the British might have thought that if the prospects of 
Turkey’s, a staunch ally of the US in Europe, future membership in the EU was made 
clear through the announcement of Turkey’s candidacy, then the Americans might 
not erect unbridgeable barriers to the formation of the European Army (Nicoliadis, 
2001).     
For the research interest of this dissertation, the most welcome account of the 
change in the EU policy towards Turkey would be that the EU accepted Turkey’s 
formal candidacy based on her possible contributions to the emerging multi-cultural 
European identity. If Turkey were seen as a state-society complex which could live 
within the cultural complex of the EU with her distinctive identity, then the chances 
for the European Union to act as a honest broker in the settlement of the Turkish-
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Greek disputes would increase. If the European Union’s integration process unfolded 
on a clearly defined ‘us against them’ mentality, then the possibility for different 
cultural entities to live within the EU would be dim. Only a multi-cultural and multi-
track European Union would allow for membership of countries, which are not 
inherently western European. 
On the other hand, if Turkey was admitted to candidacy on the basis of her 
conjectural importance for the European Union’s strategic and security interests, then 
her place within the EU would lie on shaky grounds letting the international political 
conjecture determine the European perception of Turkey. Depending on the character 
of the international political developments, Turkey’s significance to the EU would 
tend to show fluctuations. 
 
3.2.4. Turkey's Approach towards the European Union 
The underlying question of this section of the dissertation is why Turkey could not 
internalize the EU's security norms in a problem-free manner and therefore see the 
resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes within the EU framework as a legitimate 
component of her accession process with the EU. The potential role of the EU has 
also been affected by the particular logic Turkey has adopted towards the EU in the 
1990s. In general, Turkey has embraced a very critical approach towards the EU 
accession process. The struggle with political/radical Islam and Kurdish separatism 
on the one hand and Greece's use of the EU against Turkey on the other both led to 
Turkey's further divergence from the EU's security norms and made the Turkish 
security elite view the accession process as threatening (Cizre, 2003: 213-231; 
Ulman, 2000: 99-130). Even though the following sections discusses in detail the 
impact of Turkey's well-established realist security culture on its approach towards 
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the EU accession process, it would be apt to point out here that there have been two 
general factors affecting Turkey's approach towards the EU.       
First, Turkey acted towards the EU as if it was going to join an inter-
governmental organization where it would not be required to share its sovereignty 
with the supranational organs of the Union in Brussels and the local authorities 
dispersed within the country. Having failed to capture the identity-transformative 
affects of the EU’s integration process, Turkey incessantly made the case that the EU 
needs to respect Turkey’s unique socio-political conditions and therefore should not 
interfere with its domestic as well as foreign affairs to the extent the accession 
process might entail (McLaren, 2000: 117-129).  
Second, in contrast to the Cold War era, when the established elites set the 
major goal of Turkey’s foreign policy as the full participation in the western 
international community, the new era saw a gradually increasing attention of the 
Turkish public towards the meaning of Turkey’s membership in the EU. It is no 
longer automatic and for sure that the majority of the Turkish society want EU 
membership without questioning the ramifications of this action. Turkey’s blind-
eyed commitment towards the EU membership has no longer been the case and this 
seems to have constructed (constructed by) Turkey’s doubts on the intentions of the 
European Union vis-à-vis Turkey. The domestic discussion process has gained an 
upward turn since the confirmation of Turkey's candidacy in 1999. The less 
ambiguous the EU's attitude towards Turkey's accession has become, the more 
principled and analytical arguments have been voiced either for or against EU 
membership in Turkey. Since 1999, the major fault-line in Turkish political life has 
been drawn along the EU membership of the country (Onis, 2003; Avci, 2003: 149-
170; Carkoglu: 2003: 171-194). 
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However, the gradual development of such a critical approach towards the 
EU membership should not mean that a purely material instrumental logic started to 
dominate Turkey's thinking. Turkey has never adopted a pure cost-benefit rationality 
towards the European Union. This could be seen in Turkey’s reactions towards the 
consequences of the Customs Union. If a pure economic reasoning, based on cost-
benefit analysis, had shaped Turkey’s decision-making, then the Customs Union deal 
with the EU should have never been cut because Turkey’s expected economic 
benefits from the Customs Union would have fallen far behind those of the European 
Union (Calis, 2001: 123-137). This shows that main reason why the Turkish elites 
applauded the Customs Union is that they interpreted this as an important stage on 
the way to Turkey's eventual EU membership (Eder, 2003: 219-243). However, 
when the European Union did not take any responsibility for Turkey's socialization 
into EU's norms, by adopting teaching and persuasion strategies, this particular 
Turkish approach did not lead to Turkey's transformation of its security culture from 
realpolitik to non-realpolitik. These two factors did result in the dominance of Euro-
sceptic circles in Turkey that has further curtailed Turkey's transformation.   
 
3.2.4.1. Impact of Turkey's Security Culture on Its Reading of the EU Accession 
Process 
In a country, which invests a lot in the integration with any particular kind of 
international organization, the political elite should share in the idea that integration 
would bring further security benefits to their country. If there existed serious doubts 
over the merits of the integration process as such that further integration would 
curtail the territorial sovereignty of the country leading to an overall decrease in the 
level of security felt, then the integration process would be levelled a serious blow. 
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In such a case, the domestic forces, which emphasise the sovereignty sensitivities of 
the country, would gain further ground at the expense of the forces, which argue for 
the security-generating effects of the integration process (Feldman, 2000).  
Construed as such, it is important to discuss the ongoing discursive battle 
between the Euro-sceptic and pro-EU circles in Turkey in order to comprehend 
Turkey's growing critical approach towards the European Union. Of particular 
importance are their definition of Turkey's security identity and interests, their view 
of the EU's integration process and their diverging interpretation of the impact of the 
EU's accession process on the security of the nation-state, particularly concerning the 
dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations. Turkey's particular approach towards the EU 
and her performance to meet the EU's demands/norms would strongly depend on the 
people who rule the country. The more the Euro-sceptics reign in Ankara, the more 
Turkey becomes critical of the European Union and the less promising the EU's 
involvement in Turkish-Greek relations turns out to be.  
Thought of this way, it would be appropriate to state here, just before moving 
to a full discussion of their views that the Euro-sceptic circles were in the dominant 
postitions over much of the 1990s. By this group of people, this paper means the 
higher echelons of the military and the majority of the political parties that came 
together within successive coalition governments over the last decade. These people 
are categorically in favour of Turkey's membership in the EU but problematize the 
terms of the accession process. One of the main factors that seems to explain their 
dominance in power is that the European Union circles could not show a clear 
commitment towards Turkey's incorporation into the Union and they could not 
sincerely and actively support the pro-EU circles in Turkey (Onis, 2003). When these 
factors combined with the opportunities that the ongoing democratization process 
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opened, the Euro-sceptic circles could succeed in dominating the domestic political 
life by mobilising the public opinion around nationalistic and at times anti-EU 
platforms (Adamson, 2002: 163-179).  
 
3.2.4.1.1. The Pro-EU Discourse 
Of the two current discourses, the pro-EU one constructs the ongoing accession 
process as the road-map that accelerates the pace of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU as 
a full member. These people approach the EU from the logic of appropriateness in 
the sense that Turkey's claim to become an European/western country would foresee 
nothing but Turkey's attempts at internalizing the EU's norms without questioning 
them. The adherents of this view (mainly Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association-TUSIAD, Economic Development Foundation-IKV, the Centre of right 
parties-Motherland Party, the new version of political Islamists-the Justice and 
Development Party) feel committed to the idea of European integration and are 
content with the current structure of the European Union (Kopecky and Mudde, 
2002: 297-326). This discourse overemphasises the things that Turkey needs to do. 
The underlying assumption here is that as the accession process unfolds, the quality 
of Turkey’s relationship with the EU and the degree of Turkey’s security will 
improve. This will be so because Turkey will gradually embrace the EU’s distinctive 
security identity, not the other way around.  
In regard to the general character of EU-Turkey relations, these people 
recommend that Turkey should behave in such an appropriate manner that would 
display its sincerity on the EU membership. Feeling so suspicious of the future 
intentions of the European Union on Turkey's security does not suit a country, which 
has continuously tried to make its way to Brussels. These people seem to be aware of 
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the fact that the relationship between the EU and Turkey is not symmetric and 
balanced and that Turkey, as the weaker party in this interaction process, is the side 
that should better do its homework to qualify for the membership. After all it is 
Turkey that knocks on the door of the EU.  
Turkey's Customs Union deal in 1996, the publication of yearly progress 
reports since 1998, the confirmation of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999, the devising 
of the Accession Partnership Document in 2000, the invitation by the EU of Turkey 
to participate in the European Convention meetings, the enunciation by the EU’s 
December 2001 Leaken Summit of the possibility of the start of Turkey’s accession 
talks, and the statement of a date for the start of Turkey's accession talks in 
December 2002 in the EU's Copenhagen summit, are all referred to by the pro-EU 
circles in Turkey as evidences to the commitment of the EU towards Turkey’s 
membership (Kaleagasi, 2003; Aktar: 2001).  
To this logic, if Turkey preserves its enthusiasm in complying with the 
Copenhagen criteria and fulfils the required steps that the Helsinki conclusions and 
the Accession Partnership document define, then it would be harder for the 
Europeans to delay the start of Turkey’s accession talks for long. Once the accession 
talks start, it would be much easier and somehow automatic that the EU will admit 
Turkey as a member.  
What seems to have led these circles to feel highly optimistic about the 
possibility of Turkey’s EU membership is the logic that ‘appears’ to govern the 
current enlargement process of the EU towards the Central and Eastern European 
countries. To that logic, the EU is a post-modern security community and there is not 
a space-bounded conceptualization behind the EU’s enlargement strategy but a 
temporal-mechanical understanding, which is mainly built on the principle that any 
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European country can become an EU member provided that its satisfies the 
Copenhagen criteria. In other words, this temporal logic implies a kind of ever-
enlarging EU whose borders are not defined by clear-cut frontiers (Youngs, 2001; 
Ehrhart, 2002; Laffan, 2001: 709-727).  
Looking at Turkey’s relations with the EU from a geo-political perspective, 
the pro-EU view holds that Turkey, as an EU member, would be more able to pursue 
its geo-political interests in its neighbourhood. Because Turkey’s current capabilities 
do not allow her to materialize her security interests in the most effective way, its EU 
membership would provide her with additional means in this regard. To them, 
Turkey’s eventual membership in the EU would signify the realization of the 
permanent peace between Turkey and Europe (Ozdag, 2002: 28). Turkey would not 
be able to ward off the dangers to its security, if it does not pursue a closer 
relationship with the EU or just relies on its strategic relationship with the United 
States (Dagi, 2001; Aktar, 2003). In today’s world, the EU membership seems to be 
the only avenue for Turkey to effectively respond to the risks and challenges of 
globalization. The sooner Turkey joins the EU, the more secure it would feel, in 
regard to both hard (conventional) and soft (non-conventional) security threats 
(Aktar, 2003).                
To this discourse, the most important strategic issue that appears to have 
obstructed the effective functioning of Turkey’s relations with the western 
international community in general and the EU in particular for long is Turkey’s 
quarrel with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. As long as these problems 
linger, it would be the case that Turkey’s place in the West will be questioned. It is 
only through Turkey’s accession process with the EU that the Turkish political-
military elite would feel the need to come to a compromise with Greece, that might 
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in the end relive Turkey of one of the stumbling blocks in its relations with the West. 
So the Europeanization of these problems is in fact an opportunity, not an obstacle as 
the Euro-sceptics argue, for Turkey to come closer to the EU and thus claim its 
rightful place in the western international community. Because Turkey’s membership 
in the EU would give her the means to check the Greek influence in the region, 
Turkey should not be scared of the possibility of the EU’s involvement in the 
solution of these problems. If Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Turks and Turkish Cypriots 
all alike live within the EU, why fear of the Europeanization of the Cyprus and 
Aegean disputes (Belge, 2003).  
There seem to exist two major assumptions behind their optimism. One is 
related to the role that Turks generally assume Greece plays in the EU-Turkey 
relations. These people are of the view that one should not exaggerate Greece’s 
potential to determine the main dynamics of Turkey’s relations with the EU (Ugur, 
2001: 161-198). They hold that if Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen criteria in its 
earnest and in turn if the major EU members feel optimistic about Turkey’s accession 
to the EU, then it would not be a difficult task for them to overcome any possible 
Greek veto. They think that the further Turkey meets the membership criteria on the 
basis of the EU's security culture, the more pressure the EU would put on Greece to 
accommodate with Turkey. To them Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis Greece 
would only increase under such a condition. Their second assumption is that Turkey 
would find it easier to come to a compromise solution with Greece through the EU. It 
would become much easier for the Turkish politicians to sell any Turkish-Greek deal 
struck through the EU to the public. Once the thorny issues drop out of the agenda, 
then it would be easier for Turkey to take other required steps for membership. The 
existence of the Turkish-Greek disputes symbolises the most important psychological 
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barrier before Turkey’s compliance with the EU accession process (Ozdag, 2002: 
58).  
These circles look at security from a different perspective. In an age of 
diminished threats from other states, they argue that the main security referents in 
Turkey should be the society in general and each Turkish citizen in particular. In 
today’s world, the overall security of a nation-state cannot solely be measured by the 
degree of exemption from external threats but the degree of happiness and 
satisfaction its citizens feel. If there is no domestic peace, there is not going to be 
security (Dagi, 2001). The emphasis these people put on the societal dimensions of 
security seems to be in accordance with the current trends in international relations 
and the EU's integration process (Thelier, 2003: 248-263). These people see Turkey's 
EU accession process as the best strategy to deal with security threats, risks and 
challenges incurred by the ongoing globalization process (Bilgin, 2002, APSA).  The 
flow of European money to Turkey, the continuation of democratization process and 
Turkey's successful integration with the global world would only occur if Turkey 
stayed on the EU accession process.  
Thought of this way, the pro-EU circles in Turkey claim that Turkey’s 
accession process with the EU is something good for the country because it reflects 
the letter and spirit of such a security mentality they claim to represent. Through 
pluralisation and liberalization of the domestic political life, they think Turkish 
people would be able to discuss every issue and in the end reach satisfactory 
outcomes. Turkey can only solve its problems of Kurdish separatism and political 
Islam through the process of politicization of these issues (Belge, 2003; Ozel, 2003). 
They fear that if Turkey turns its face away from the EU, no credible incentive would 
continue to exist for the establishment elite to try to embrace compromise solutions 
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to the issues of concern. A Turkey, which solved its major domestic problems 
through the EU accession process, would be more powerful and secure than as it is 
now. Above all, the main reason why the pro-EU circles in Turkey think the EU 
environment offers Turkey security is that they conceive of the EU as a post-modern, 
multi-cultural and supranational entity where people of different religious, historical, 
social and cultural origins can live in harmony and peace (Vural, 2002: 74-75).  
Unlike the Euro-sceptics, these people think that Turkey's democratization 
should not be totally dependent on the quality of her relationship with the European 
Union and that the more Turkey gets democratised, the more it would be likely that 
the EU would admit Turkey as a member (Oguzlu, 2004-forthcoming). It is to the 
benefit of the Turkish people that the democratization process should proceed fast.  
To them, the nature of the ongoing accession process, through its side effect 
of democratization, should not denote for the reluctance of the EU not to admit 
Turkey but on the contrary the EU's determination to prepare Turkey for future 
membership. In other words, these people think that the EU acts on a rational basis 
when it incessantly asks Turkey to further democratize. Why, these people ask, 
would the EU want to weaken Turkey through a process of democratization that 
would in the end lead to the decentralization and dismemberment of the country? 
(Kaleagasi, 2003) After all, it would be the EU itself that would have to deal with the 
risks and threats a decompartmentalized Turkey would likely pose to the EU's post-
Cold War era institutional identity. To them the current EU accession criteria are 
designed in such a manner that would enable the EU to digest such a big country as 
Turkey at a future time.    
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3.2.4.1.2. The Euro-Sceptic Discourse 
The Euro-sceptic discourse questions the current form of the European Union in 
general and the structure of the ongoing accession process in particular. Though the 
adherents of this view do not take issue with the general idea of European 
integration, they have a problem with the asymmetric power relationship between the 
EU members on the one hand and the candidate countries on the other (Kopecky and 
Mudde, 2002: 297-326). They want to bargain with the EU over the terms of the 
accession criteria, rather than strictly comply with the EU's demands. To these 
circles, Turkey does not need to prove its European identity in order to join the EU, 
but the EU should let Turkey in due to Turkey's European identity (Nas, 2001: 177-
190). 
 They tend to characterise the accession process as a well-intended EU 
policy whose main goals are to de-emphasise Turkey’s geo-politically defined 
strategic-identity and to create the best possible conditions for the EU to absorb 
Turkey. The underlying assumptions here are that the EU will (can) not admit 
Turkey as a member for security reasons and that as the accession process runs its 
course, Turkey will be confronted with grave risks and challenges for its security 
because the EU’s attitude towards Turkey’s membership is ambiguous to say the 
least. At the end of the day, Turkey will become a much weaker country than as it is 
now in terms of its ability to act as a pivotal geo-political security actor. Contrary to 
the previous discourse, the Euro-sceptics tend to put the onus on the European Union 
for all the bad and the good things in the EU-Turkey relations (Canefe and Bora, 
2003: 127-148).  
Even though these people have not seen a mutually constitutive relationship 
between democratization and the EU accession process right from the beginning, 
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they have gradually come to believe that the connections between these two 
processes are very strong and what happens in one can likely affect the other 
(Oguzlu, 2004-forthcoming). They have also developed the idea that since the EU is 
so reluctant on Turkey's membership, democratization might provide the EU with a 
lever to weaken Turkey and possibly pave the way for Turkey's disintegration in the 
face of increasing Kurdish and Islamist claims (Ozdag, 2002). 
This discourse mainly holds that the EU accession process erodes Turkey’s 
security because it contributes to the weakening of Turkey’s geo-political power and 
identity, as well as the main principles, on which the modern Turkish Republic rest 
(Ilhan, 2000 and 2002). Conceptualizing Turkey’s relations with Europe from a ‘self-
other’ prism, Euro-scepticism in Turkey views the current accession process as a 
well-intended EU policy to construct a Turkey, whose resilience towards the EU’s 
demands would gradually weaken.  
 The underlying assumption behind the Euro-sceptic logic is that the European 
Union, as it stands today, is not capable of digesting Turkey’s membership for both 
economic and geo-political reasons. The main concern of today’s EU is to 
successfully adapt to the membership of the twelve Central and Eastern European 
countries between the 2004-2008 time period. While this is the case, it seems to be 
impossible for the EU to accelerate Turkey’s accession process. The EU is neither a 
global geo-political actor, with well-defined strategic interests in the regions around 
Turkey, nor possesses the required economic resources to cope with Turkey’s 
membership. So read from this perspective, the Euro-sceptics tend to read Turkey’s 
accession process with the EU by making a strong emphasise on the geo-political and 
economic calculations on the side of the EU (Ozdag, 2002). To them, the ongoing 
accession process aims two things. One is to develop a mechanism, which would 
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help the EU constructively manage its relations with Turkey by keeping her on the 
EU’s orbit but not offering her a clear timetable for membership. The other is to slow 
Turkey’s possible admittance to the EU while the latter will be busy with digesting 
the EU memberships of the CEECs and transforming into a geo-political actor of its 
kind. 
 The same circles go on to argue that while the geo-political logic dictated the 
EU’s inclusive attitude towards the Central and Eastern European countries, neither 
an economic rationality nor geo-political imperatives seem to allow for such a 
possibility vis-à-vis Turkey. To this thinking, what motivated the EU members to 
extend membership to the CEECs was to stymie the possible hard and soft security 
threats that unstable and transitionary political environment there might pose to the 
EU. Due to the geographical closeness of these places to the Western Europe, it was 
somehow a geo-political necessity for the EU to offer those countries clear 
membership prospects (Reuber and Wolkersdorfer, 2002: 39-60). To the EU 
members, the threats that might stem from either the political structure of Turkey 
itself or the unstable places in Turkey’s vicinity can be managed without granting 
membership to them, but by keeping them on the EU’s orbit. In such a scenario 
Turkey would only be given the role of being a barrier between the EU’s zone of 
peace and the zone of danger in the Greater Middle Eastern region.               
These circles believe that the EU discriminates against Turkey on cultural, 
political and economic grounds (Onis, 1999). They point to the EU's treatment of the 
Central and Eastern European countries as evidences. Turkey was neither given 
significant sums of financial aids nor incorporated into many of the trans-European 
network programs (Rumford, 2000: 331-343). 
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To them, the ongoing accession process does mainly reflect the security 
interests of the European Union. Besides, there is not a positive relationship between 
the security of the EU and that of Turkey. It is inconceivable that the accession 
process serve both the EU’s and Turkey’s security interests at the same time, because 
the asymmetric power relationship between the two sides would not allow for this. A 
Turkey, which strives to meet the EU’s membership criteria, would feel less secure 
than it does now (Manisali, 2001). To this conceptualization, the Europeans are still 
captive to their cultural and historical biases towards Turkey. The accession process 
would also serve as a constraint on Turkey’s ability first to determine its geo-political 
priorities and then to pursue them.      
To the Euro-sceptics the best possible arrangement of EU-Turkey relations 
would take place if the European Union evolved into a global strategic-security actor 
and then admitted Turkey as a member due to the geo-political and military 
capabilities of the latter. The continuation of EU-Turkey relations on an inter-
governmental basis would serve Turkey’s interests more because Turkey would not 
feel obliged to undergo a radical transformation process, hence preserve its security 
norms intact. Through this way, Turkey would be able to preserve its character of 
being a strong nation-state functioning on the Republican principles. These people 
are inclined to explain all positive developments in EU-Turkey relations in terms of 
hard-core geo-political considerations (Ilhan, 2000 and 2002). 
The Euro-sceptics would like to see that the EU treats Turkey more positively 
than other candidates because Turkey is an important security actor not only in its 
environment but also the greater European context. If the EU wants to evolve into a 
global security actor in the regions surrounding Turkey, it is a must for the EU to 
agree to Turkey’s accession. The facts that Turkey has been contributing to the 
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realization of the European security interests since the beginning of the Cold War as 
a legitimate partner and that Turkey has been equipped with the tools to provide for 
European security, namely its NATO membership and sophisticated military 
capabilities, seem to have emboldened those circles in their claims. These circles are 
inclined to explain the EU's decision to admit Turkey as a candidate in 1999, even 
though Turkey could not come closer to the EU since 1997 in terms of its 
performance in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, on the basis of the EU's growing 
security needs to attach Turkey firmly to Europe (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 489-502).  
It is further argued that rather than contributing to the emergence of a healthy 
liberal-pluralist domestic political environment in the country, the ongoing accession 
process damages to a significant degree internal peace in Turkey, whose foundations 
and security norms have been built by the Lasusanne Treaty of 1923 (Rumford, 
2002: 258-277). In principle, full democratization, completion of a liberal economic 
order and adoption of the EU’s Community Law are all regarded by these circles as 
legitimate EU demands. However, their anxiety arises out of Turkey’s domestic and 
external context. Ideal as it might seem to have a plural democratic system in a 
country, especially in an EU-candidate one, the ongoing accession process in Turkey 
might result in just the opposite of what is intended. The sensitivity of the 
establishment elite over the founding principles of the Republic, namely secularism 
and Turkish nationalism, seems to have led to the cultivation of suspicions on their 
part in regard to the specific EU demands (Manisali, 2001; Kosebalaban, 2002: 130-
146; Barkey, 2000: 87-105; Aydinli, 2002: 209-225; Yavuz, 2000: 33-38). To these 
circles, one should not compare Turkey to the major EU members where pluralism 
and liberalism in the political arena would not constitute grave risks for the make-up 
of their societies because their historical paths do not follow the same lines as those 
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of Turkey. Turkey is the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, a multi-religious and 
multi-national polity, and therefore is justified to feel more sensitive over the 
demands on these issues.  
The sources of their sensitivities seem to originate from two factors, both of 
which appear to reflect the legacy of the Ottoman Empire-Europe relations. One is 
that the Empire had to come to an end just because of the multi-religious and multi-
national characters of the political structure of the Ottoman State. It was through the 
policies of the then European powers that these characteristics of the Empire led to 
its dismemberment at the hands of its subjects. The second is that the founding 
fathers of the Republic adopted the Europeanization ideal from an instrumental 
perspective with a view to rooting out the traces of multi-nationalism and 
‘politicization of religion’ in the new State (Heper, 2000: 63-83). This is an ongoing 
process and has not reached a satisfactory conclusion yet. Their fear is that the 
Europeanization process might scuttle all the positive achievements reached so far 
(Jenkins, 2001).  
They also fear that even though regionalization and the sharing of sovereignty 
in the European Union generally occur on the basis of economic rationality, that 
might take place in Turkey along ethnic-lines. The Europeanization process might 
also result in the erosion of the institution of citizensip in the sense that the well 
established state-above-society structure migth give into the society-above-state 
structre (Keyman and Icduygu, 2003: 217-232).  Moreover, the Euro-sceptics 
contend that the EU may not necessarily turn out to become a more supra-national 
entity in the years to come, overemphasising common European interests instead of 
national ones. For the time being it seems that the allegiance of the peoples of the 
major EU members to their nation-states far outweighs the level of their 
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identification with the EU (Euro-barometer results). After all, the decision-making 
mechanisms within the EU, particularly concerning the key areas of foreign, security 
and defence policies, are mainly of inter-governmental in nature. Strong states have 
greater degree of representation in all of the EU organs. The logic lying behind the 
Euro-sceptic view is that if the EU will preserve its inter-governmental character in 
the years to come, why would Turkey feel obliged to embrace the often-heard 
understanding of sovereignty, according to which sovereignty is shared by 
supranational EU organs in Brussels, the central authorities in the capital and the 
local authorities dispersed throughout the country.  
It is doubted that Turkey would have to evolve into a more decentralized and 
federalized political structure as the ongoing accession process runs its course. 
However, if it is highly likely that the common European interests are going to be 
defined by stronger EU members, then what would be the use of taking some steps 
that might contribute to erosion of the central authority in Turkey (Ozdag, 2002). 
What if the major EU members decide to turn the tide away from further integration 
towards more inter-governmentalism? What if they decide not to take Turkey in even 
though the latter would have been involved in the transformation process along the 
EU’s demand to higher degrees?  
To the Turkish Euro-scepticism, either the accession process itself or the 
future membership in the EU would certainly constrain Turkey’s freedom of action 
around its environment. How would Turkey be able to devote a concerted attention 
to the external developments in its neighbourhood while being so busy with 
minimising the possible dangers of the would-be decentralisation process within the 
country? Because the quasi-imperial structure of the EU does not allow for the 
existence of strong nation-states along the peripheries of the EU, Turkey would not 
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be able to define and implement its geo-political interests in the way as it does now. 
The only option left for Turkey would be to follow the instructions of Brussels and to 
act as the agent of the EU in the region. Unless the core of the EU does not want, a 
federalised and highly decentralized Turkey would not be able to affect the geo-
political priorities of the Union in such a way that the EU turns its attention to 
Turkey’s neighbourhood and resolves to act as a strategic-security actor (Ozdag, 
2002).  
Thought of this way, the Turkish Euro-sceptics would feel more comfortable 
with Turkey’s ongoing strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel. In the 
face of common threat perceptions and strategic mentality, they think Turkey would 
be in a much better position in pursuing its national interests in the Greater Middle 
Eastern region (Kibaroglu, 2003, forthcoming). The Europeans would most probably 
not understand Turkey’s hard-core security concerns emanating from the possession 
by Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
medium-to-long range ballistic missiles. Neither would the EU members be receptive 
to the idea that Turkey’s policies of forming alliances with Israel and the United 
States and improving its conventional military capabilities are worth in containing 
such threats as mentioned above (Bir and Sherman, 2002: 23-52; Tayfur, 2000; 
Turan, 1998).  
The Euro-sceptics in Turkey also argue that the current EU policies towards 
the Turkish-Greek relations are nothing more than the reflection of the EU’s 
determination to contribute to the erosion of Turkey’s geo-political power and 
identity. The thing that seems to have created the greatest pressure on the these elites 
is the EU’s demand that Turkey needs to settle all its territorial disputes with Greece 
over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus by the end of 2004. To them, one of the significant 
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factors that constitutes Turkey’s security culture as well as its geo-political identity 
in the Eastern Mediterranean region consists of the idea that the strategic balance 
between Greece and Turkey, which the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 and the 1960 
treaties on Cyprus had established, needs to be preserved (Kramer, 1991: 57-71; 
Barlas and Turan, 1999: 469-489). The reason why they have been sensitive about 
the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek relations is that they perceive Greek actions 
within the EU as giving damage to the one of the well-established aspects of the EU-
Turkey relations, that is the strategic connection. The strategic connection in EU-
Turkey relations constitutes the most important and the oldest conduit binding 
Turkey and the EU to each other. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the real source of 
Turkey’s geo-political identity and power in regard to the region stems from the fact 
that it is Turkey, not Greece or any other country, that can most effectively preserve 
and promote European interests in the area.  
Thought of this way, the Euro-sceptics arrive at two major conclusions. The 
first is that the EU is not a neutral actor in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek 
disputes simply because Greece has been an EU member since 1981 and successfully 
utilise the EU’s platforms against Turkey. The second is that the EU membership of 
Cyprus, without a priori political settlement between the two communities, and a 
possible resolution of the Aegean disputes through the International Court of Justice 
in the Hague in line with Greece’s position, would certainly militate against Turkey’s 
geo-political identity, power and interests (Manisali, 2002; Suvarierol, 2003: 55-78). 
To the Euro-sceptics, any strategic retreat in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea constitutes 
the threshold, beyond which Turkey’ ability to stand against the future demands of 
the EU will decrease. If a feeling of inferiority penetrates into the minds of Turkish 
political-military elite due to the erosion of Turkey’s geo-political identity and 
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interests in the region, this will be the most dangerous thing one could imagine 
(Ozdag, 2002).  
The signs of their discontent with what they perceived as a pro-Greek EU 
position could be seen in Turkey's response to the EU's invitation to participate in the 
European conference scheduled for March 1998 (Yesilada, 1999: 144-161). 
Prospective participants were asked to indicate a commitment to take unresolved 
border issues to the International Court of Justice. Turkey, already disgruntled at the 
EU decision at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 to exclude Turkey from 
the first and second waves of enlargement, resolved to suspend its political dialogue 
with the EU and declined to join the planned conference on the grounds that its 
participation would have implied agreement with Greece's interpretation of how to 
resolve the Aegean disputes (Park, 2000: 31-53).  
Their discontent with the accession process only increased when the EU 
seemed to offer Turkey the candidacy status in Helsinki on the condition that Turkey 
would need to accept that the political resolution of the Cyprus dispute would not be 
a precondition for Cyprus's membership in the EU (at least the Greek Cypriot part of 
it). In interpreting the EU position on the Cyprus conflict, the Euro-sceptic circles 
come to two main conclusions: the EU has been unwilling to put enough pressure on 
Greek Cypriots to compromise with their co-islanders in the north (Sonyel, 2003: 20-
33) and Turkey's EU membership might depend on Turkish concessions over the 
island, which would in turn jeopardise Turkey's strategic (one can read national 
security) interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The best manifestation of the Euro-
sceptics’s view on the Cyprus dispute can be seen in Turkey’s National Program 
prepared in March 2001.*  
                                                           
* One can reach Turkey’s National Program at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/npaa_full.pdf  
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 To them, the major EU summit decisions, Luxembourg in 1997, Helsinki in 
1999 and Copenhagen in 2002, are not encouraging enough to give Turkey incentive 
to continue the Europeanization process. In parallel to their scepticism on the EU's 
intentions on Turkey, they have gradually tried to hinge the scope and intensity of the 
democratization process within the country on the quality of Turkey's 
Europeanization process. To them further democratization should follow credible EU 
attitudes towards Turkey's accession. The more the EU becomes receptive to Turkey, 
the more democratization process in Turkey will proceed and the more Turkey will 
adopt pro-EU foreign policy choices and behaviours. The first step should come from 
the European Union (Ilhan, 2000 and 2002).  
 
3.2.4.2. Turkey's Security Culture and Attractiveness of non-EU Options  
An important factor that seems to inhibit Turkey’s efforts to internalize the EU’s 
security identity concerns her close strategic relationship with the United States in 
Eurasia, the Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. This also inhibits Turkey's 
cooperative relations with Greece on the basis of non-realpolitik security 
understanding. However, it needs to be stated that such kind of a foreign policy 
course has not been Turkey’s first option but gradually came into being as the 
European Union turned down Turkey’s membership application. Even though the 
majority of the political parties and the public have been advocating Turkey’s EU 
membership, they have found themselves backing non-EU alternatives as they 
perceived the EU discriminating against Turkey (Kirisci, 2000: 37-63).  
Nevertheless, there are some facilitating factors that made such a non-EU 
option as a strategy to implement. First, Turkey’s Republican security culture made it 
possible to cooperate with the United States in the above-mentioned regions. Both 
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Turkey and the United States are used to operate in the international arena along the 
principles of realpolitik security culture. Second, the 1990s witnessed an increase in 
the quality of the whole gamut of Turkish-Israeli relations, which fostered bilateral 
cooperation in economic, social and military areas (Inbar, 2001: 115-128; Makovsky, 
1996:147-170; Altunisik, 2000: 172-191). To mention one example, the two could 
sign a sophisticated military agreement in 1996. These strategic relationships with 
the US and Israel did not constitute an aberration from Turkey’s security culture. 
Their threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Weapons of Mass Destruction, the ballistic 
missiles to deliver them and terrorism were (are still) similar. Third, the American 
governments did not force Turkey to go through a radical transformation process to 
become a model for the newly established states in this region (Kuniholm, 2001: 25-
53; Larrabee, 1999: 231-247). To them, the secular and homogenous nature of the 
Turkish nation-state was enough for those countries to emulate. For the Americans 
Turkey’s stability always came before Turkey’s democratization (Kramer, 2000: 
223-231). Fourth, the American interests in the above-mentioned regions did most of 
the time coincide with those of Turkey. Fifth, the US governments always declared 
their support to Turkey’s march to the EU, (Pearson, 2001/2002: 53-61, Kirisci, 
2001: 129-150) and played the role of consoling Turks when the Europeans rebuke 
them. The Turkish elites seem to be content with their relations with the Americans 
because the latter tend to treat Turkey as a more important country then Greece in 
terms of the geo-political and geo-strategic considerations (Wilkinson, 2000: 185-
218). Sixth, there was (and is still) a similarity between Turkish and US ways of 
dealing with terrorism. The United States has assisted Turkey in its struggle against 
terrorism while some of the EU members supported the PKK and served as the 
PKK's financial bases.  
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When the Western international community acted as a coherent entity, 
Turkey could find it easier to align its policies with that of the European Union. In 
such cases Turkey followed a cooperative and multilateral foreign policy, in 
accordance with EU's security norms. Turkey's participation in cooperative security 
arrangements in the Balkans and other parts of the world together with the Europeans 
testifies to this (Criss, 1995: 198-214). In case the Turkish security elites concurred 
that the issues of concern touched upon Turkey's vital interests and that the Western 
international community seemed divided on such issues, they tended to follow 
unilateral and nationalistic foreign policies. In such cases it would not matter to them 
whether they aligned their choices with those of the European Union (Sayari, 2000, 
169-183; Makovsky, 1999: 92-113). 
Nonetheless, co-operation with the United States has many drawbacks. First, 
the alliance will last only so long as the bilateral security interests of the two 
countries continue to overlap. For Turkey, as the weaker and more dependent party, 
this could create strong pressure to forsake some national interests for the sake of the 
alliance. Second, it would be irrational for the Turkish elite to find solace in a 
strategic-security relationship with the United States in the absence of 
institutionalized economic relations with Washington. It seems that the Americans 
are content with keeping the relationship a military one, despite repeated Turkish 
calls for more free trade and social interaction (The latest of many attempts to 
establish institutional economic relations with the United States occurred in February 
2002 when the Turkish prime minister visited Washington DC). 
Third, if reliance on the strategic relationship with the United States is at the 
expense of the 'Europeanization' of Turkey, Turkey's march to a 'more pluralistic-less 
authoritarian' democracy and 'more liberal-less statist' economic order will certainly 
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be delayed (Dagi, 2002). Even though it is not my intention to portray the 
accession/integration process with the European Union as the best possible 
alternative to Turkey's strategic-security dominated relationship with the United 
States, one needs to be cognizant of the fact that Turkey's interests in gaining EU 
membership are far more important than a continued strategic-security relationship 
with the United States. More than half of Turkey's trade is with the EU countries, and 
traditionally Turkey's Western identity lies in Europe, not across the Atlantic.  
Even though the majority of the Turkish elite does not fall into the trap of 
either the United States or the EU and seems to recognize the different dynamics of 
EU-Turkey and United States-Turkey relations, the danger is that further 
'Americanization' of Turkish foreign and security policy orientation might risk 
derailing Turkey from the EU track. This danger will be more acute if the West 
becomes more divisive (Walt, 1999: 3-11). 
The latest Iraqi war has demonstrated that Turkey and the United States do 
not always see eye to eye. If they cannot bridge their perspectives on Iraq, 
particularly Northern Iraq, they might further apart from each other on the basis of 
their security understandings. While Turkey might feel the need to internalize the 
EU' security culture as a balancing strategy vis-à-vis the Americans, the United 
States might continue to stick to the realpolitik security culture to the degrees never 
seen before. The fact that the gap between the United States and other security actors 
is continuing to widen in terms of material power capabilities, the US' adherence to 
realpolitik security culture would likely increase.    
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3.2.5. Turkey's Approach towards Greece  
Another factor that decreased the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-
Greek disputes over the last decade is that the Turkish security elite did not view 
Greece as a truly European country and acted towards her from a strategic-
instrumental perspective. In this process, the EU's treatment of Greece as a 
bargaining chip in its overall relations with Turkey also played an important role. 
What would be the use of coming to terms with Greece along Turkey's EU accession 
process when the EU did not foresee Turkey's accession in the short-run and when 
the Turks regarded Greece as a non-European country (Onis, 2002; interview with 
Onis, 2 July 2002).  
 The important thing in this regard is that the dynamics of EU-Turkey 
relations affect the dynamics of Turkey-Greece relations. As Turkey felt excluded 
from the European Union on the basis of identity-security related rationalities, its 
tendency to view Greece from a realpolitik perspective increased. Turkey at times 
projected its failures in meeting the EU's demands onto Greece. These concerns are 
pure ideational concerns and cannot solely be explained by the power disparities 
between the two countries.   
 The Turkish elites perceive Greece's attempts at Europeanising the dynamics 
of bilateral Turkish-Greek disputes as dangerous for the smooth functioning of EU-
Turkey relations, especially in the field of security. The fear is that Greece's 
instrumental usage of the EU's platforms against Turkey might further erode the 
'positive-European-security-provider' image of Turkey in the EU's eyes, as well as 
Turkey's privileged position over Greece in the greater Middle Eastern region.    
The dynamics of Turkey’s relations with Greece matter to a considerable 
extent in determining the congruence between the security conceptualizations of the 
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EU and Turkey. In contrast to the Cold War era, in which the heat of Turkey-Greece 
relations used to be taken off by the constraints of the bipolar structure of the 
international system, the last decade proved to be more conducive to any armed 
confrontation between them. The dynamics of the post-Cold War Turkey-Greece 
relations demonstrated two things. One is the fact that the possibility that Turkey 
might indulge in an interstate-armed conflict with Greece increased. It is not only 
with its Middle Eastern neighbours to the south, but also with Greece, an EU 
member developed country, that Turkey might find itself in a future military conflict. 
The way Turkey deals with her territorial problems with Greece will play an 
enormous role in demonstrating whether and if Turkey can be regarded as a country 
fit for EU membership. The fact that one of the most important requirements of the 
EU membership is about the lack of possibility of interstate war and the presence of 
peaceful neighbourly relations, Turkey’s interaction with Greece over the Cyprus and 
the Aegean sea disputes serves as a litmus test as for the appropriateness of Turkey’s 
EU membership.  
Because Greece is fundamentally different from Turkey’s Middle Eastern 
neighbours due to its EU and NATO memberships and inclusion among the 
developed members of the international community, Turkey’s way of interaction 
with Greece will be much more important than the way it deals with its neighbours in 
the south. What one can drive from this observation is that Greece holds one of the 
most important keys, which might open the doors of the EU to Turkey. Turkey’s 
interaction with Greece will shed light on Turkey’s feasibility for the EU 
membership, that is a pure ‘ideational’ concern. A Greece, which builds her 
European identity on the otherness of Turkey and Turkey’s exclusion from the EU, 
might easily sabotage Turkeys’ future hope for the EU membership by carrying the 
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Cyprus and the Aegean Sea problems to the EU-Turkey agenda and by forcing 
Turkey to adopt an intransigent and hardline attitude towards its western neighbour.                  
As a result of their misgivinbgs about Greece's role within the EU, the 
Turkish elites have never internalized the idea that the earlier Turkey reached a 
consensus with Greece along its accession process, the more likely the prospects of 
its accession to the EU would become. The EU's gradual exclusion of Turkey on the 
security-identity basis has made it difficult for the Turkish elites to cooperate with 
Greece along the EU accession process. They did not see the resolution of bilateral 
disputes within the EU framework as legitimate. Instead, Turkey mainly considered 
its policy towards Greece as a derivative of its overall approach towards the EU. The 
Turkish rationale has evolved in such a way that the more the majority of the EU 
members treat Turkey as European and offers her a credible membership prospect 
backed by promising rewards and costly punishments, the more easily Turkey solves 
her territorial disputes with Greece along its accession process (Guvenc, 2000: 102-
129).  
This points to a pure instrumental logic in the sense that Turkey is not 
interested in the solution of the Turkish-Greek problems in themselves, but views 
and exploits the outcomes of any cooperative Turkish-Greek interaction in order to 
extract further benefits from the European Union. In one sense, Turkey has countered 
the Greek strategy of ‘conditional rewards’ with the strategy of ‘conditional 
sanctions’. The message sent to Greece has been that 'if you cerate problems in my 
relations with the European Union, you had better forget any peaceful atmosphere in 
the Eastern Mediterranean region that would otherwise enable you to complete the 
‘Europeanization process’ successfully'. These are ideational points and directly 
constituted by the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations.                  
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The Turkish political-security elite has also regarded Greece as a possible 
scapegoat for all the negative developments in the EU-Turkey relations. When 
Turkey's 'European-ness' has been severely disputed by the EU circles, the Turkish 
elites have countered these moves by arguing that Turkey has been European for 
ages and if there were any country within the EU that is not European that would be 
Greece. Labelling Greece as a non-European country and blaming her for the 
worsening of EU-Turkey relations has at times served as an excuse for Turkey's own 
failures and deficiencies in meeting the EU's membership criteria. Greece has served 
as a useful target to divert the attention of the domestic and European circles when 
things went wrong in the overall EU-Turkey relations (Interview with Bolukbasi, 16 
June 2002; Onis, 2001: 105-119; Ugur, 2001: 217-242).    
At times of negative EU-Turkey interaction processes, Turkey adopted 
realpolitik behaviours and tried to prove its 'European-ness' by projecting all non-
European attributes onto Greece. The promise of the European Union was at its 
lowest level at these times. For example, this was the case between 1995-1999. 
During the Imia crisis in 1996 and the S-300 missile crisis in 1997-1998, Turkey 
vociferously argued that Greece's course of action during these crises did not fit well 
with European identity. To Turkish political and security elites, Greece's behaviour 
during these crises provided the EU members with additional evidence to Greece's 
non-European identity. In fact, one could argue that it was a deliberate action on the 
part of the Turkish security elite to escalate the crisis atmosphere and push Greece to 
adopt aggressive stances. Through this way, the Turkish elite might have thought that 
it was Greece's non-European identity and behaviours that caused these crises at the 
first instance (Ayman, 2000).  
 170
The same logic of behaviour was also evident during the course of Öcalan 
crisis in 1999, when Turkey in one sense caught Greece off red-handed. The capture 
of Öcalan, the leader of the outlawed PKK terrorist organization, in the Greek 
embassy in Kenya with a Greek-Cypriot passport on himself revealed the close 
relations between Greece, a self-alleged European country, and PKK, a terrorist 
organization trying to undermine the territorial integrity and national security of an 
EU-associate country, Turkey. This provided Turkey with the greatest opportunity 
ever found to justify the decades-long claim that Greece did not deserve a European 
label and a seat around the tables in Brussels (Interview with Eralp, 10 May 2002).           
Despite the fact that Turkey’s perception of Greece started to change with the 
second half of the 1990s as the Turkish elite saw that the dynamics of Turkey-EU 
relations were to be strongly affected by the tone of Turkey-Greece relations, the 
main reasons behind Turkey's recently initiated cooperative approach towards Greece 
in 1999 prior to the Helsinki Summit displayed that Turkey still treated Greece 
instrumentally and from a realpolitik perspective. The main motive of Turkey's 
cooperative mood towards Greece was not to resolve the long-standing Turkish-
Greek disputes but to enhance her prospects of EU membership by taking advantage 
of the changing dynamics of regional environment in 1999, not to mention to 
ameliorate Turkey's image in the eyes of the major EU members (Siegl, 2002: 40-
52). In other words, relations with Greece were instrumentalized in order to 
accelerate Turkey's EU accession process.  
When Greece was caught off guard in the Öcalan affair and when the EU's 
ability to forge a common foreign and security policy was given a serious setback by 
the EU's poor performance on the Kosovo conflict, the international strategic 
environment turned out to become very favourable for Turkey to act on a cooperative 
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logic towards the EU. The thinking was that both Greece's and the EU's bargaining 
leverages vis-à-vis Turkey seriously deteriorated and that Turkey's gains from a 
cooperative policy towards Greece and the EU would become more than its possible 
losses. Greece would have to show more flexibility towards Turkey's positions on the 
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea in order to recuperate her tarnished image in the eyes of 
Turkey and the international community.  
Besides, political elites in Ankara might have concluded that a Turkey, which 
is on good track with Greece, a member of the EU, might have better chances for 
admission into this exclusive club. Given that Athens holds one of the 15 keys to 
Ankara’s EU membership, Turkey might have approached Greece with such a 
strategic consideration in mind (Bahcheli, 2000: 131-152).  
 
3.2.6. The Legacy of the Past, 1990-1997: Conflict Dominates? 
The record of the Turkish-Greek relations during the first decade of the post-Cold 
War era did not prove optimistic for the future because the decades-long culture of 
mistrust has well penetrated into the national thinking in both countries. Based on the 
account below, this section of the dissertation argues that it will be extremely 
difficult for these countries to break the well-established conflictual cycle in bilateral 
relations.     
Starting with the divergence of opinions as for the handling of the crises in 
the territories of the ex-Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey set off a chain of rivalry in 
the Balkans reflecting their desires to dominate the regional politics in the post-Cold 
War era (Cavusosmanoglu, 2002; Buyukcolok, 2000; Sonmezoglu, 2000; McDonald, 
2001: 116-150). Despite the claims that both are members of the Western security 
community and have the entire wherewithal to work together for peace and stability 
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in the region, they preferred completely divergent and conflicting courses of actions 
in the Balkans. Instead of cooperating within the institutional links they have with 
the West, they constructed a kind of rivalry in the region. The crises in the territories 
of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Macedonia, demonstrated that Turkey and 
Greece were actually involved in opposite camps. Neither during the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina nor over the name issue concerning the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) they saw eye to eye.   
However, one needs to mention here that the rivalry relationships mainly 
stemmed from the nature of Greece's relations with the European Union. As long as 
she was a marginal insider within the EU; as long as she approached the EU from a 
realpolitik perspective; and as long as the EU did not treat Greece as a true European 
country, Greece viewed Turkey from the realpolitik perspective setting the stage for 
regional rivalry. While Greece's Balkan politics in the first half of the 1990s were 
mainly nationalistic, unilateral and anti-Western, Turkey's course of actions reflected 
a multilateral, pro-western and cooperative dimension. Rather than constituting a 
fact, the image of Turkish-Greek rivalry in the Balkans was mainly a Greek 
fabrication based on Greece's fear of encirclement in the face of Turkey's cooperative 
relations with Greece's neighbours. 
The Turkish-Greek rivalry in the Balkans took place as Turkey and Greece 
each advocated different routes for the transportation of Caspian Sea oil and gas 
reserves to the European markets. While Turkey campaigned for the construction of 
the Baku-Ceyhan pipelines project, Greece argued for the merits of Burgas-
Alexandropolis pipeline (Kentrotis, 2000: 323-338). Besides, while Turkey worked 
for the realization of an East-West Motorway project, which would pass through 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania bypassing Greece, Greece proposed the 
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construction of North-South Motorway project, which would exclude Turkey 
(Buyukcolak, 2000: 131-139; Craig, 1999).    
When Turkey's partial exclusion from the EU was on the agenda, Turkey and 
Greece developed realpolitik-based security relations. For example, a serious crisis 
broke out in February 1996 over the legal status of two small islets in the Aegean Sea 
situated within three miles off the Turkish coast, called Kardak by the Turks and 
Imia by the Greeks. Two countries almost came to the brink of war (Hickok, 1998: 
118-136). The significance of this crisis lays in the fact that Turkey for the first time 
started to question the legal status of some islands scattered in the Aegean Sea. 
Coining the term ‘gray areas’ Turkey initiated a policy of bringing the sovereignty 
issues onto the agenda of Turkish-Greek relations. The Imia/Kardak crisis also 
revealed that if the ongoing democratization process in Turkey were not seriously 
supported by the European Union in such a way that the EU channels its credible 
backing to the pro-democracy and pro-EU circles in Turkey, then this 
democratization process would benefit only the circles which thrives on parochial 
and unilateral nationalism. The EU's incredible socializing strategy enhanced the 
position of the Euro-sceptic circles in Turkey. The performance of the then Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller of the True Path Party exactly confirmed this observation. In 
the face of the EU's ambiguous policy towards Turkey, it was not difficult for the 
political parties to successfully employ mobilising ideologies of 'nationalism' and 
'political Islam' over the last decade. 
Another crisis took place over Cyprus when the Republic of Cyprus intended 
to bring in S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia. Turkey and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus jointly declared that such a move by the Greek 
Cypriots would be reciprocated harshly. It was made clear that Turkey would strike 
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at the missiles if they were installed on the island. Although the tension was reduced 
with the decision of the Greek Cypriot government to install them in the island of 
Crete, instead of Cyprus, the underlying logic that dictated the policy of ordering 
such surface-to-air missiles still prevails in the southern part of the island 
(Christodoulos, 2001: 325-355).  
Another crisis was the involvement of the Greek agents in Öcalan case. For 
the first time, the Turkish accusation that Greece has been giving support to PKK 
terror organization for years was proven right when it was made public that Ocalan, 
the leader of the outlawed terror organization, was given shelter in the residence of 
the Greek ambassador in Kenya. 
 
3.2.7.  The EU's Changing Approach towards Greece 
Another factor that has affected the overall promise of the EU relates to the EU's 
changing perception of Greece from being a bargaining chip with Turkey into a true 
European country that needs to be listened carefully. What makes the EU's changing 
perception of Greece important with respect to the EU's role to contribute to Turkish-
Greek cooperation is the fact that while the EU has gradually accepted Greece's 
normalcy in the EU-based European international society, it has at the same time 
adopted a more critical attitude towards Turkey's aspirations to become a part of the 
same society. The EU has inadvertently contributed to the chasm between Turkey 
and Greece by treating Greece as European and Turkey not. While Turkey's 
otherness has been reinforced, Greece's 'selfness' has been gradually internalized by 
the EU. Under these conditions, it proved really difficult for Turkey and Greece to 
end up with a cooperative relationship in their region.           
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 The fact that Greece has been regarded as more European from the second 
half of the 1990s onwards did not lead Greece to develop a non-realpolitik security 
behaviour towards Turkey, because the EU itself did not see Turkey as European and 
continued to hold on to its well-established constructively managed deliberate 
ambiguity policy towards Turkey. As will be explained later in detail, it would be apt 
to point out here that when this situation, namely the EU's treatment of Greece as 
more European, combined with, first, Greece's partially internalization of the EU's 
constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey, and then, the 
EU's decision to engage Turkey through the candidacy mechanism, a regional 
stability set in the region. This dissertation argues that the regional stability and 
tranquillity in the region within the last four years is attributable to realpolitik 
factors, such as the increase in Greece's soft power vis-à-vis Turkey. However, this 
realpolitik outcome, stability on the basis of distribution of power capabilities, can 
only be understood within the context of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey and Greece 
have lived through a relative stability not because Greece's bargaining power has 
increased vis-a-vis Turkey but this has occurred within the context of identity-
security based Turkey-EU relations. Therefore this kind of realpolitik stability is not 
material but ideational (Couloumbis and Ifantis, 2002). In the pre-1999 era, there was 
an unstable regional environment based on identity-driven realpolitik security 
understanding and now, since 1999, there is a partially stable regional environment 
based on identity-driven realpolitik security understanding.      
Initially, the European Union did not help Greece avoid of thinking in 
realpolitik terms by treating her instrumental in terms of its relations with Turkey 
and in terms of its concerns over the EU's enlargement. Two examples from the 
recent past would be enough to demonstrate that the EU did not act as the 'protector 
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power' as Greece wanted to see (Ioakimidis, 1999: 169-191). The 1992 decision of 
the Ministrial Council of the Western European Union (the military wing of the EU 
until its merger with the EU in 1999) to exclude Greece from the collective defence 
area of the Brussels Treaty in case of an armed conflict with Turkey was the 
harbinger of the most recent EU decision that the area of responsibility of the 
emerging European Army would not cover the Aegean Sea and Cyprus 
(Tsakaloyannis, 1996: 186-207).  
However, in parallel to Greece's further Europeanization efforts, Greece's 
partners in the EU gradually adopted more pro-Greek stances in regard to specific 
Turkish-Greek disputes in the second half of the 1990s (Ioakimidis, 2000: 359-372). 
What has been observed in the EU-Turkey-Greece triangle since 1996 has been the 
confirmation of this outcome. As Greece acquired a more European face and adopted 
a more federalist attitude toward the EU's integration process, her soft power against 
Turkey dramatically increased because her partners within the EU started to view 
Greece as a European country in the Balkans rather than as a Balkan country in 
Europe (Tsoukalis, 1999: 65-74). It became possible under these conditions that the 
EU had to agree to Customs Union with Turkey in return for a pledge to 
Greeks/Greek Cypriots that accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus would start 
six months after the end of inter-governmental conference. The EU's pro-Greek 
attitude has become solidified since 1999 as many of the official documents 
regulating EU-Turkey relations attest to this.  
Greece gradually embraced the view that the previous inter-governmentalist 
approach towards the EU integration process did not yield positive outcomes in the 
strategic games with Turkey.     
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3.2.8. What does Europeanization Mean in Greece's post-1996/1999 Policy 
towards Turkey? 
Before the second half of the 1990s, Greece's policy towards Turkey was not in 
accordance with that of the European Union. In one way or the other, one can argue 
that Greece's conception of Turkey was more primitive and conflict-conducive 
compared to that of the EU. Turkey was cast as Greece's other and all Greek attempts 
were made to keep Turkey away from the EU. When the EU's ambiguous attitude 
towards Turkey combined with Greece's ambiguous/non-European position within 
the EU, one could safely argue that Greece adopted anti-Turkey policies in order to 
legitimize her 'Europan-ness' in the eyes of her partners within the EU 
(Panagiotopoulou, 1997: 349-370; Dragonas and Bar-On, 2000: 335-353). However, 
such a course of action proved to be the worst of all outcomes for Greece, since both 
Greece's partners within the EU could hide behind Greece when they had to decline 
Turkey's membership aspirations and Turkey did not agree to the settlement of the 
disputes in mor pro-Greek ways. It would become a highly difficult course of action 
for Greece to actively support Turkey's EU membership when her partners have seen 
Turkey non-European. In one way or the other, non-Turkey policies could better 
serve Greece's interest in having its EU partners recognize her European identity.  
However, one needs to make it clear that the level of EU's anti-Turkishness 
was lower than that of Greece. Even though both Greece and her partners within the 
EU shared in the idea that Turkey's membership in the EU would (should) not 
become a possibility in the years ahead, Greece differed from her partners in the 
sense that she was even against any effective and cooperative relationship between 
the EU and Turkey. Instead, Greece's partners within the EU were happy with 
Turkey's EU-orientation among many choices of Turkish foreign policy.      
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Built on the partial differentiation between the EU and Turkey in terms of 
their security and foreign policy cultures, another argument of this dissertation is that 
it would be simplistic to claim that the more Greece integrated with the core of the 
European Union, the less it would embrace an anti-Turkish foreign policy, with a 
view to sincerely supporting Turkey’s EU membership. This would be so because the 
European Union itself did not seem to want to accord membership to Turkey. I 
contend that Greece even failed to adopt the EU’s ‘constructively managed deliberate 
ambiguity’ policy toward Turkey, let alone channelling its full support to Turkey's 
full membership in the EU.  
What matters in this regard is that the upper limits of the ‘Europeanization’ in 
the context of Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey do not presuppose a ‘sincere’ 
belief in Turkey’s membership in the European Union. Instead, it foresees the 
internalization of the EU’s consequential view of Turkey, i.e., the EU had better 
constructively manage its relations with Turkey, rather than offering her full 
membership (Tsoukalis, 1999: 65-74). Therefore, one should not feel so much 
optimistic as to expect that the Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy would 
certainly lead to cooperative Turkish-Greek relations. The change of the old policy of 
‘trying to do everything possible to exclude Turkey from Europe’ with the new 
policy of ‘helping its EU partners keep relations with Turkey on the level of 
constructively managed deliberate ambiguity’ will not offer promising signals for 
future cooperation between these two countries (Interview with Taşhan and Öniş), 
for such a policy change would only imply Greece's adoption of a less dangerous 
realpolitik security behaviour instead of a more dangerous one.        
Even though, there has been an apparently positive shift in Greece's attitude 
both towards the EU's integration process and Turkey since the instalment of Simitis 
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government, this reversal would be bound to remain insufficient for the resolution of 
the Turkish-Greek disputes. On the other hand, the dispute settlement would be 
greatly facilitated if Greece ceased to view Turkey's EU membership accession 
process as a means to secure its national interests and begin to regard it as an end in 
itself, meaning Turkey's further attachment to the EU, paving the ground for a 
mutual internalization of the shared norms and values of European security 
community. The main reasons for this scepticism arises from the underlying 
rationales behind Greece's later Europeanization efforts and its openings to Turkey.  
It appears that Greece increased its efforts in further Europeanization from an 
instrumental perspective in the sense that Greece would remain as a highly 
marginalized EU member-state in the ever enlarging EU if she delayed its 
convergence with the EU (Prodromou, 1997: 123-134). Through the twin processes 
of enlargement and deepening, the EU has now found itself in the process of 
redefining its own institutional and representational identity. In case the number of 
the EU members climbed into more than twenty in the years ahead, it seems 
inevitable that a kind of differentiation would take place in terms of the quality and 
class of EU membership.  
Given the dynamics of these twin processes, the Greek politicians of the last 
6 to 7 years might have come to a common understanding that if Greece could not 
succeed her own structural transformation process and join the European Monetary 
area by the specified time limits, it would have been highly likely that Greece’s 
current position within the EU would have been downgraded to those of the new 
comers (Tsoukalis, 1999: 65-74; Ioakimidis, 2001: 73-94; Moschonas, 2001: 11-24). 
Besides, Greece's relative bargaining power vis-a-vis Turkey would further 
deteriorate if she remained as an awkward EU country and Turkey's geo-political and 
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geo-strategic significance increased in the western (European) eyes (Constas, 1997: 
48-54; Skarvelis, 1997: 106-112). In contrast to the arguments that Turkey’s relative 
importance in the first decade of the post-Cold War era was in decline, Turkey’s 
moves in the international arena disproved them. The changing context of Turkey-
US and Turkey-EU relations did not mean the loss of Turkey’s value to the West but 
the reconstellation of Turkey’s relations with the West. Increased cooperation with 
the West either in the Balkans during the wars in the territories of ex-Yugoslavia or 
in the Greater Middle Eastern region strengthened Turkey’s international standing. 
Besides, Turkey’s relations with the European Union improved in this new era with 
the signing of the Customs Union (Muftuler-Bac, 1997).  
Turkey also increased its sphere of influence in the Balkans by establishing 
solid and bilateral relationships with the ex-communist countries in the region. While 
the government of Papandreou was involved in a bitter and embarrassing name 
dispute with the newly formed Macedonian State, Turkey was highly active in 
constructing a cooperative interaction process with Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania 
(Calis, 2001: 135-146; Barlas and Turan, 1999: 469-489).  
What one can deduce from all these developments is that the upgraded 
international standing of Turkey indirectly propelled the Greek politicians to set into 
motion a new chapter in their relations with the European Union and the United 
States. The most visible demonstration of this new understanding took place during 
the war in Kosovo. In contrast to the ethno-nationalistic lenses Greece put on during 
the wars in Bosnia and Serbia, this time the Greek government actively participated 
in the NATO campaign (Papacosma, 1999: 47-67; Iatrides, 1999: 265-294; 
Papandreou, 2001: 1-10; Papandreou; 2002: 17-23). Eventually, following the peace 
accord in Kosovo and the initiation of the Stability Pact of the European Union, 
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which was designed with the aim of bringing stability and prosperity to the war-torn 
countries of the Balkans, Greece has jumped into a new role in the region as the 
country that could help the Balkan countries successfully complete their 
Europoanisation, namely liberalization and democratization, process (Karamanlis, 
2000: 7-11; Kaklamanis, 2003: 1-5). 
This increased Europeanization in Greece’s world outlook could not be based 
on an anti-Turkish character mainly for the reason that in an age of improved EU-
Turkey relations if Greece had continued to sabotage the dynamics of Turkey’s 
relations with the EU, then she would have been probably cast both by the EU and 
Turkey as the ‘spoiler’. Though the EU was, and still is, not eager to offer Turkey 
membership, she would have been content with a constructively managed 
relationship with Turkey that would render Turkey neither as a constitutive part of 
the EU’s ‘Self’ nor the ‘Other’. Thought of this way, one could argue that the EU 
was and still is against Turkey’s estrangement from the EU’s orbit. As long as 
Turkey remained on the EU track, neither the lingering Aegean disputes nor the 
continuation of the political deadlock on Cyprus seemed to have constituted an 
unbearable headache for the EU. It was also the case that as long as Turkey remained 
within NATO and turned its face to the West, her diverging security 
conceptualization in regard to Russia and her Middle Eastern neighbours could have 
been tolerated.  
The EU appeared to have been successful in its goals vis-à-vis Turkey until 
Greece’s behaviours began to sabotage this invisible harmony. Turkey participated in 
the Gulf War alongside the Europeans; took part in many of the peacekeeping and 
peace-making operations in a regional and global scale shoulder to shoulder with the 
Europeans; signed the Customs Union deal with the EU (Muftuler-Bac, 1997).  
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Given that the EU valued Turkey's Europeansiation process (or the European 
orientation), it would have been risky for Greece had she continued to hamper the 
functioning of the EU-Turkey relations. In such a case the security feelings of the 
Greeks would have been bound to diminish because a Turkey, which would feel 
estranged from the EU due to the Greek machinations, would feel less restrained 
towards Greece. Besides, Greece would have likely lost the respects, as well as the 
future security guarantee, of its European partners that might otherwise have 
strengthened its relative position vis-à-vis Turkey. If Greece’s conceptualization of 
her relations with Turkey, or the level of Turkey’s Europeanization, had lagged 
behind those of her partners within the EU, then her actions against Turkey might 
have carried the risk of disrupting the EU-Turkey strategic-security relations, which 
the EU would certainly view as an anathema (Muftuler-Bac, 1997).  
In fact, it would not have been too difficult for Greece to prove its 'European-
ness', had she adopted the EU’s ‘constructively managed deliberate ambiguity’ 
policy towards Turkey. Therefore, Greece's efforts to give support to Turkey's EU 
membership aspirations since 1999 have been mainly driven by realpolitik and 
instrumental considerations in the sense that Greece could never join the EU's 
security community if she continued to deal with territorial problems with Turkey 
and spent increasing amounts of its resources on armament rather than on economic 
convergence (Tsakonas, 2001: 1-40). A Turkey, which meets Greece's concerns on 
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea as required by the EU accession criteria, would be the 
best means for Greece both to further Europeanize its national identity and to 
enhance its soft-power against Turkey (Keridis, 2001: 2-18). 
A strange development in this occurred in 1997 when the then Greek Foreign 
Minister Pangalos had to find himself supporting Turkey's European credentials to 
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join the EU. It was hard to believe in his sincerity given than he had used a very 
derogatory language towards Turkey previously. Rather than generating a positive 
backlash from the Turkish side and a more accommodating Turkish attitude towards 
the Turkish-Greek disputes, such statements of Pangalos felt on deaf ears in Turkey. 
The main reason behind such Turkish skepticism was that Pangalos made these 
statements in response to declarations of the Christian Democrat leaders of the EU 
countries, who convened in Belgium in March 1997. They simply stated that Turkey 
can (should) never join the EU because it is a non-European country mainly because 
of its alien religion and culture. If the then Greek government had signed onto this 
argumentation, Greece might have faced with two negative consequences in her 
foreign policy. The first would concern the degree and quality of her relations with 
her partners within the EU. Because Greece's own European identity was based on 
shaky grounds and she used to hold a precarious position on the identity spectrum of 
'European-ness', if Turkey had been excluded from the EU on the grounds of cultural 
and religious differences, Greece might have experienced the same thing in future. 
Her orthodox religion and Eastern Mediterranean socio-political culture might have 
likey led to her alienation from the enlarged EU.     
Second, Greece might have faced the terrible consequences of Turkey's 
estrangement from the EU in her relations with Turkey. To Greek politicians, such a 
Turkey would have appeared as less flexible on bilateral relations, for Turkey would 
not have felt enthusiastic to come to an accommodation with Greece as part of her 
Europeanization strategy.  
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3.2.9. Why Did Greece Cooperate with Turkey in 1999 and Agree to Turkey's 
Candidacy in Helsinki? 
The two fundamental Greek foreign and security policy objectives in the second half 
of the 1990s were that both Greece could join the first tier EU members of the Euro-
zone and that the Republic of Cyprus acceeds to the EU even if a priori political 
settlement could not be initially reached (Moustakis and Sheean, 2000: 95-115). 
These Greek concerns were also highlighted by the failure of Greece's internal 
balancing strategy to counter Turkey's growing power and influence in the 1990s. 
Greece could not simply reciprocate Turkey's growing military expenditures in the 
second half of the 1990s and her strategy of deterrence against Turkey was given a 
setback due to her humiliation during the Imia crisis of 1996 (Fakiolas and Mavrides, 
2001: 205-233). When all these factors combined, the only strategy left for Greece to 
adopt against Turkey would be to increase her soft power through its external 
alliance relationship with the EU. It somehow appeared that for Greece to fulfil its 
two significant objectives, Turkey would have to be encouraged in its 
Europeanization process. 
 Greece's new policy towards Turkey might have also emanated from the 
thinking that the external balancing policy towards Turkey did also come to a naught 
in 1999 when Greece's potential allies against Turkey were one by one loosing their 
struggles with Turkey. When Turkey's both external and internal power increased, 
the Greek security elite pondered that Greece might find herself in such a situation in 
which Greece would have to face Turkey on its own. This would have certainly 
constituted a nightmare for Greece. To this matter, Turkey's victory over PKK and 
Syria, as the most important external supporter of the former, and her growing 
strategic relations with Israel led the Greek political-security elites to conclude that 
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countering Turkey through external alliance relationship would not prove useful in 
the years to come (Adabi, 2000: 40-70). The dominance of a neo-realist strategic 
mentality in Greece's approach towards Turkey most radically became evident in 
Greece's responses to the growing military, economic and political ties between 
Turkey and Israel (Geokas and Papathanasis, 2000: 1-6; Athanassopoulou, 2003: 
108-125). The Greek political and security elites concurred that Turkish-Israeli 
cooperation, particularly on military issues, would prove destabilising for the Eastern 
Mediterranean region and level a strong blow to Greece's capacity to stand up to 
Turkey.   
Under these conditions, the only option for Greece to adopt seemed to lure 
Turkey into the EU's orbit. Through this way, it was hoped that Greece would find a 
legitimate ground to increase her sof-power vis-à-vis Turkey (Nachmani, 2001: 71-
92; Nachmani, 1998: 136-153). The hope was that the more Turkey wanted to join 
the EU and was encouraged in this way, the more it would adopt a flexible attitude 
towards the resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and in turn that the more 
the resolution of these territorial disputes became a reality, the faster Greece would 
be able to join the EU's zone of peace. Without Turkey becoming an EU candidate, it 
might have been difficult for Greece to accomplish its Europeanization project since 
a Turkey, which felt further alienated from the EU, would continue to keep Greece 
occupied with territorial issues (Tsakonas, 2001: 1-40). Therefore, since 1999, it has 
no longer been stated that Turkey is not a European country and can never become 
an EU member. On the contrary, this new Greek policy of ‘facilitative conditionality’ 
has been based on a new discursive practice emphasising the points that Turkey is a 
European country and can always become an EU member (Papandreou, 2002: 17-
23).  
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Athens might also have hoped that by setting off a new policy initiative 
towards Turkey, some circles in Ankara and the EU would conclude that it was not 
Athens but the others in the EU that block Turkey’s entry into the EU. A further 
advantage of such a policy would have been that Athens would be relieved of the 
additional burdens of her military armament program set into place with a view to 
achieving military parity with Turkey in the Aegean Sea. A side-benefit of reductions 
in military spending would be that Greece would be able to devote more resources to 
her economic program of catching up with the EU standards put before her to join 
the European Monetary Union. The fact that Greece will organise the Olympic 
Games in 2004 might have also propelled the Greek authorities to try to do 
everything possible to downsize military spending in order to allocate more resources 
to the realization of this organization (Papandreou, 2002: 17-23; Kaklamanis, 2003: 
1-5).  
 Greece's attitudes towards Turkey and the Turkish-Greek disputes in the post-
11 September era appear to be instrumental as well. It seems that the Greek foreign 
policy makers are aware of the facts that Turkey's strategic importance has increased 
in this new era and that Greece's above-mentioned strategic goals might be seriously 
endangered by a more intransigent and intimidating Turkish attitude towards Greece. 
Therefore, the Greek government of the last four years has been vociferously arguing 
for the start of Turkey's accession talks with Turkey lest the latter switch from her 
current cooperative stance to a much harder line. Interestingly enough, Greece has 
now become the most ardent supporter of Turkey's EU membership. 
Despite Greece's appearing support to Turkey's EU membership, her rationale 
on the ESDP dispute once more alerted the Turkish politicians to the possibility that 
Greece did not radically give up its well-established exclusionary policy towards 
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Turkey. What proved difficult to understand for objective analysts was that while 
Greece one the one hand been argued for Turkey's EU membership within the 
context of Cyprus's accession to the EU, she on the other hand adopted a very 
intransigent attitude towards the resolution of the ESDP conflict between the EU, 
Turkey and NATO. Her reaction to the Ankara deal of November 2001 was a case in 
point. Until the latest EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, where the 
dispute over the ESDP issue came to a satisfactory end for all the parties concerned, 
the Greek governments appeared to act on the assumption that Turkey would never 
join the EU and therefore what would be the rationale of offering her full rights to 
participate in the decision-making process of EU-led and EU-only military 
operations (Missiroli, 2002: 9-26). The Greek government harshly rejected the 
rationale of the Ankara deal by arguing that the European Union (should) cannot let a 
non-EU member country take hostage the future of the European Army. They 
objected both to the exclusion of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus from the area of 
responsibility of the emerging European Rapid Reaction force and Turkey’s 
qualitatively strengthened role on the initiation and implementation of autonomous 
EU military operations in Turkey’s vicinity.  
This Greek attitude seems to have fallen short of even meeting the gist of the 
EU’s view of the relations with Turkey. Rather than contributing to the EU’s 
attempts at constructively managing relations with Turkey, as the latest Ankara deal 
demonstrates, Greece’s course of action has had the potential risk of putting the EU-
Turkey relations into jeopardy by leading to the cultivation of anti-EU feelings in 
Turkey and vice versa. This risk has even been higher than as some circles might 
have expected, for at the end of the day the lack of any final agreement between 
Turkey and the EU over the ESDP issue might accelerate the process of drifting apart 
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between the EU and NATO (Missiroli, 2002: 9-26) If the EU ceased to value its link 
to NATO as inevitable and vital for the European security and stability, it would be 
highly likely that its perception of Turkey, as an Alliance member, would 
downgrade.  
In order to better understand this Greek reaction, one should make an inquiry 
into the ways in which Greece has traditionally conceptualized the European Union 
in regard to its foreign and security policy interests vis-à-vis Turkey. In one way or 
the other, Greece has been beset by a strategic dilemma in her approach towards the 
EU. While taking up an inter-governmentalist approach towards the EU's integration 
process would enable her to use its veto power against Turkey in various EU organs 
in her efforts to damage Turkey's relations with the EU, the same approach would at 
the same time highlight the non-European character of Greece in the eyes of its 
partners within the EU (Mitsos, 2000: 53-89).  
Greece has always been in favour of the development of the EU’s 
independent security and defence identity (Aybet, 2000). Thinking in a regional 
strategic context, it would not be so much meaningless for Greece to see the EU to 
have evolved into a collective defence organisation. Given that NATO’s platforms 
did not prove useful to put pressure on Turkey due to the geo-strategic and military 
significance of the latter in the eyes of the Americans, it would make sense for 
Greece to see that the EU turns out to function as a kind of collective defence 
organization where Turkey is not present. According to the Greek Memorandum 
presented at the 1996 inter-governmental conference, the EU should guarantee the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member countries as a collective defence 
organization.  
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Based on Greece's performance over the ESDP issues, one can conclude that 
Greece has not given up its old foreign policy understanding vis-à-vis Turkey yet. 
Rather than helping Turkey accelerate its Europeanization process by eliminating the 
seemingly most important hurdle before its membership in the EU, it seems that 
Greece felt prey to its old policy of keeping Turkey at an arm’s length from the 
European Union. If the main rationale of Greece’s latest Europeanization process 
since 1999 had been to attain security through the further Europeanization of Turkey, 
including Turkey’s membership in EU as the ultimate goal, then it would have been 
difficult to explain why Greece took up such an uncompromising attitude in response 
to the above-mentioned deal on the margins of such EU's summits meeting as 
Leaken and Sevilla.  
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CHAPTER 4: A Case Study: The EU's Involvement in the Cyprus 
Dispute 
The main goal of this chapter is to critically analyse the so-called catalytic effects of 
the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute and to demonstrate that the promise of 
the European Union has not been so high as some circles have expected to be. 
Thought of this way, in what follows, first an historical account will be provided in 
order to highlight the major turning points in the EU's Cyprus policy, then the 
attention will focus on the analysis of the major assumptions, on which the catalytic 
effects of the EU's involvement are based. In analysing the reasons for the EU's 
seemingly failure in Cyprus, this dissertation will pay a concerted attention to the 
identity aspects of the Cyprus dispute, as well as the main points why the allegedly 
'post-modern' security community character of the EU could not lay the ground for 
the resolution of a highly 'modern' conflict on the island. 
 The reason why this dissertation emphasises the role of the EU, rather than 
NATO, in the evolutionary process of the Cyprus dispute concerns the fact that it has 
been the EU's involvement in the dispute that has fundamentally altered the main 
dynamics and parameters of the dispute in the 1990s, as well as contributed to the re-
construction of Realpolitik security understandings in the region.       
 
4.1. Historical Evolution 
4.1.1. 1990-1994 
The EU initially adopted a reluctant attitude towards the dispute, particularly toward 
the membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration in July 1990. 
Cyprus was rarely mentioned within the EU’s enlargement plans in the first years of 
the post-Cold War era when the EU was about to redefine its new identity in the 
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wake of the Cold War era, as well as articulate its strategies how to deal with the ex-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The mainstream European 
conviction was that Cyprus was a problem area and the possibility of its membership 
in the EU without any ‘a priori’ political settlement of the dispute would cause a 
great headache for the EU (Eichinger, 1997: 197-203). The EU members would not 
have had any clearly defined interest in the importation of a Turkish-Greek territorial 
dispute to the EU given that the first decade of Greece’s membership did not prove 
promising for the EU-Turkey relations. 
Since 1990 till 1994 the EU documents stressed that the membership of the 
island would be much easier once a political settlement reached. Even though the EU 
considered the non-settlement on the island as a significant stumbling bloc to 
Turkey's accession to the Union, the dynamics of EU's approach to the island and 
Turkey were not identical, if not constitutive of each other. The possible problems to 
be incurred from the accession of the island without the solution of the dispute were 
somehow distinct in themselves (Redmond and Pace, 1996: 430-450). When the 
European Commission announced its opinion in July 1993 on the membership 
application of the Greek Cypriots, it recommended that the accession process should 
follow the resolution of the dispute.* 
 In analysing the possible reasons why the EU might have decided to postpone 
the inclusion of Cyprus in the EU before the conclusion of any settlement, one could 
provide the following reasons. First of all, the EU was then during the initial stages 
of its post-Cold War era identity construction. It was simply not able and confident 
enough to take such a strategic decision to incorporate such a problematic island as 
Cyprus into its body. When the EU was in its initial stages of developing a highly 
                                                           
* One can reach the EU Commision’s opinion on Cyprus’s membership application at : 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus/op_06_93/index.htm  
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institutionalized foreign and security policy identity and when the EU members were 
not in harmony as for the appropriate policies to be adopted towards Turkey and 
Cyprus, it seemed to be a logical conclusion at that time to postpone the time of 
decision on Cyprus.   
 Second, it was not appropriate for the EU to antagonize Turkey at that time 
when it had recently rejected Turkey's application for full membership and suggested 
to establish a functioning relationship with Turkey along the Matutes's package 
(Redmond, 1993; Kramer, 1994: 190-259). Turkey's possible reactions to such an EU 
decision that would see the accession of Cyprus to the EU before the solution of the 
dispute might have been severe. Besides, the second Gulf War that had ended a few 
years ago demonstrated once again Turkey's geo-strategic and geo-political value to 
the Europeans. Looking from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, the European 
Union valued Turkey's attachment to the EU more than the Europeanization of the 
Cyprus dispute. Given that the EU's main area of concentration did not cover the 
greater Middle Eastern region with the Eastern Mediterranean in focus, and that 
Turkey's cooperation with the EU over the security challenges stemming from the 
Balkans was considered vital, the EU did not simply want to confront Turkey over 
Cyprus.   
 Third, the international conjecture in the Balkans was not suitable for the EU 
to deal with such a thorny issue as the Cyprus dispute. The EU had been busy with 
the recently started war in the territories of the ex-Yugoslavia (Holland, 1995).  
 Fourth, the credibility of Greece in the eyes of the EU members was at its 
lowest point at that time due to the highly non-European foreign and security policy 
behaviours of the Athens government. Greece was at odds with its partners in the EU 
over the Bosnian war and the Macedonian issue. The signing of the joint-Defence 
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doctrine with the Greek Cypriots in late 1993 showed that Greece was still thinking 
in realpolitik and modern terms in regard to the essential of its foreign and security 
policy (Valinakis, 1992: 52-68; Rizopoulos, 1993: 17-26). Greece was also 
preoccupied with the Macedonian conflict and could not devote a concerted attention 
to the resolution of the dispute. It was somehow satisfactory for Greece that Turkey's 
chance to be included in the EU remained low due to the continuation of the conflict, 
among many other factors. The resolution of the dispute in pro-Greek way through 
Turkey's EU accession process was not on the agenda of the Greek politicians at that 
time.  
 
4.1.2. 1994-1999 
However, the EU had to change its view on the membership of Cyprus as Greece 
successfully utilised the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relations in order to accelerate 
the accession process of the island to the EU. The EU decided to include Cyprus 
within the next group of countries to be admitted to the EU. This about-turn in the 
EU’s position came about for the first time in the EU’s Corfu summit meeting in 
June 1994 and later was confirmed in the Essen summit in December of the same 
year.* On 6 March 1995 on the sidelines of the signing of the Customs Union treaty 
between the EU and Turkey, the EU’s General Affairs Council added a new 
dimension to the declared Cyprus policy of the EU by establishing a strong link 
between Turkey’s relations with the EU and the EU membership of Cyprus. The deal 
was that Greece would have lifted its veto over Turkey’s Customs Union with the 
EU in return for the EU’s agreement to the start of the accession talks with the Greek 
                                                           
* One can reach the EU’s Corfu Summit conclusions at: 
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=54738&from=&LANG=1. One can reach the 
EU’s Essen Summit conclusions at: 
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=54760&from=&LANG=9    
 194
Cypriots on behalf of the whole island six months after the end of the 
intergovernmental conference to be held in Amsterdam (Nicolaidis,1998: 30-34).  
Following the historic 1995 deal, the EU started the structured dialogue with 
the Greek Cypriots in order to prepare them for the real accession talks. In the 
footsteps of the recommendations of the European Commision's July 1997 Agenda 
2000 report, the EU decided in December 1997 to include Cyprus within the first 
track countries, with which the accession talks would start in March 1998, while 
denying Turkey of the formal candidateship status. From 1994 till 1999, the tone of 
the EU language turned out to be more pro-Greek Cypriot in the sense that the EU 
documents allowed for the possibility of an early membership of the island prior to 
any political settlement on the island (Nugent, 2000: 131-150). The international 
conjecture at that time seemed suitable for the EU to take such a bold decision. First, 
the geo-strategic value of Turkey decreased in the European eyes as the memories of 
the Gulf War were gradually left behind. A clear manifestation of this situation took 
place with the change of US policy towards the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek 
disputes after Richard Hollbrooke was appointed as the US government 
representative on Cyprus (Evriviades, 2003: 241-156). The new American rationale 
was based on the assumption that Turkey could never be anchored to western 
international community, particularly Europe, without the resolution of the Cyprus 
dispute within the EU framework. In the past, the Americans tended to show their 
respect for Turkey's value to the Western world, and therefore to attach Turkey to the 
West, by trying to take utmost care not to antagonize Turkey over the Turkish-Greek 
disputes.  
However, they soon came to the conclusion that this strategy would no longer 
facilitate Turkey's firm placement in the Western world, for the continuation of the 
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Turkish-Greek disputes would likely constitute an important obstacle on this way. 
The new American strategy was built on the premise that Turkey's anchoring to the 
West would sooner or later require Turkey's full membership in the European Union 
(Larrabee, 1999: 231-247). Conceived of this way, the Clinton Administration, in the 
personality of Hollbrooke saw the resolution of the Cyprus dispute within the EU 
framework from an instrumental perspective that would finally bring Turkey closer 
to the EU. With the American support in the background the European Union could 
more easily get involved in the Cyprus dispute.    
Second, Turkey was at that time doing poorly in its Europeanization process. 
Both the pace of internal reformation process was slow and the state of Turkish 
domestic politics was in a mess. Kurdish separatism and political Islam were on the 
rise. Turkey was giving non-European signals both in its domestic and foreign policy 
behaviours (Calis, 2001: 3-34; Kramer, 1996: 202-233). Turkey's performance over 
the Imia/Kardak crisis, the S-300 crisis and the quarrel with Syria over the 
extradition of the PKK leader Ocalan sharpened Turkey's non-European outlook. 
Such images were further reinforced by the rise of nationalist and to some extent 
religious undertones in Turkey's foreign policy approach (Lombardi, 1997: 191-215; 
Wood, 1999: 95-115). The Erbakan period was a case in point. When Turkey's non-
European character in foreign and domestic politics combined with the EU's 
emphasis on identity-related security considerations in its enlargement process 
towards the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries, Turkey's 
gradual otherness became more visible in this era. Consequently, the EU might not 
have felt the need to constrain itself in regard to the accession process of the Island. 
The quality of EU-Turkey relations was so seriously damaged during this time that 
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Turkey was increasingly seen as an 'other' of Europe. The EU members did not 
hesitate to adopt ostensibly anti-Turkish policies towards the Cyprus dispute.  
 Third, Greece entered into a new era with the advent of the Simitis rule in 
Athens. The new Greek government started to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its 
partners within the EU due to its more-European outlook. The more Europeanized 
Greece became, the more pro-Greek views the EU adopted on the dispute 
(Moschonas, 2001: 11-24). When the quality of EU-Turkey relations worsened 
during this period, Greece could easily legitimize the accession of the island to the 
EU irrespective of its possible dangers for the EU-Turkey relations. Because Greece 
held the EU's presidency in 1994, it found herself in a good position to utilize the 
EU's mechanisms to accelerate the accession process of the island.  
Fourth, it seemed that the EU left the memories of the Bosnian war behind 
with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in late 1995. The end of this war gave a 
boost to European efforts to put into place a distinctive European strategic identity 
with its military means on the ground. Cyprus stood out as the best place for the EU 
to demonstrate the conflict resolution characteristics of its distinctive security 
identity and to make clear in which ways the EU's strategic identity would differ 
from that of the United States (Diez, 2002a, 2002b). 
In response to the EU's growing exclusionary approach towards Turkey's 
membership and concomitantly with the radical volte-face seen in the EU attitude 
towards the Cyprus dispute with the start of the second phase, Turkey adopted more 
realpolitik security behaviours and started to lay the ground for a future integration 
of the TRNC with Turkey (Bagci, 1997: 159-169). The new policy was based on the 
idea that the closer the EU came towards the Greek Cypriots, the more Turkey would 
speed up the integration process with the TRNC, a kind of tit-for-tat mentality 
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(Dodd, 1999: 67-89). The main underlying motivation behind Turkey’s oft-repeated 
intention arose from the EU's ambiguous attitude towards Turkey's membership. The 
fear that it might lose the prestigious and advantageous position it used to hold over 
the island should the divided island join the EU before its own accession seems to 
have led the Turkish foreign policy makers to set the thresholds high on the island.  
What the Turkish elite tried to do was to convince the EU circles to the idea 
that any early EU membership of the island would be highly risky and costly for the 
EU’s interests since the EU would gain nothing by antagonising Turkey over such a 
small island as Cyprus. In conformity with this thinking, Turkey and the TRNC 
initialled some agreements in 1997 envisioning closer integration between the two 
countries. Turkey also lent its support to the “confederation” proposal of the 
president of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, put forward on 31 August 1998 (Olgun, 2001: 21-
38). The thrust of his proposal revolved around the idea of two externally sovereign 
states on the island recognized by the international community as such. With this 
proposal, a prior recognition of the external sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus was elevated to the sine quo non condition for the Turkish Cypriots 
to come back to the negotiation table. The significance of this Turkish endorsement 
of Denktaş’s confederation proposal lies in the fact that Turkey reverted back from 
the years-long federalism argument in favour of a more hardline attitude towards the 
resolution (Dodd, 1999: 128-147).  
It was within this spirit that the President Denktas of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus left the inter-communal talks in Gilon in Switzerland in the summer 
of 1997 when the EU commission announced in its Agenda 2000 report that the 
resolution of the Cyprus dispute should not be a precondition for the accession of the 
island to the EU. The strange point during this time period was that the more anti-
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Turkish the European Union turned out to become, the more realpolitik behaviours 
the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments adopted. The modernist and nationalistic 
undertones of the Greek Cypriots' policies towards the Cyprus dispute could become 
likely within the framework of the European Union's exclusionary approach towards 
Turkey. The Greek Cypriots might have thought that if they kept their distance from 
the Turkish Cypriots, they would more likely attain the EU membership. Hence the 
non-yielding Greek Cypriot attitude during the inter-communal talks under the 
auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations (Stavrinadis, 1999: 54-97).  
For example, the S-300 crisis displayed that the Greek Cypriots still held on 
to realpolitik rationalities. They did not hesitate to create a crisis situation on the 
island in 1997-1998 time period, even though the European Union started to become 
more pro-Greek. The Greek Cypriot rationale that these weapons systems were 
mainly of defensive in character and the sole purpose of their possible deployment 
was to deter any aggressive Turkish military assault on the south of the island did not 
seem to be in accordance with the main spirit of the ongoing accession process with 
the EU. If the hope were to contribute to the security of the island through the 
transformation of the national-exclusionary-communal identities of the Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots into an inclusive-island-wide-identity along the EU accession 
process, then such a military strategy of armament would seem odd to understand.  
This shows that the main reason why the Greek Cypriots applied for the EU 
membership was political and intended to help them achieve their highly nationalistic 
foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Zervakis, 1999: 137-
150; Featherstone, 2001: 141-162). Despite this parochial Greek Cypriot behaviour, 
the Athens government displayed a more European attitude during the crisis as 
Greece tried to convince the Greek Cypriots to agree to the deployment of the 
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missiles in Crete instead of Cyprus. Many high level Greek politicians were warning 
the Greek Cypriots not to create a crisis atmosphere when the EU membership of the 
island was on the agenda (Zambouras, 1999: 114-127). 
The developments between December 1997 and December 1999 showed that 
Turkey’s approach to the Cyprus dispute was strongly linked to the evolutionary 
process of her relations with the European Union. Whenever there was a gradual 
worsening in the tone of EU-Turkey relations, Turkey hardened her policy stance 
over the Cyprus issue. During this time period, the degree of the EU's power of 
attraction was at its lowest point in the Turkish eyes. Turkey's escalatory and 
nationalistic behaviour during the S-300 missiles crisis were examples to this 
situation (Ayman, 2000; Ayman, 2002: 5-34).  
On the other side of the Aegean Sea, Greece threatened to veto the whole 
enlargement process of the EU towards the CEECs if the EU delayed Cyprus's 
accession to the EU on the ground that no political settlement has been reached yet.  
 
4.1.3. Helsinki and Its Aftermath: From December 1999 until December 2002 
In the face of such Turkish and Greek threats and warnings prior to the Helsinki 
Summit, the EU circles seemed to have come to the conclusion that if they did not 
come up with a new policy initiative they would (might) face a real crisis situation 
when the time comes to decide over the accession of the island to the EU.  
The ideal situation from the EU's perspective would be that Turkey would 
actively encourage the Turkish Cypriots to reach a compromise solution with the 
Greek Cypriots; the two communities would agree on the modalities of the new 
political arrangement and they decide to join the EU together; the EU would admit 
the undivided Cyprus as a member; Greece could not find any reason to veto the 
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enlargement of the EU to the CEECs; and finally the EU could continue its 
constructively managed deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey (Joseph, 
1996,2000, 2003). This seemed to be the only way to secure the enlargement process 
of the Union towards the CEECs by the end of 2002.  
The nightmare for the EU would concern the scenario in which the Greek 
Cypriot Government would successfully complete all the chapters of EU accession 
process; the two communities could not reach a political settlement by the end of 
2002; the EU would decide not to admit the island to the membership bowing to the 
pull of Turkish warnings; and finally Greece would veto the enlargement of the EU 
towards the CEECs (Barkey and Gordon, 2002). In addition to this scenario, there 
happened to be another worst-case scenario, according to which the EU would have 
to agree to the accession of the divided island at the expense of worsening EU-
Turkey relations.  
Given that the second scenario seemed not so far-fetched, the European 
Union might have decided to prevent its happening by offering Turkey the 
‘candidacy carrot’ hoping that Turkey would not create a great fuss over the 
accession of Cyprus, though divided, to the EU. The Helsinki decisions were the 
inscription of this rationale on the paper (Oguzlu, 2002). Given that the quality of 
EU-Turkey relations did not radically change between December 1997 and 
December 1999, it seems that the instrumental EU logic could explain the decision of 
the EU to offer Turkey the candidacy status (Park, 2000: 31-53).  
Given that neither the rationalist institutionalist logic (cost-benefit 
calculations) nor the sociological institutionalist logic (identity-related concerns) 
seems to have explained the EU's about-turn towards Turkey, one would be left only 
with instrumental concerns on the part of the EU, resulting in inefficient socialization 
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strategies adopted towards Turkey. It seems that the EU's decision to offer candidacy 
to Turkey was more a cost-management strategy than a full commitment to Turkey's 
membership. Given that Turkey's policy stances might damage the EU's deepening 
(ESDP) and widening (enlargement and Cyprus) policies, the EU circles might have 
thought to reduce such risks to minimum by buying Turkey's cooperation through the 
placement of the latter among the candidate countries. The 1997-1999 period did 
greatly curtailed the EU's capability to influence Turkey's policies (Park, 2000: 315-
328). 
Even though the EU's decision to grant candidacy to Turkey can be explained 
from an instrumental perspective, the main idea behind the developments of the last 
four years has been to handle Turkish-Greek disputes and to sustain Turkey's security 
cooperation with the European Union by re-emphasising Turkey's 'European' 
identity. The institution of candidacy, an identity-related category, would in the final 
analysis both enable Turkey to more easily accommodate with Greece within the EU 
framework and lead Greece to view Turkey from a more inclusive-less exclusive 
angle. Thought of this way, the promise of the European Union in the resolution of 
the Turkish-Greek disputes have improved a lot since December 1999, if not resulted 
in the resolution of the thorny Cyprus and Aegean disputes once and for all.       
Turkey did not show a fascinating performance in meeting the EU's 
Copenhagen criteria since 1997. Nor did the EU circles begin to think that the 
material benefits of Turkey's placement on the accession process would be more than 
its benefits. Besides, the EU circles could not muster any identity-rationale vis-à-vis 
Turkey as was the case with respect to the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Turkey was neither seen as an identical part of the EU's self identity nor there existed 
any patron-country within the EU that would actively and persistently argue for the 
 202
merits of Turkey's accession to the EU. Under such conditions, it seems that the EU 
acted towards Turkey from a security-driven instrumental logic in 1999, according to 
which Turkey's proposed candidacy status within the EU would mitigate its negative 
and security-degenerating responses towards the Europeanization of the whole gamut 
of Greece-Turkey relations. It was assumed that Turkey would not dare to risk 
damaging her EU membership candidacy by seriously confronting the EU over the 
accession of the island to the EU divided.         
In a manner to avoid such costs to its enlargement process, the EU adopted a 
‘constructive ambiguity’ policy towards the question of Cyprus’ EU membership 
both in Helsinki and in its aftermath. It seems that this policy is based on three 
different legs.* One is that the EU would not regard the resolution of the political 
deadlock on the island as a precondition before the mebership of the island. The 
second is that the EU will take all relavant factors into account when deciding 
whether or not to admit the island into membership. The third is that the EU would 
most likely approve of any political settlement between the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot communities and would not create problems during the implementation 
process of the EU’s internal regulations in each and every parcel of the island. 
In total, these conflicting sentences were formulated to send different 
messages to all interested parties to the conflict. The first part seems to have 
sympathised with the Greek Cypriots’s view. The message sent to Turkey was that 
the EU membership of the island cannot be taken hostage by any third country and 
that if the Greek Cypriots fulfilled the accession criteria they would become an EU 
member.     
                                                           
* One can reach the EU’s Helsinki decisions on Turkey’s candidacy and and the Cyprus dispute at 
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm. Articles 4, 9-a, 9-b, and 12 are relevant.    
 203
The second is adressed  mainly to the Greek Cypriots. Through this policy 
stance the EU hoped to put some pressure on the Greek Cypriots lest the latter felt 
assured that the island would be admitted to the EU whatever happens during the 
negotiation process. Here the EU somehow established a link between Turkey's EU 
membership and the way the Cyprus dispute is solved. In one way or the other the 
EU wanted Turkey to know that if the latter worked for the resolution of the Cyprus 
dispute in good faith, without overlooking the possiblity of the EU membership of 
the island, then Turkey would likely get a favourable EU treatment on its way to 
Brussels. The EU message was that if Turkey aspired to join the EU, its performace 
on this issue would likely affect the substance of what she would get from the EU.  
The last one is aimed at encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to show more 
commitment to the EU membership of the island. By making it clear that the EU 
would likely agree to the possiblity of some exceptions (opt-outs) from the EU's 
Community Law, it is hoped that both commnuities, particularly the Turkish 
Cypriots, would adopt a more flexible approach towards the settlement of the dispute 
within the EU's environmet.  
Judged against this instrumental rationality on the part of the European 
Union, this dissertation argues that the European Union agreed to Turkey’s EU 
candidacy in 1999 in the hope that Turkey would put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot 
community to reach a political settlement with the Greek Cypriots before the 
accession of the island to the EU takes place. This was so mainly for two reasons. 
One is that the way the island joined the EU would fundamentally affect the gist of 
the future Turkey-EU relations, carrying the risk of damaging the ‘constructively 
managed deliberate ambiguity’ policy of the EU towards Turkey. The second is that 
any crisis over Cyprus's accession to the EU would seriously affect the destiny of the 
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EU's overall enlargement process to the Central and Eastern European countries. The 
main motivation of the EU in regard to the EU membership of the island appeared 
not to make a genuine contribution to the everlasting resolution of the Cyprus 
problem, by trying to embrace an impartial attitude towards the positions of the 
parties to the conflict, but to secure the enlargement of the EU to the Central and 
Eastern European Countries proceed smoothly (Tocci, 2002: 104-138; Larrabee, 
1998: 25-29).  
It is within this spirit that Turkey has been required, as part of the short-term 
requirements of its Accession Partnership prepared in late 2000 and yearly progress 
reports of the European Commission, to contribute to the attempts of the United 
Nations at reaching a settlement on the island.* The political conditionality between 
Turkey’s accession to the EU and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute has for the 
first time been officially inserted into an EU document in relation to Turkey 
(Accession Partnership Document). 
From Helsinki until the end of 2002, the European Union made it evidently 
clear that Turkey's accession to the EU would not be possible unless the Cyprus 
dispute was solved in such a way that the whole island acceded to the Union 
following a comprehensive deal between the two communities. In addition to this 
stick poised to Turkey, various EU officials also offered carrots to the Turkish 
Cypriots. For example, the head of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, stated 
in the Greek Cypriot Parliament in late 2001 that the EU would be content with 
whatever regulations the communities reach as part of a comprehensive solution 
package. Provided that the island would have a single international 
                                                           
* One can see the Acession Partnership document at the address: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_085/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf. Turkey was required  to “in accordance 
with the Helsinki conclusions,in the context of the political dialogue,strongly support the UN 
Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive 
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identity/sovereignty and acts with one voice in the EU organs, the EU would agree to 
some derogations in the EU's Community Law.  
However, while the EU officials have been pushing for the Turks and Turkish 
Cypriots to work for resolution, they have on the other hand taken the pressure off 
the Greek Cypriots by reiterating that the island would join the EU without the 
resolution of the dispute being a precondition (Guven, 2003). 
 Thought of this way, the EU circles felt quite uneasy with the end of the 
inter-communal talks between November 2000 and December 2001. They, however, 
invested great hopes in the latest face-to-face negotiations set off in late 2001 with 
the initiatives of the President Denktas of TRNC.  
Despite the appearance that both the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots 
have engaged each other in an inter-communal negotiation process since 16 January 
2002 under the auspices of the United Nations from an instrumental perspective, both 
parties have to a greater extent internalized the idea that an everlasting solution on 
the island could more likely take place within the EU framework (Tocci, 2003: 199-
212). This fact itself demonstrates the increasing promise of the European Union in 
the resolution of the Cyprus dispute.     
Even though the communities themselves could not smooth over their 
decades-long points of frictions, the EU circles strongly asked them to reach a final 
settlement along the so-called Annan Plan, which the Secretary General of the United 
Nations put on the table in November 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). To the EU, 
this plan proved successful in meeting the fundamental demands of the parties 
concerned. While the constitutional and political status of the Turkish Cypriots 
                                                                                                                                                                        
settlement of the Cyprus problem,as referred to in point 9(a)of the Helsinki conclusions” in 2001.  One can also 
reach the EU’s yearly progress reports on Turkey at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm  
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would be improved, a significant portion of the Greek Cypriots would be allowed to 
resettle in the north of the Island and to reclaim their previously held properties.  
Despite the inter-communal talks, the parties could not come to a settlement 
before the EU's Copenhagen summit in December 2002 and the EU eventually had to 
agree to the EU membership of the divided island with the proviso that the EU's 
Community Law would not be applied to the northern part of the island (Copenhagen 
conclusions) temporarily. However, it appears that the EU will continue to support 
the parties in their efforts to finally arrive at a settlement until May 2004 when the 
island will officially accede to the Union.  
 
4.2. The Catalytic Effect: Flawed Assumptions versus the Facts on the Ground 
The hope in the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute was twofold: On the one 
hand it was claimed that the post-modern and post-sovereign international 
environment of the European Union would allow the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to 
escape the dangers of their decades-old state-centric modern conceptions of what an 
ideal solution would entail on the island. They would resolve their dispute by 
developing a collective identity within the EU framework.   
On the other hand it was also hoped that the EU's mere power of attraction 
would be enough for both sides on the island and Turkey to come to a mutually 
satisfied settlement along the EU's norms as they proceed with their accession 
processes. When the lure of EU membership in the eyes of Turkish and Greek 
communities combined with EU's credible conditionality policy, it was simply 
assumed that an everlasting settlement would be achieved soon (Diez, 2000).  
However, this dissertation argues that the performance of the European Union 
in the evolution of the Cyprus dispute has led to the intensification of the 
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‘securitization’ in and around the island, rather than generating the conditions that 
would allay the concerns of the two communities, especially the Turkish Cypriots, as 
to the EU membership of Cyprus. The main reasons for this outcome seem to lie in 
the EU's failure both to formulate a credible conditionality policy in regard to 
Turkey's EU membership prospects and to adopt a neutral position in the eyes of the 
Turkish Cypriot community. When the European Union's exclusionary attitude 
towards Turkey became clearer with the enunciation of Turkey's non-European 
identity more frequently in the 1990s, it turned out to become more difficult for the 
Turkish side to invest in any solution proposal crafted within the EU's frameworks. 
Under such a condition, the Greek Cypriots did not feel encouraged enough to come 
to terms with Turkish Cypriots on an equal basis, but viewed the EU as a strategic 
instrument in order to force them to accept more pro-Greek Cypriot settlements.    
It is the contention of this dissertation that had the EU made it clear right 
from the beginning that the accession of the island to the EU would become more 
likely in the aftermath of a political settlement between the two communities 
provided that both communities successfully internalize the EU's institutional norms, 
then the catalytic effects of EU involvement would have become more visible. Now 
what follows is an account of the factors that have diluted the expected catalytic 
effects of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute.  
The first problematic assumption in this regard concerns the security 
producing character of the adoption of the EU’s internal regulations. Though they 
were initially assumed to foster collective identification process on the island, the 
less numerous Turkish Cypriots have gradually grown fearful of being swallowed by 
the Greek Cypriots and denied their communal identity. It is mainly assumed that the 
membership of the whole island would be a sufficient reason for both communities, 
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especially the Turkish Cypriots, to feel secure. It was hoped that the supranational 
institutional environment of the EU; the EU's culture of tolerance and 'unity in 
diversity'; the upward and downward diffusion of sovereignty within the EU area; 
and social security guaranties of the EU's Community Law would all help the 
communities to rid themselves of their security-driven mentalities. With the 
realization of the three fundamental rights of movement, settlement and buying 
property within a post-sovereign EU, a secure and stable environment would flourish 
on the island. A federal arrangement on the island, internally similar to the Swiss 
model and externally to the Belgian model, would lead the parties to view each other 
through less nationalistic and sovereignty sensitive perspectives (Emerson and Tocci, 
2002). 
However, this assumption could not convince the Turkish Cypriots mainly 
because of the fact that in the eyes of many in Turkey and TRNC, there was no 
difference between the official stance of the Greek Cypriots and the character of the 
EU’s internal regulations (Ertekun, 1999: 97-113). The current EU policy has been 
interpreted by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as such that what the EU is doing 
would be tantamount to lending support to the Greek Cypriots. If the EU proceeded 
with its declared goal of admitting the Greek Cypriots in to the membership before 
the reach of any political settlement, this would indirectly imply that the EU cared 
for only the security considerations of the Greek Cypriots and did not hesitate to 
alienate Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots further from the EU. The end result of any 
imposition on Turkey to pull its forces back from the island on the ground that it 
occupies the territories of any EU member state would be the demarcation of new 
boundaries between the EU on the one hand and Turkey on the other. The EU 
seemed to have overlooked the fact that it is due to the presence of the Turkish troops 
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on the island that the Turkish Cypriots felt secure. This has been strongly inscribed 
into the collective conscious of the Turkish Cypriots (Olgun. 1998: 35-42; Duner, 
1999: 485-496). 
Moreover, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not agree on the 
implementation of the EU rules, the most significant of which concerned the three 
fundamental freedoms, namely the freedoms of free movement, settlement and 
buying property. While the Greek Cypriots insisted on the immediate implementation 
of these rights, the Turkish Cypriots considered the activation of these freedoms as 
attempts to dilute the Turkish character of the northern part of the island by 
providing the Greek Cypriots with incentives to extend their foothold in these places 
(Stavrinides, 1999: 54-96; Ertekun, 1999: 97-113). 
The main reason why the two communities have so far interpreted the EU's 
regulations as differently concerns the way of how they conceptualize/define the 
Cyprus dispute. It is the contention of this dissertation that the Cyprus dispute is 
more of an identity dispute than a simple clash of political views (Diez, 2002c). The 
facts that there has not taken place a Cyprus-wide collective identity between the two 
communities; that the ideology of nationalism has been the dominant current in both 
parts of the island; that the number of circles that worked for the materialization of 
collective identity has been so limited and only confined to a handful of leftist circles 
in both sides; that the main direction of the nationalisms on the island have been 
towards the mainlands; that the current political leaderships in both sides have 
adhered to nationalist ideology and interpreted the EU's Community Law through the 
prisms of their ideologies; have all obstructed the expected catalytic effects of the 
EU's involvement to take place. When the mainland countries Greece and Turkey 
gradually estranged from each other on identity terms due to the EU's identity 
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building functions, the communities on the island were also affected by this 
development.  The Turkish Cypriot political leadership, backed by the power holders 
in Ankara, have gradually invested in the idea that the EU membership of the island, 
particularly if that took place before Turkey's own accession, would certainly erode 
their communal identity and pave the ground for the Hellenisation of the whole 
island. Likewise, the Greek Cypriot political leadership seems to have calculated that 
the Hellenisation of the whole island under the contemporary international society 
could only take place should the island join the EU. Otherwise the ongoing inter-
communal negotiations within the UN framework would lead nowhere since Turkey 
and the Turkish Cypriots would do their best to preserve their gains of the post-1974 
era (Bahcheli, 2001). To the Greek Cypriot rationale, the Turkish side would not 
have been put under pressure if the ongoing UN-based negotiation process had 
continued uninterrupted.      
The Greek Cypriots became aware of the fact that in today’s international 
conjecture, the western international community would not consider the pursuit of 
enosis (the unification of the island with Greece) as a legitimate and legal action. 
Therefore, today’s Greek Cypriot Nationalism does not pursue this goal. However, 
the new Greek Cypriot Nationalism asserts, on the other hand, that the island is 
Greek; that the Greek Cypriots are entitled to govern the island; that any common 
Cypriot identity is not possible to emerge given the degree of cleavages between the 
two communities; that the close cooperation between the Greek Cypriots and the 
mainland Greeks is a must for the realization and preservation of the rights of the 
Greek Cypriots; that Greece’s extension of its security guarantee to the island 
through the joint defence doctrine is essential for the security of the Greek Cypriots; 
and that the EU membership of the island would provide the best mechanisms for the 
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close cooperation between the Greek Cypriots and the mainland Greeks (Mavratsa, 
2001: 151-179; Yiallourides: 2002: 325-357).         
In stark contrast to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots argue that the 
origins of the Cyprus dispute lie in the Greek Cypriot attempts at overhauling the 
constitutional structure of the 1960 agreements in late 1963. To their 
conceptualization, the island has never come under a sole Greek Cypriot rule and that 
the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus became possible in 1960 when both 
communities of the island gave up their maximalist positions, enosis for the Greek 
Cypriots and partition fro the Turkish Cypriots. To them, the Turkish Cypriots are as 
much politically equal as the Greek Cypriots and that their legal status of being 
recognized as one of the constitutive components of the Republic of Cyprus must be 
observed in all proposals for the reunification of the island. Therefore, they are 
strongly against the solution proposals that would likely dilute their equal status vis-
à-vis the Greek Cypriots. The membership of the Island in the EU as represented by 
the Greek Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus would level fundamental blows to 
their concerns for political equality. The dangers would be grave if the island were 
admitted to the EU either before any political settlement has been reached by the two 
communities or before Turkey’s EU membership.      
The second problematic assumption, on which the current EU policy towards 
the island is based, holds that Turkey would do whatever is necessary in order to 
become an EU member. This assumption is predicated on the hope that Turkey 
would value its interest in getting EU membership more than anything else because 
Turkey would value the social benefits of inclusion in the EU more than the social 
costs of exclusion. However, this proved insufficient for Turkey to internalize the 
EU's norms and see the EU accession process as legitimate for the settlement of the 
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dispute. Absent the EU's commitment to Turkey, Turkey's own efforts did not result 
in strong socialization on the part of Turkey. The logical consequence of this 
reasoning has resonated in the EU circles with the expectation that Turkey would 
give her consent to any EU-backed Cyprus solution in order not to risk her own 
prospective EU membership. Such kind of reasoning on the part of the European 
Union is flawed, for it allows for blackmailing tactics against Turkey likely to be 
implemented by the Greek and the Greek Cypriots. The recent past has clearly 
demonstrated that Turkey did not hesitate to drive wedges with the EU in case the 
latter did not upgrade the tone of the association relationship with more developed 
mechanisms. Rather than softening its position on the Cyprus dispute with a view to 
mending fences with the EU, Turkey decided to harden its Cyprus policy in the 
aftermath of the Luxembourg decisions of December 1997 (Suvarierol, 2003: 55-78). 
It is the case that the factors underlying Turkey’s policies towards the island 
are of strategic character (Tank, 2002: 146-164). Scared of any Greek encirclement 
from the south, Turkey has been alert to the possibility that the Greek Cypriot 
domination of the island might deprive it of a very important strategic outlet to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Besides, the presence of the Turkish troops on the island seems 
to have increased Turkey’s leverage against Greece in the Aegean Sea. A much 
speculated Turkish argument was that given that the construction of the Baku-
Ceyhan oil pipeline is planned to terminate in Ceyhan oil port, the possession of 
Cyprus under the control of any power but Turkey might inhibit the Turkish interest 
in controlling the flow of the oil to the western capitals.  
Rather than softening its position on the island, the Turkish security elite 
defined Turkey's interests on the island in more strategic-security terms since the 
second half of the 1990s. Whereas it was previously stated that the well-being of the 
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Turkish Cypriot community constituted Turkey's prime concern in the island, since 
the mid-1990s the emphasis has been put on the strategic-security value of the whole 
island, at least the northern part of it, for Turkey's own security needs (Bahcheli, 
2001: 208-222). 
In the minds of Turkish security elites, the incorporation of the island into the 
EU, as suggested by the Greek Cypriots, would be tantamount to the Hellenization of 
the southern periphery of Turkey, invoking the fears the ‘Crete example’ raised in 
the aftermath of the unification of the Crete Island with Greece in 1913 (Yetkin, 
2002; Gurel, 1993: 55-66). Besides, the fear of any possible degradation in her role 
of being the strategic outpost of the western security community, particularly by 
being replaced by the Greek Cypriots, is the prime reason leading Turkey to view the 
developments in and around the island from a strategic perspective (Stivachtis, 
2000). If the changing parameters of the international system offer the EU a grater 
role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern regions; and if the EU 
decides to pursue its interests in these regions through Greeks/Greek Cypriots; and if 
the EU does not envision Turkey’s membership soon, it is highly likely that Turkey 
would continue to view the developments over the island from a strategically 
oriented realpolitik perspective.           
The third flawed assumption on which the EU has acted holds that the 
Turkish Cypriots would join the Greek Cypriots during the accession talks in order to 
reap the economic benefits of the accession process and future membership. To this 
logic of economic rationality, the Turkish Cypriots would be relieved of the 
unbearable effects of the economic embargo put on them by the Greek Cypriots and 
the international community. The EU was also assumed to channel enormous 
amounts of financial help to the areas, which are under Turkish control, within the 
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framework of EU structural aids to the less developed regions of the Union 
(Stivachtis, 2000). To this end, the EU commission announced an economic aid 
package in the early 2002 foreseeing the flow of more 200 million Euro to Turkish 
Cypriots until 2006 following the settlement of the dispute through the accession of 
the island to the Union undivided. However rational it may sound, economic 
rationality is not the only logic currently under consideration in the TRNC. More 
than economic rationality, what seems to matter for the Turkish Cypriots are the 
needs of societal and political security. For them the continuation of Turkey’s 
security guarantee and the presence of the Turkish troops on the island, rather than 
the cohabitation with the Greek Cypriots within the EU, have proved to be more vital 
in terms of their security. It is not the economic well-being but physical and societal 
security that matter for the Turkish Cypriots (Diez, 2000). 
The fourth assumption was that not only the Turkish Cypriots but also the 
Greek Cypriots would soften their negotiating positions. The EU membership of the 
island would be a supporting reason for the Greek Cypriots to feel themselves more 
secure. Conceived of as such there would be nothing wrong for them to give the 
Turkish Cypriots something more than what they actually desire.  
However, the main impediment before the Greek Cypriots to show a more 
accommodating behaviour towards the Turkish Cypriots was related to their major 
political goal of scoring diplomatic gains against the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
via the EU (Stavrinides, 1999). If there did not exist a strong political will on the part 
of the Greek Cypriots to carry the Cyprus dispute to the EU circles, and if they did 
not lodge a membership application with the EU as representing the whole island, the 
EU might have not involved in the Cyprus dispute to the current degree.  
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With the evaporation of the Cold War dynamics, the Greek Cypriots had 
stopped to view their connections with the Non-Aligned Countries in a less vital 
manner since it would have been no longer possible for them to exploit these links at 
the expense of Turkey. Therefore, they had come to a conclusion that their gains 
against Turkey would be more if they courted the European Union, which started to 
view Turkey less from a strategic-security perspective but more from political and 
human rights perspectives in the 1990s (Yiallourides, 2001: 325-357). 
Within this spirit since 1995 the Greek Cypriots have hardened their 
negotiation positions. Neither the inter-communal talks in the second half of 1997 
nor the negotiations between December 1999 and September 2000 were indicative of 
any softening in the Greek Cypriot policies. When the EU made it clear that the 
resolution of the conflict would not be a precondition for the membership of the 
island to the EU as representing the whole island, the incentives on the part of them 
to negotiate a new deal with the Turkish Cypriots decreased. Why would the Greek 
Cypriots agree to share their internationally recognized sovereignty over the island 
with the Turkish Cypriots under a new political framework where both communities 
would be considered as politically equal? (Tocci, 2003) 
The fifth assumption is that the EU could act as an impartial third party 
towards both communities. However, this is wrong given that Greece is a member of 
the EU and can affect the final EU decisions in regard to Turkey’s and Cyprus’s 
accession to the EU to a considerable extent (Brewin, 2000:  21-34; 2002a, 2002b). 
The sixth assumption regarding the EU’s active engagement with the Cyprus 
dispute revolves around the idea that the EU is in fact contributing to the realization 
of the UN-designed Cyprus settlement. The most important evidence of this is that 
numerous EU officials have been repeatedly stating that the EU supports the efforts 
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of the United Nations Secretary General to broker a deal between the two 
communities. To this logic, the EU is not an active third party, as the Secretary 
General of the United Nations has been, during the inter-communal negotiations. 
Though the European Union started to appoint EU representatives and rapporteurs on 
Cyprus since 1994 mandated to write reports on whether the parties negotiate in 
earnest within the UN framework, their mere existence and contacts with the parties 
have undeniably affected the negotiation position of the parties. 
This assumption is flawed mainly for the reason that even though the EU 
members did not put some solution proposals on the table and preferred to refer to 
the EU accession process as the framework for an everlasting settlement (Richmond, 
2002: 117-136), the prospective EU membership of the island certainly altered the 
main parameters of the conflict as well as the incentive matrixes of the parties 
concerned (Baier-Allen, 1999: 179). This has had no less an impact than the overall 
UN role. Even though the EU circles made it clear that they would welcome any 
solution of the dispute along the United Nations framework and would relax the 
Union's Community Law for the sake of accession of the island to the Union, this has 
not produced any settlement so far. One reason for this is that the EU involvement 
has seriously questioned the legitimate rights of Turkey on the island. While the 
Greek Cypriots have not felt any serious EU pressure, Turkey has been considered as 
the most important party to affect the solution prospects of the dispute.  
While the UN framework used to respect Turkey's legitimate concerns on the 
island emanating from the 1960 agreements and considered the optimum way of 
solution process to revolve around inter-communal negotiations, the European Union 
seems to have invested in the idea that if Turkey was 
encouraged/asked/pressurised/demanded to push the Turkish Cypriots for some 
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reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots the solution would immediately follow 
(Brewin, 2002c). In contrast to the EU's attitude, the well-established UN framework 
used to assume that all parties concerned would have to feel satisfied with the 
ultimate settlement on the island (Baier-Allen, 1999).  
The fact that UN authorities and the US governments have increasingly 
supported the EU membership of the island as the most important external dynamic 
that would encourage the communities on the island to come to a settlement has 
contributed to the Europeanization of the conflict. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
authorities have gradually believed that this UN-US attitude has damaged their 
interest on the island and made the Greek Cypriots more reluctant to negotiate with 
them in good faith. How would the Greek Cypriots accommodate the Turkish 
Cypriots if the EU, UN, and US authorities all argued for the EU membership of the 
island without any a priori resolution of the dispute being a precondition and without 
the European Union not feeling committed to Turkey's own accession to the Union? 
 
4.3. The Risks of the EU Membership of A Divided Cyprus 
The performance of the EU’s involvement in the Cyprus dispute has demonstrated 
three things. The first is that the cooler and the less intensive Turkey’s relations with 
the EU are, the less conducive an environment exists to an inter-communal 
negotiation process and the less conciliatory the Turkish Cypriots become towards 
the Greek Cypriots. The second is that if the EU continues to proceed with the 
accession talks only with the Greek Cypriots as representing the whole island, then 
prospects for resolution will be dim with the political environment on the island 
turning out to be more ‘securitised’ and the Greek Cypriots feeling no need to 
accommodate the Turkish Cypriots. The third is that the Turkish political/military 
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elites have come to the conclusion that the EU acts towards Turkey from an 
instrumental perspective in the sense that if Turkey were encouraged on its way to 
EU membership, then Turkey would actively support the Turkish Cypriots to agree 
with the Greek Cypriots. I argue that if the EU does not radically phase out its 
ambiguous position as to Turkey's membership and offer Turkey a clear membership 
prospect in the wake of radical domestic reforms within the country, the most 
probable outcome in the years ahead would be the EU membership of Cyprus as a 
divided island.  
As of the first half of 2003, the situation is as follows: The parties could not 
come to a settlement along the so-called Annan Plan of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, despite of the fact that the original plan of November 2002 was 
revised twice in December 2002 and February 2003. The parties could neither reach 
the 28th of February dateline of the Secretary General nor agree to submit the plan to 
public referenda by the end of March 2003. Eventually, the Greek Cypriots have 
signed the Accession treaty with the European Union on 16 April 2003 on their own 
on behalf of the whole island. Both the Secretary General Annan has pointed to the 
Turkish Cypriot leader as the main party responsible for the failure of his plan and 
the international community, including the EU as well, interpreted the latest decision 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to open the border gates and allow the 
communities to visit each other with scepticism.  
If the Greek Cypriots accede to the Union by May of 2004 without the 
resolution of the dispute as representing the whole island, this will further increase 
the 'securitization' dynamics in the region mainly for the reasons mentioned below. 
In such a case the Greek Cypriots would permanently loose their hopes of a unified 
Cyprus where it could be possible for them to enjoy one day all of the three 
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fundamental rights all over the island. Besides, their incentive for any further round 
of inter-communal talk would go down, for given their EU membership they would 
have felt less motivated to accommodate the claims of the Turkish Cypriots as part of 
a final deal. They would also have to increase their military spending in the face of 
escalated risks in the region. Their economic performance would be negatively 
affected by the escalation of the crisis environment on the island, since foreign 
investors would not want to come to the island to invest their capitals. Besides, sharp 
reductions in the profits of the lucrative tourism sector would be likely. It is for 
certain that a divided Cyprus would constitute a major source of friction in EU-
Turkey relations (Barkey and Gordon, 2001/2002: 83-94). 
The Turkish Cypriots would not be immune from the negative consequences 
of the EU membership of a divided Cyprus either. First of all, their dependency on 
Turkey would tremendously increase in many policy areas. The economic benefits of 
the EU membership would be foregone. This situation would level a serious blow to 
their communal identity and the years-long claim that they possess an independent 
and sovereign state (Barkey and Gordon, 2001/2002: 83-94). In parallel to the 
increased integration with Turkey, more settlers may come from Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots might find themselves as the minority community in their 
territories. The number of Turkish Cypriots who might both leave the northern 
Cyprus either for the southern part or other places of the European Union or apply 
for Greek Cypriot passport might increase. This would certainly shake up the ground 
on which social peace in the TRNC is built. It would be highly likely that growing 
numbers of Turkish Cypriots would view their political leaders, who object any deal 
with the Greek Cypriots within the EU framework, through suspicious and critical 
eyes (Guven 2002). Besides, the increased economic dependency on Turkey would 
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not relieve them of their current economic problems. Neither the economic embargo, 
put on them by the Greek Cypriots and endorsed by the European Union, would be 
lifted, nor the deteriorating economic performance of Turkey would be able to bail 
them out on a future occasion of financial crisis.  
Turkey would also be affected by the membership of a divided Cyprus in the 
EU negatively. First of all, the addition of the Greek Cypriots to the anti-Turkish 
block within the EU would lessen Turkey’s chance for future EU membership. 
Second, the EU might not start the accession talks with Turkey on the pretext that the 
latter has not worked enough to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to come to an 
agreement. If the accession talks with the EU do not take off the ground in the next 
two to three years, particularly due to the continuation of the stalemate on the island, 
Turkey’s relations with the EU would be seriously severed. If Turkey proceeds with 
its declared intention to annex (or integrate with) the TRNC to the mainland, then 
Turkey’s hope to join the EU will sink to the bottom (Wallace, 2002). In Turkey the 
pace of EU-induced transformation process would slow down. In parallel to 
heightened tensions in the island, Turkey might find itself spending more on 
armament, thus forsaking investments on more lucrative fields.  
Moreover, the Euro-sceptic forces in Turkey might gain political victories 
against the circles, which see the future of the country in closer integration with the 
EU. Turkey would also channel huge amount of financial resources to the Turkish 
Cypriots to buttress their position on the island.  
The most important consequence of this scenario would be seen on the 
ongoing negotiation process between Greece and Turkey. All the gains of the last 
three years in the bilateral relations might be squandered. If the atmosphere soured in 
the Aegean Sea, risks to regional and continental security might abound with Greece 
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and Turkey finding themselves on the opposite sites. One additional disadvantage of 
the non-membership of the island in the EU would be that Turkish would not be 
registered as an official language spoken within the EU zone. However, if registered, 
the use of Turkish language might lead to the evaporation of one of the psychological 
barriers before Turkey’s membership in the EU (Barkey and Gordon, 2001/2002: 83-
94). 
Greece would also feel the negative consequences of the crisis situation on 
the island. The pro-EU-integrationist Smitis government in Athens might be exposed 
to harsh criticism at home as such that Europeanising the Turco-Greek relations did 
not yield to satisfactory outcomes for Greece. Critics might accuse the PASOK 
government of its pro-conciliatory attitudes toward Turkey on the ground that neither 
the bilateral negotiation process since the late 1999 nor the transformation of the 
dynamics of the Turkish-Greek relations into EU-Turkish relations did help Greece 
see the accession of Cyprus to the EU undivided and in favour of the Greek Cypriots. 
Greece’s defence expenditures would also increase in order to keep pace with Turkey 
(Wallace, 2002). A Greece, which would have to live next to a Turkey that would 
have further estranged from the European Union, would in no way feel itself so 
secure as to channel its energy and resources to the completion of its Europeanization 
program.  
The European Union as an institution or the EU member states would also be 
negatively affected from the membership of a divided Cyprus. In addition to the 
escalation of risks to the security and stability in the region, the EU would have 
found itself having a member state whose borders are patrolled by the UN forces. 
Imagine the negative impact of this on the EU’s institutional identity. In case the 
divided island became an EU member, it would be a likely option for the Greek 
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Cypriots to sabotage EU-Turkey relations by sparking a crisis with Turkey and then 
inviting the EU’s Rapid Reaction forces to come to their help (Wallace, 2002). 
However far-fetched it might sound, this scenario would not be unlikely given that 
one of the main arguments of the Greek Cypriots is that Turkey would find itself in a 
position to occupy a part of the EU’s territory should it not withdraw its troops from 
the island following the EU membership of the island.     
The EU would also face a Turkey, which would have felt alienated from the 
EU. Such a Turkey might easily adopt anti-EU policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
Balkans, and Middle Eastern regions if its interests contradict with those of the EU. 
Given that transatlantic bonds are getting as fragile and flimsy as possible, the 
impression that Turkey is siding with the United States, rather than the EU in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions would not serve the interests of 
the EU.  
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CHAPTER 5: Post-Helsinki Period: Change or Continuity  
The post-Helsinki period in the EU-Turkey-Greece triangle has been giving mixed 
signals as to the credibility and promise of the European Union to constructively 
contribute to the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes, through the transformation 
of Turkey and Greece's realpolitik security culture into non-realpolitik security 
culture. While there exist some factors that seem promising for the future, some other 
factors continue to shed doubts on the ongoing positive climate and remind the 
observers of Turkish-Greek relations of the painful cycles of conflict-cooperation 
seen in the past.  Viewed through this prism, what follows first is an analysis of the 
factors that might lead observers to feel optimistic about the future.  
 
5.1.Encouraging Factors  
The first promising thing is the fact that Turkey and Greece have been involved in a 
cooperation process since 1999 (Heraclides: 2002: 17-32). It seems that the dynamics 
of Turkey's EU accession process has in one way or the other led the two countries to 
develop a positive view of each other. Thus, it would not be an overestimation to 
claim that Europeanization processes on the both shores of the Aegean Sea 
constitutes the main underlying factor behind this cooperation process.  Rather than 
the mere existence of this cooperation process, what seem promising are the factors 
that make this process different from the previous cycles of cooperation. Before 
proceeding with the reasons why this is so, what follows next is a brief account of the 
latest cooperative interactions between Greece and Turkey. 
In the summer of 1999 Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece set off a new 
policy of reconciliation on the margins of a UN meeting in New York in late June. 
Note that this was happening before the earthquakes struck both countries in August 
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and September. Following the high level bilateral meetings and consultations in 
Ankara and Athens throughout the second half of 1999, Turkey and Greece signed a 
total of 10 agreements on various issues, ranging from organized crime, tourism, 
drug trafficking, illegal immigration, environment, culture, trade to terrorism. Half of 
these agreements were signed in Ankara when the Greek Foreign Minister 
Papandreou paid an historic visit to Turkey on 19-22 January 2000, first in the last 
three decades. The other half was signed in Athens during Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ismail Cem’s visit on 1-3 February 2002.*  
Since the first Turkey-Greece EU Committee meeting in February 2000, 
Greek officials have been offering training to their Turkish counterparts on customs 
and financial issues, judicial reform, agricultural issues, and low enforcement 
concerning illegal immigration, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime in the 
region.  
In early 2001, both countries agreed to eliminate the landmines on their 
common borders over the next ten years. They also simultaneously became 
signatories of the 1997 Ottawa Convention requiring the destruction of their existing 
landmines and prohibiting future landmine use and production.  
In early 2001, Greece has lifted the state of mobilization of war against 
Turkey. Turkey is no longer officially considered as the prime threat to Greece.  
 In early 2001 they agreed to cooperate on a feasibility study under the EU's 
Inogate program for a series of pipelines to carry natural gas from Central Asia to 
Europe. The $10 billion project would bring interconnections between the Greek and 
Turkish networks. In spring 2002 they agreed to build a cross-border pipeline to 
carry natural gas from central Asia to Western Europe. The 177-mile pipeline would 
                                                           
* One can visit the web sites of Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministries to have an idea about the 
treaties signed by thesecountries. http://www.mfa.gov.tr and http://www.mfa.gov.gr   
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be the first joint infrastructure project launched since the two neighbours set aside 
their traditional hostility in the wake of disastrous earthquakes in both countries in 
1999. The pipeline, which would cost $300 million and take three years to build, is 
the first inter-governmental project to take practical shape (Hope, 2002)  
In mid 2001, the soccer authorities of both countries agreed to make a joint 
bid to host the 2008 European soccer championship. In mid 2001 the militaries of 
both countries announced to downsize their military spending. Although the main 
reason behind the decision of the Turkish military authorities was the latest economic 
crisis precipitated by the developments of the February 2001, the Greek authorities 
foresaw this and announced that they would also go for savings.    
In early 2002, the two foreign ministers, Papandreou and Cem achieved a 
political breakthrough when they agreed that both countries would set up expert 
committees to discuss the solution of the long-running bilateral disputes, such as 
airspace over the Aegean Sea and ownership of mineral rights in the seabed. 
 A very important sign of the success of the latest reconciliation process 
between Greece and Turkey took place in early August 2002 when Turkey’s new 
National Security Policy Document did not mention Greece as the top external threat 
to Turkey’s national security.  
 Their cooperation within the NATO framework is also worth mentioning. In 
July 1997 they signed a memorandum of good neighbourly relations on the margins 
of the NATO's Madrid Summit where the Alliance officially endorsed the primacy of 
the Eastern Mediterranean region for the Alliances' future interests. Greece and 
Turkey finally came to an agreement over the NATO's command structures in 
December 1997 with the promulgation of the Alliance's new command structure. In 
the summer of 1998 both countries agreed to revitalise the Confidence Building 
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Measures, to which they had initially agreed in 1988. In this process, the role of 
NATO's Secretary General Solana was immense. In September 1998 they agreed to 
the establishment of a Balkan regional peacekeeping force alongside with NATO 
allies Italy and the United States. Their cooperation in NATO's war in Kosovo in 
1999 is also worth remembering. Last but not least, Greek and Turkish soldiers for 
the first time since 1982 participated together in a NATO military exercise in May 
2000, called Dynamic Mix (Papacosma, 1999: 47-67). 
The first reason why this latest cooperative mood is promising for the future 
is that the new thaw in bilateral relations has a strong domestic public support. If 
compared to the old times when the public opinion did most of the time constrain the 
political leaders to take bold initiatives, the new era witnesses that the majority of the 
Greek and Turkish people support the current reconciliation process (Heraclides, 
2002: 17-32).  
 Second, in addition to the public support, the majority of the political leaders 
in both countries are also in favour of closer cooperation. It is getting more and more 
difficult for the political parties to get votes by strictly adopting a nationalistic 
discourse (Heraclides, 2002: 20). Further democratization in both countries, 
particularly along the Europeanization process, holds out the prospect of decreasing 
the appeal of more-nationalistic and more unilateral policies to the public.   
 Third, the business elites in both countries also encourage the political leaders 
to mend the fences. The fact that the bilateral trade volume increased at least three-
fold over the last three years shows the degree of support the business circles give to 
the ongoing cooperation process (Larabee and Lesser, 2003: 87). The activation of 
the Greek-Turkish and Turkish-Greek business councils in 1998, the increase in the 
number of joint ventures and investments all display that the stakes of the business 
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elites in the continuation of the cooperation process is getting higher and higher. If 
the volume of these bilateral economic activities increase without interruption, it 
would be extremely difficult for the future political leaders to reverse this process. 
The creation of the Turkish-Greek academic forum in 1998 and the fact that Greece 
and Turkey have put into practice various confidence building measures since 1998 
are also positive steps worth mentioning in this regard.   
 Fourth, the current Turkish-Greek cooperation seems to operate in 
accordance with the functional approach of David Mitrany. Instead of dealing with 
the resolution of the hard security issues in the short run, the leaders in both countries 
actively support the view that cooperation should first continue in areas of low 
politics. The hope is that the more the level of cooperation increases in areas of low 
politics, the more difficult would be for political leaders to put the gains of this 
process into danger by adopting intransigent and unyielding approaches towards the 
resolution of the issues of high politics (Heraclides, 2002). Since 1999, both 
countries have signed more than ten treaties regulating as many issues as possible. 
Cooperation on terrorism, immigration, energy transportation, environment, de-
mining, illegal drug traffic, tourism, fisheries, education, sport are worth mentioning 
in this regard (Ministries of Foreign Affairs). 
It is to be noted with great satisfaction that both countries have also initiated a 
process of consultation on the issues of high politics as well. Since the early months 
of 2002, diplomats from both Foreign Ministries come together to discuss these 
issues with a view to determining the areas of contention as well as the means how to 
handle them. The facts that the Steering Committees, which prepared the content of 
the treaties on the issues of low politics, have not been dissolved and that the Task 
Force, which was established with a view to channelling Greece's experiences and 
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know-how to Turkey in her efforts to adopt the EU's Community Law, are still 
functioning are good omens for the future. 
 Fifth, the Greek national strategy towards Turkey has evolved in such a way 
that the majority of the Greek political and military elites are today in favour of 
Turkey's closer relations with the European Union. For now, it seems that Greece's 
national interests vis-a-vis Turkey envisage Turkey's further anchoring to the 
European Union because this seems the only way for Greece to settle territorial 
disputes with Turkey in the name of further Europeanization. The old strategy of 
'conditional sanctions' has given way to the new strategy of 'conditional rewards'. 
Instead of threatening Turkey to veto her EU membership aspirations unless the 
latter support more pro-Greek settlements over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus disputes, 
the new Greek strategy emphasizes the point that Greece would actively support 
Turkey's EU membership prospects should the latter shows more accommodating 
and cooperative stances over the bilateral disputes (Couloumbis, 1999: 407-422). 
This new Greek policy is promising because the materialization of Greece' national 
interests requires both the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes and the continuation 
of Turkey's EU accession process. Besides, it is based on positive incentives rather 
than negative conditions.  
The hope that a Turkey, which is more Europeanized and democratized, 
would be more peaceful and cooperative in her foreign policy appears to underpin 
the essence of the current Greek strategy (Tsakonas, 2001: 145-159). With Turkey's 
acceptance as an EU candidate, one of the most important excuses for Greece's non-
European outlook in foreign and security policy areas would wither away, since 
Greece would no longer feel the need to counter Turkey on the basis of a realpolitik 
threat perspective, characterising the latter as non-European. In one way or the other, 
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Turkey's closer relations with the EU in the post-Helsinki era have indirectly 
contributed to Greece's 'European-ness' within the EU. 
Sixth, Turkey’s perception of Greece’s relative position within the EU has 
also started to change in this new era in such a way that the Turkish elite now see 
that the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations have been strongly affected by the tone of 
Turkey-Greece relations (Guvenc, 2000: 102-129). Unsatisfactory though it may 
seem, the Turkish political elites have gradually embraced the view that Turkey has 
also to come to terms with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, if she wants 
to join the EU. Greece is now considered more seriously by Turkey. The more 
Europeanized Greece has become, the more difficult has become for Turkey to carry 
out the old policy of relying on major EU members in the hope that they would exert 
pressure on Greece not to put obstacles on Turkey's way to Brussels. It is to be noted 
with satisfaction here that Greece is not mentioned as a main security threat for 
Turkey in the latest National Security Document issued in August 2002. Compared 
to the previous document issued in 1997 and despite traumatic effects of the Ocalan 
crisis on Turkey-Greece relations, this development should be considered of 
significant value.      
Seventh, the European Union and the United States, as the major external 
actors that have significant interests in the region, have been actively supporting the 
current cooperation process for their own security reasons. In this regard, the most 
important thing is the changing EU policies towards Turkey. Since 1999 Turkey has 
been an official candidate for the EU membership destined to join the Club on the 
basis of the same criteria as applied to other would-be members. The promising thing 
in this regard concerns the likelihood that the EU might have started to look at 
Turkey from a new perspective that holds that Turkey's eventual admission to the EU 
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would serve the EU's own security interests (Kalaycioglu, 2002). Rather than 
sticking with the old idea that the EU would be able to influence Turkey to overhaul 
its socio-economic and socio-political dynamics if/when the former could keep the 
latter on the EU's orbit (Duner, 2002), this new thinking has started to emphasise the 
EU's own interests that might be damaged if Turkey remains outside of the Union for 
an indefinite period of time. Particularly since September 11, 2001, a growing 
number of people in the EU have been increasingly arguing for the merits and 
advantages of Turkey's admission to the EU on the basis of economic and security 
rationality. This is promising because if one could prove that the main reason for the 
EU's recent commitment to closer and more cooperative relations with Turkey has 
emanated from the EU's own security needs rather than the instrumental concerns 
over the settlement of the Cyprus and the ESDP issues, then one might feel 
optimistic about the future.  
There are some important signs in this regard. The Kosovo war in 1999, the 
cease of political dialogue with Turkey between 1997 and 1999, and the electoral 
triumph of the more nationalistic and isolationist circles in April 1999 elections as a 
response to EU's exclusionary attitude towards Turkey might have all alerted the EU 
circles to the dangers that Turkey's gradual alienation from the EU would damage the 
EU's core values and post-Cold War era security interests. Thought of this way, one 
can aptly argue that Turkey's EU membership candidacy might denote for the EU's 
determination to contribute first to Turkey (directly) and the EU's (indirectly) 
security interests through Turkey's transformation on the basis of the EU's norms. If 
so, the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes would 
increase in the years ahead simply because the EU's attitude towards Turkey has 
started to become less ambiguous and more receptive due to the high stakes in the 
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estrangement of Turkey from the EU. A committed EU would certainly skyrocket 
Turkey's penchant for EU membership as well as efforts to come to an everlasting 
settlement with Greece along the ongoing accession process. A more 'European' 
Turkey would easily compromise with Greece. 
A related strategic reason for the EU's more receptive approach towards 
Turkey has become evident in the post 11 September era as the Europeans have 
found themselves opposing the American model of security conceptualization and 
international order. The war against global terrorizm on the one hand and the 
American plans to revise the organizing principles of the Middle Eastern security 
order on the other might alerted the EU circles to the danger that Turkey's placement 
within the American camp would likely erode the EU's global/regional power status 
as well as the 'power of attraction' of the EU's soft-security model. Assuming that the 
EU would feel the need to make its own security model appear strongly in the years 
ahead, then the degree and quality of Turkey's placement within this model would be 
of fundamental importance.     
Based on this logic, the European Union for the first time announced in its 
Leaken summit in December 2001 that if the pace of Turkey's EU-induced 
reformation process goes unabated, the accession talks with Turkey would likely 
start soon. In such a way as to reiterate this position, the European Union recently 
made it clear in Copenhagen in December 2002 that the accession talks with Turkey 
will start immediately should the European Commission recommends this in its 
yearly progress report on Turkey in 2004 (Copenhagen conclusions). These 
developments are important because the EU members for the first time enunciated 
clear dates in regard to Turkey's accession talks with the EU.  
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The future would prove more promising if the EU members agreed to 
Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki and Turkey's participation in the EU convention 
meetings with a view to accelerating the re-institutionalization of the EU on the basis 
of the EU's multi-cultural and supranational traits. A multi-cultural and heterogenous 
EU area 'united in diversity' on the one hand and a two-tier integration process on the 
other will increase the promise of the EU in the resolution of the Turkish-Greek 
disputes since Turkey's membership prospects in such an EU would become realistic.  
What is important in this regard concerns the EU's gradually changing 
attitude towards the Kurdish question in Turkey. In contrast to the pre-Helsinki 
period, the EU circles have been referring to this issue for the last three years within 
the framework of Turkey's democratization. Rather than exerting pressure on Turkey 
to accept the Kurds in Turkey as a minority group entitled to community rights, the 
EU has changed its attitude towards this issue in the sense that Turkey has been 
demanded in the EU's Accession Partnership Document and yearly progress reports 
to recognize and improve individual political, social and cultural rights of all Turkish 
citizens regardless of their ethnic origins (Kirisci, 2002). Turkey's victory over the 
PKK, the changing strategies of the Kurds-dominated political parties in Turkey in 
favour of more political-less confrontational approaches, and Turkey's growing 
recognition of the Kurdish issue as a problem in its relations with the EU have all 
made it easier for the EU to modify its old approach.      
The Americans are also encouraging the latest Greek-Turkish cooperation 
process in the hope that Turkey's EU membership prospects will be higher if one of 
the great obstacles in this regard is eliminated. The fundamental US concern in this 
regard is that Turkey's pro-Western and pro-American character will be bolstered if 
Turkey joines the EU. A more European and western Turkey will more easily and 
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likely cooperate with the US in the realization of the latter's strategic-security 
interests in the Greater Middle Eastern region (Kuniholm, 2001: 25-53). It seems that 
the Americans are aware of the inverse relationship between Turkey's European 
vocation on the one hand the power of nationalism/isolationism in Turkish foreign 
policy on the other. To them, if Turkey finds itself isolated from the EU, then 
nationalist/isolationist circles would become dominant in Turkish domestic and 
foreign policy and this would in turn increase the degree of Turkish scepticism of the 
Western world (EU and the USA alike). It would gradually become more difficult for 
the Americans to buy Turkey's participation in US-designed security policies in 
Turkey's near abroad. Doing business with Turkey outside the weakening 
transatlantic framework (EU-USA drifting apart on the on hand and the 
marginalisation of NATO on the other) and on the basis of bilateral relations would 
become highly costly for the Americans. The Americans are of the view that if they 
supported Turkey's EU membership prospects and lobbied for Turkey in the EU 
circles, then Turkey would more actively support the American policies in Turkey's 
strategic environment.  
In addition to this instrumental reasoning, the US authorities also approached 
Turkey's EU membership from an ideational perspective. To them, if Turkey acceded 
to the EU, the doubts over Turkey's national and international identity would cease to 
exist. From then on, Turkey would become a true member of the western 
international community and cooperate with the US more easily and in a more 
efficient and time-consuming way. The hope is that Turkey's nationalistic and 
sometimes anti-western foreign policy openings in its region would strongly be 
curtailed by its membership in the EU.       
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The second promising factor, in addition to the new rationale of the latest 
Turkish-Greek cooperation process, is that Turkey's interest in the EU membership 
has increased in the post-Helsinki period, particularly following the ominous 
September 11 events. Given that the stakes of exclusion from the EU, particularly on 
cultural and civilisational grounds, will be much higher today than the past, Turkey 
has speeded up its efforts to meet the accession criteria. To this end, the Grand 
National Assembly enacted some radical reforms over the last years, the latest of 
which occurred in August 2002. Not only Turkey abolished the death penalty and 
civilized the composition of National Security Council but also allowed the use of 
Kurdish in education. All these changes aim at adapting Turkey's internal and 
external make-up to those of the European Union. Turkey's gradual success in this 
regard has been noted by the EU Commission's progress reports issued in 2001 and 
2002.  
Turkey's enhanced interest in the EU membership is also affected by 
concerns not to live with the Americans on a bilateral level. Given NATO's 
decreasing importance in general transatlantic relations, further estrangement of 
Turkey from the EU would mean that both Turkey's European character would erode 
in the years to come and Turkey would find itself dealing with the United States on 
more bilateral-less institutional levels (Oguzlu, 2002: 579-603). This would certainly 
weaken Turkey's bargaining power vis-à-vis the Americans, as the latest Iraqi war 
has demonstrated. 
Estranging from the European Union and joining the Americans in their 
global campaigns as a secondary power, Turkey would not feel itself in security. She 
would likely face increasing, and at times disturbing, pressures coming from the 
United States to throw its lot with the Americans, sometimes to the detriment of her 
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national security interests (Aktar, 2003). Reflecting this new mood in Turkey, even 
the ex-Chief of the General Staff argued for Turkey's EU membership on strategic-
security grounds claiming that Turkey's accession to the EU is a geo-political 
necessity on the part of Turkey. 
Additionally, the political Islamists have recently made a u-turn and decided 
to give support to Turkey's accession process with the EU. Even though many claim 
that their prime reason for this change is their hope to find an external ally against 
the secular establishment within the country, the fact that these circles constitute 
nearly one third of the Turkish society is important in this regard (Oguzlu, 2004: 
forthcoming). 
A significant concern in Turkey's growing desire for the EU membership 
relates to the fact that the Turkish foreign policy makers have realized that if Cyprus 
joins the EU as a divided island, this will have catastrophic impacts on Turkey's 
relations with the EU. It would become more difficult for Turkey to reach its EU 
membership goal when the Greek Cypriots would be able to block Turkey's attempts 
from within the EU (Oguzlu, 2002: 79-101).  
 As an indication of the EU's increasing promise, the Greek and Turkish 
governments, particularly the latter, encouraged the Cypriots in their efforts to come 
to a settlement before the island joins the EU in the middle of 2004. Despite a break 
with the inter-communal negotiation process between late 2000 and late 2001, the 
two sides set into motion a new negotiation process in early 2002. Even though the 
parties themselves could not sort out their points of friction until the EU's 
Copenhagen summit in December 2002, the fact that they seriously considered the 
peace plan of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is of significant value. It seemed 
that all parties concerned have realized, to varying degrees though, the urgency of 
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reaching a solution. While the Greek Cypriot leadership has tried to garner the 
support of the sceptical Greek Cypriot public opinion to the need to solve the dispute 
along the Annan plan, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot public opinion has actively 
and vociferously encouraged their sceptical political leader to show more flexibility 
in helping pave the way for the accession of the island to the EU united (Guven, 
2003). 
 The public discussions in Turkey are also very encouraging. As being 
different from the past experiences, this time the quality of the domestic discussions 
on the merits of the Annan plan and on the need to help facilitate a solution before 
the EU casts its final decision has been comparatively high. A significant portion of 
the Turkish political elite as well as the Turkish public, compromising of 
academicians, intellectuals, businessmen and the men on the street, have 
enthusiastically argued that Turkey should accept the Annan Plan as a framework for 
negotiations and not let this important opportunity wither away (Arim, 
Karaosmanoglu and Tashan, 2002). To these circles, Turkey's EU membership 
prospects would certainly be affected by the political situation in Cyprus. 
 It is now the time to analyse the factors that seem to still negatively affect the 
promise of the EU's involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations.     
 
5.2. Discouraging Factors on the Part of Greece 
The first signs in this regard took place during the negotiation of the terms of 
Turkey's candidacy in 1999 and Turkey's Accession Partnership document in 2000. 
On both occasions, Greece tried to link Turkey's eventual accession to the Union to 
the resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes in favour of Greece. The tough 
bargaining between the Greek diplomats on the one hand and EU and Turkish 
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diplomats on the other proved that Greece tried to get as much concessions as 
possible from Turkey as the latter tries to march to Brussels.  
Despite all Greek attempts at further Europeanization, it seems that the 
increasing Greek calls for the set of a clear date for the start of Turkey's accession 
talks with the EU has been driven by Greece's instrumental concerns vis-à-vis 
Turkey. According to them, if the Turks were given such an exact date for the start of 
accession talks, they would not make a great fuss over the incorporation of the Greek 
Cypriots Administration into the EU as representing the whole island even if a 
political solution could not be reached. It is quiet telling that Greece was the only EU 
country, which adopted such a stance by the time the EU Council convened in 
Copenhagen in December 2002.  
 Given that the successive Greek governments in the 1990s elevated the EU 
membership of the Greek Cypriots to Greece's most important foreign policy goal, 
the negative repercussions of any delay in this process might be unbearable for any 
Greek government.  
 Although one cannot be so sure about the real intentions of the current Greek 
government on Turkey's EU membership by analyzing Greece's policy towards 
Cyprus, one could get a clearer picture if the attention were turned to Greece's policy 
on the ESDP issue. Here Greece behaved towards Turkey on the assumptions that 
Turkey can never join the EU and that Turkey's exclusion from the ESDP (therefore 
the EU) would contribute to her security.  
The interpretation of the latest Copenhagen summit by the majority of the 
Greek political elites does not also seem promising for the ongoing Turkish-Greek 
détente because that once again displayed that the Greeks still approach Turkey from 
an instrumental perspective. To these circles the new status quo has resulted in a win-
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win situation for Greece. On the one hand, if Turkey accepted these conclusions and 
fulfilled the EU's requirements, than her behaviour towards Greece would be 
cooperating and accommodating (a positive outcome for Greece). On the other hand, 
if Turkey chose the path of escalation and refused to comply with the EU's decisions 
over the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, then Turkey would have to face the European 
Union, rather than Greece (another positive outcome for Greece) (Dragoumis, 2002). 
 Another non-promising sign concerns the position the Greek government 
took up during the European Convention meetings. While Greece on the one hand 
argued for the strengthening of the power of the European Commission and the 
European Parliament, as instruments to protect the interests of 'smaller' members 
against 'bigger' members, she on the other hand appeared quite satisfied with the 
inter-governmental character of the decision-making process within the European 
Councils in regard to European Security and Defence Policy issues (Gropas, 2003). 
When this inter-governmental approach toward the ESDP issues combined with 
demands that the EU turns into a unique international political and security actor 
equipped with instruments to defend borders of the Union and security interests of 
the members states, it appears that the Greek view of the EU as a 'security alliance' 
and 'protector power' is still valid. Otherwise if a qualified-majority system were 
adopted as regards ESDP issues, Greece's more powerful partners within the EU 
might easily sidestep Greece's security concerns for the sake of constructively 
managing relations with Turkey. 
 What one can derive from this particular Greek approach towards the EU 
integration process is that Greece has tried to give a more European outlook by 
adopting more federalist appearances in regard to less problematic issues in return 
for EU backing of Greece's national security interests vis-à-vis Turkey. When this 
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particular logic towards the EU integration process combines with the repeated 
statements of the Greek politicians that there is only one dispute between the two 
countries in the Aegean Sea, namely the delimitation of the Continental shelf areas, 
and that the last resort to solve this dispute is the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague, Turkey's incentives to come to a final agreement with Greece within the 
ongoing EU accession process will to a great extent diminish.            
 Despite the significance of the new approach towards Turkey, one should not 
ignore the still influential position of the traditional anti-Turkey circles in Greece as 
to how to deal with Turkey. It is getting more frequent that a quite number of Greek 
politicians and strategists are blaming the current government for its blind support to 
Turkey's European vocation. They hold that Turkey has not showed any 
compromising stance towards Greece and upped the ante in the Aegean and Cyprus 
in spite of the fact that Greece has gradually helped clean Turkey's ways to Brussels. 
A clear manifestation of this thinking become more evident during the course of the 
first half of 2003 as such circles pushed the government to take up a much harder 
line towards Turkey, particularly concerning Turkey's alleged disrespect for Greece's 
air zone. Even though the Turkish military fighters flew over the extra 4 miles of 
Greece's alleged air zone, they took place in accordance with NATO's military 
planning and in quite low numbers compared to the Greek flights over the Aegean 
Sea. Fearing that the ruling PASOK government might face a defeat in the upcoming 
elections in the spring of 2004, the Greek authorities could easily adopt a highly 
nationalist and anti-Turkish discourse and even lodged the European Commission 
with accusation-files in regard to Turkey's allegedly non-European misbehaviour 
over the Aegean Sea. As this episode demonstrates, domestic political concerns 
might even push the current Greek Foreign Minister, seemingly a figure in favour of 
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Turkey's closer attachment to the EU, to embrace nationalistic stances vis-à-vis 
Turkey.           
 
5.3. Discouraging Factors on the Part of Turkey 
The most important reason for pessimism on the part of Turkey emanates from the 
particular logic Turkey embraced in coming to a settlement with the EU over the 
ESDP issue. Rather than believing in the need and appropriateness to meet the 
required demands on the way to accession, particularly concerning convergence with 
the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, Turkey seems to have acted on the 
assumption that the international conjuncture heavily favoured Turkey against the 
European Union in general and Greece in particular in the post 11 September era. 
The reason for this was that the negotiation position of Turkey might have increased 
with the elevation of the country to a very significant place in the American 
strategies of containing and fighting terrorizm. Due to her increased international 
standing in regard to global war against terrorizm and Iraq, the Turkish security elite 
might have calculated that this would have been the right time to strike a deal with 
the Europeans, for Turkey's bargaining power would have certainly increased vis-à-
vis them (Yetkin, 2002). Another instrumental concern driving Turkey's actions in 
this case seems to have been the rationale that if Turkey cooperated with the EU over 
this issue, the latter would likely take the pressure off Turkey concerning the non-
settlement on Cyprus. The fact that the need to develop healthier security relations 
with Turkey in this new era has increased on the side of the EU has also constituted 
another reason helping produce a deal over the ESDP issue.   
 A significant factor why Turkey's particular behaviour towards the European 
Union may not be promising for the EU's role to contribute to Turkish-Greek 
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cooperation is that the Turkish political-security elite acts on the assumption that the 
more the EU approaches to Turkey the faster Turkey would accommodate with 
Greece. In addition to this, a survey conducted among the members of Turkish 
Parliament concluded that Turkish MPs have not considered Cyprus and the Aegean 
Sea disputes as fundamental obstacles towards Turkey's accession to the EU. They 
mainly signed on the idea that if Turkey successfully handled its problems in the 
areas of human rights and democratization, then the EU would hardly find any 
excuse to deny Turkey's membership. The fact that the Cyprus dispute has not been 
regarded as a condition for Turkey's membership would likely militate against the 
prospects of the resolution of this dispute along the EU accession process (McLaren 
and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 195-218). 
Such thinking on the part of state elites was highly conspicuous during the 
discussion process of the Annan plan in Turkey. The core of Turkey's security elite 
did not want to cast their decision on the applicability of the Annan plan before 
hearing what the European Union would offer Turkey in Copenhagen in December 
2002 (Guven, 2003). It seems that the ruling Justice and Development Party has also 
signed on to this thinking despite the initial comments of the important figures of the 
party that this plan would constitute a promising ground for the continuing inter-
communal negotiations on the island. Some have even argued that the main reason 
why the President Denktas of the TRNC has invited the Greek Cypriot President to 
face-to-face talks in late 2001 was to enhance Turkey's relative negotiation position 
vis-à-vis the European Union (Yetkin, 2002). 
 The important thing in this regard is that all the parties concerned, including 
the Greek and Greek Cypriots as well, have taken an utmost care not to appear as the 
intransigent side during the negotiations. Rather than engaging each other with a 
 242
sincere interest to come to an everlasting settlement, their prime concern has been to 
please the European Union and give the image that they are the party working for a 
true settlement (Guven, 2003).  
 One of the handicaps in regard to Turkey is that Turkey's EU accession 
process will likely pit the current Justice and Development Party government against 
the traditional state elites, if the European Union does not reward Turkey's 
reformation attempts with clearer prospects of membership soon. It seems that 
whatever the EU offers Turkey in the months/years to come, the current government 
would likely accept, for the Europeanization process appears to constitute the most 
important legitimation strategy of the government (Insel, 2003: 293-308). However, 
the danger is that the traditional elites might not feel satisfied with whatever the EU 
gives to Turkey and start to mobilise the pubic against the European Union by 
deciphering the cynical intentions of the EU. Under such conditions, the government 
might also adopt more nationalistic anti-EU openings if the majority of the public 
takes side with the traditional elites (Robins, 2003: 547-566). Such domestic 
conditions would highly likely diminish the promise of the European Union in the 
resolution of the Turkish-Greek disputes.       
 
5.4. Discouraging Factors on the Part of the EU 
Despite the fact that the EU's approach towards Turkey has evolved into more 
concrete forms since Helsinki 1999, with the confirmation of Turkey's candidacy in 
1999, one can still claim that the roots of ambiguity has not been cleared away yet. It 
is still the case that there does not exist any cohesion or consensus among the EU 
members whether to admit Turkey as a member in the next decade. Given that the 
majority of public opinions in each member country are against Turkey's inclusion in 
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the Union, that Turkey's accession to the EU cannot still be justified on economic 
and identity grounds, that the EU is going to become very busy in adopting its 
institutional structures according to the requirements of the enlarged EU, that there is 
not any common understanding among the members as to the scope and direction of 
the EU's geo-political and security horizons, that the future of transatlantic relations 
will likely remain blurred and uncertain, the EU will have likely clung to its old 
'constructively managed ambiguity policy' towards Turkey. It is a reflection of this 
thinking that the EU did not mention Turkey in its Nice Summit conclusions when 
the future plans to re-organise and re-structure the Union were on the table 
(Muftuler-Bac, 2002: 79-95; Nice Conclusions). One can also read the EU's vague 
answer in Copenhagen to Turkey's calls for an early start of the accession talks in 
this as such (Aktar, 2003, ASAM). 
 In addition to its vagueness on Turkey, the European Union has also 
preserved the main principles of its Cyprus policy since 1999. The hope is still that 
Turkey would actively encourage the Turkish Cypriots to come to a final accord with 
their co-islanders within the UN-EU framework, if she wanted to see that her 
accession process to the EU goes less problematic. Thought of this way, the EU 
circles have not put significant pressures on the Greek Cypriots despite their sporadic 
warnings that the accession of the island to the EU as divided would not be certain. 
However, in many ways and on numerous occasions, they have not hesitated to make 
it clear that Cyprus has successfully completed the accession process and would join 
the Union as foreseen in Helsinki in 1999 (Guven, 2003). The Copenhagen decision 
to admit the divided Cyprus to membership constitutes the latest evidence of this EU 
thinking. 
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 Despite Turkey’s growing international geo-political significance in the post 
11 September era and despite the increased domestic reformation process since 
Helsinki in 1999, the European Union does not view the issue of Cyprus’s 
membership from a Turkey-friendly perspective. After all the stakes in the possibility 
of a Greek veto over the whole enlargement process in case the EU decides not to let 
the divided Cyprus in appeared to be greater than the risks that Turkey’s reactionary 
estrangement from the EU would engender.     
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CONCLUSION 
Before summarising the main conclusions of this study, we will first of all mention 
the reasons why the ongoing cooperative relations between Turkey and Greece for 
the last four years within the EU framework might turn out to be fragile in the years 
to come.  
 The first and the foremost point concerns the fact that Turkey's cooperation 
with Greece seems to be dependent on the nature/quality of her relations with the 
European Union. The risk is that whenever Turkey-EU relations deteriorate, the 
quality of Turkish-Greek cooperation might degenerate, hence accelerating the 
perpetuation of realpolitik security identities and practices (Larabee and Lesser, 
2003). If the European Union does not increase her commitment towards Turkey's 
accession by adopting more credible policies, then Turkey's ongoing democratization 
process might result in a decrease in Turkey's penchant for EU membership and this 
might in turn lead Turkey to embrace more non-cooperative policies towards Greece.  
An additional risk is that the longer it takes for Turkey to take some bold 
steps on the issues concerned, the more difficult it would be for the Greek politicians 
to legitimize their pro-engagement policy in the eyes of Greek public opinion. At one 
point, the Greek politicians might reverse back to their old habit to court nationalistic 
Greek public opinion for their domestic political interests (Larabee and Lesser, 
2003). However for Turkey to reciprocate Greece's ostensibly cooperative approach 
towards Turkey, the EU needs to change its view of Turkey.  
Second, if the current intra-Alliance rift cannot be healed soon, Turkey's 
behaviour towards the European Union and Greece might show some vicissitudes. 
This would make it difficult for Turkey to assess the possible consequences of her 
actions and to easily line up with European stances against the American ones. A 
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Turkey, which would always feel itself to be sandwiched between European and 
American choices, would end up thinking in more strategic and instrumental ways. A 
Turkey, which would perceive her foreign policy environment through strategic-
security lenses, would likely tend to interpret the developments in the region from a 
zero-sum mentality, highlighting costs at the expense of benefits (Oğuzlu, 2004: 
forthcoming). If the West gets further divided into two, with the EU and the US 
being the two polars, Turkey's chance of being included in the EU would to a great 
extent be affected by the dynamics of transatlantic relations. If the Europeans feel 
that the Americans are supporting Turkey's EU membership with a view to 
weakening the Union and accelerating its disintegration, then the EU's attitude 
towards Turkey would not change from its current ambiguous one to a more 
receptive one.   
 Third, the current Greek strategy towards Turkey should value Turkey's 
membership in the EU more than the resolution of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes 
in favour of Greece. The former should be the end whereas the second the means, not 
the other way around. Given that Turkish public opinion and the military-security 
elites are highly suspicious of Greece's intentions to use EU mechanisms against 
Turkey, it would be difficult for the Turks to believe in Greece's sincerity on 
Turkey's accession to the EU. The highly shared Turkish view is that Greece 
advocates Turkey's accession to the EU in general and the start of the Turkey's 
accession talks with the EU in particular in the hope that Turkey would agree to more 
pro-Greek solutions in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. It is not still certain whether the 
latest Greek openings towards Turkey reflect a 'change of hearth' or can be labelled 
as a 'change of mind' with new tactics put into practice in order to pursue the old 
belligerent and exclusionary strategy towards Turkey (Siegl, 2002: 40-52). 
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 Fourth, Turkey's domestic conditions are also important in this regard. Even 
though it seems that Turkey's penchant for EU membership has increased in the 
aftermath of the latest war in Iraq, due to the need to increase Turkey's bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the United States, Turkey's doubts about the West might not be 
limited to the Americans but include the Europeans as well should the EU does not 
start the accession talks soon. 
As for the main conclusions of this dissertation the following points can be 
said: It has been demonstrated here that the theoretical expectations of neo-realism 
with respect to the role of international organizations in interstate relations have not 
come true. Turkey and Greece's links with the EU and NATO played quite 
significant roles in the evolution of their bilateral relations. Despite the fact that 
structural realists do not aim to explain states' identities and interests, particularly the 
impact of international institutional environments on states' identities, one would find 
it difficult to argue that the institutional links with the EU and NATO have played 
marginal roles in the evolutionary process of Turkish-Greek relations. Besides, it was 
not due to the regional anarchy and distribution of material capabilities in the region 
that these two countries have at times cooperated and at times conflicted with each 
other in line with realpolitik security understanding. They have done so because the 
dynamics of their institutional relations with the EU and NATO has provided the 
context conducive to these happennings.  
As for the expectations of rationalist institutionalism of neo-liberalism one 
can say that these institutional links have not helped them cooperate easily by 
contributing to the elimination of cheating and relative gains concerns. Neither their 
joint membership in NATO nor close relations on the sidelines of the European 
Union led them to trust each other. This was so because their institutional relations 
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with NATO and the EU have not only continued on technical and functional grounds 
but also included ideational aspects. This disseration has made the point that even if 
they had had collective interests before starting to interact with each other through 
these institutions, they would have ended up with divergent interests due to the 
dynamics of their relationships with EU and NATO.  
The expectations of the sociological institutionalists that Turkey and Greece's 
links with NATO and the EU would first and foremost affect their identities and 
interests, rather than their strategies, have come true. Even though these countries 
could not develop a cooperative relationship in their region based on non-realpolitik 
security culture and continued to view each other through realpolitik glances, this 
end result is an ideational outcome and to a significant extent informed by the 
dynamics of their institutional relations with NATO and the EU. However, 
sociological institutionalists' claim that Turkey and Greece would transform their 
realpolitik security cultures into non-realpolitik ones through their interaction within 
the framework of western security community, as represented by the EU and NATO, 
has not come true. The main reason for that was neither the Cold War era NATO was 
a security community nor the post-Cold War era European Union approached Turkey 
and Greece as a credible socializing institution in accordance with the security norms 
of the post-modern European Union. The following section summarizes the main 
arguments of the dissertation why such an outcome has taken place. 
It has been argued here that for a long-term cooperative Turkish-Greek 
relationship to take place, their current realpolitik security cultures should evolve 
into non-realpolitik security cultures. To this end, Turkey and Greece's institutional 
links with the European Union and NATO initially seemed promising. Their long-
term membership in NATO and joint aspirations to become members of the 
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European Union were initially thought of playing encouraging roles in this regard. 
The credibility of these institutional links to play such roles were assumed to be 
extremely high if one could consider these institutions as security communities based 
on non-realpolitik security norms. Presumably, the EU and NATO would value the 
resolution of Turkish-Greek border disputes in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus lest their 
socially constructed international/security identities were not negatively affected by 
their continuation.  
NATO, conceived of a security community based on liberal-democracy 
norms and constituting the main security organization of the western international 
community, would become the main platform for Turkey and Greece to come closer 
in terms of their national identities and interests. Its potential role in this regard was 
assumed to be at its peak during the Cold War era simply because Turkey and Greece 
were members in the Alliance and considered as Western/European countries. The 
hope was that their joint interests to seek security against the Soviet Union and prove 
their Western/European identities would eventually lead them to develop collective 
identities within NATO. This would become possible when these countries first 
internalized the security culture of the Alliance and then gave the primacy to the 
concerns of the Alliance over their regional security interests.  Besides, Turkey and 
Greece would gradually begin to trust each other when they interacted within the 
informational environment of the Alliance. The possibility of their cooperation 
would have increased when they participated in NATO's joint military command, 
military planning, and exercises and shared sensitive military information about their 
respective military capabilities and strategic plans.  
However, I argued here that such expectations did not take place for a 
number of reasons. The most important of all were the following: First, the Cold War 
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era NATO was not a security community based on collective liberal-democratic 
norms. It was a military collective defense organization whose security culture was 
based on the practices of realpolitik security understanding. Containment of the 
Soviet Union, the extension of the United States' nuclear and conventional military 
assets to Europe, the improvement of other allies' military capabilities were the main 
instruments of NATO in its struggle against the communist block. Designed as such, 
the significance of allies within the Alliance and in the eyes of the United States, in 
principle, varied according to their military capabilities and geo-strategic positions. 
From this perspective, their joint membership in NATO did demonstrate the power 
disparities between Turkey and Greece in the clearest way, as well as contributed to 
their realpolitik security understanding. Besides, the NATO's policy to arm Turkey 
against the externally defined Soviet danger whereas the flow of arms to Greece on 
the basis of its internal struggle against the communist groups did further widen the 
military capabilities between these two countries. The potential role of the Alliance 
further decreased, from a neo-liberal perspective, when Turkey and Greece did not 
develop a collective security interest against the Soviet Union. They did not feel it 
necessary to cooperate closely in order to ward off the Soviet threat. The bilateral 
character of their security relations with the United States, in conformity with the 
security relations between other allies and the the United States, first reduced the 
multilateral character of NATO and then relieved Turkey and Greece of the need to 
solve their disputes in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus in order to deal with the Soviet 
threat more effectively.    
When these combined with the deficiency of the Alliance to act as a 
democracy promoter, the contextual requirements for a promising NATO role in the 
transformation of Turkey and Greece's realpolitik security cultures into a non-
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realpolitik one did not simply take place. The most significant role of NATO was to 
pave the ground for Turkey and Greece to learn how to build confidence-building 
mechanisms in their region and how to develop a crisis management culture. Even 
though these points can be mentioned as NATO's positive impact, one could also 
make the case that these developments were only partially positive simply because 
they did not encourage Greece and Turkey how to mutually contribute to the solution 
of substantial issues.     
With the advent of the 1990s, the role of NATO in the nature of Turkish-
Greek relations started to decrease mainly for the reasons that NATO's European 
identity started to erode with the gradual division of the West into two, EU and 
American, and that Turkey and Greece turned to the European Union as the main 
international fora in order to secure their places within the western international 
community. Gradually, Turkey and Greece found it difficult to develop a collective 
security identity under the 'more political-less military', 'more American-less 
European', 'more bilateral-less institutional', and 'more global-less regional' NATO.  
Despite all its drawbacks, the dynamics of institutional relations between 
Turkey and Greece on the one hand and NATO on the other have positively 
contributed to the emergence of cooperative bilateral relations of realpolitik kind. 
These two countries could develop and sustain a functioning crisis-management 
culture. For example, it was due to the existence of such a culture that Turkey and 
Greece could eventually succeed in de-escalating the Imia crisis of January 1996. 
Absent this crisis-management culture developed within the NATO framework, 
Turkey and Greece might have resorted to use of force in the past. Though they 
could not transform their realpolitik security identities into non-relapolitik ones, their 
joint memberships in NATO helped them control their warlike/crisis situations. This 
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can be considered as a postive aspect of their institutional relationship within NATO, 
rather than a mere indication of the Alliance's fire-fighting capabilities.          
In the post-Cold War era, the main international institution to have the 
greatest potential to affect the nature of Turkish-Greek relations has been the 
European Union. When Turkey's increasing aspiration to join the EU combined with 
Greece's instrumental strategy to use the EU platforms against Turkey, in accordance 
with its security culture, the European Union has found itself in a unique position in 
regard to the evolution of Turkish-Greek relations.  
I argued here that if the European Union had formulated its enlargement 
strategy towards Turkey on the basis of the logic of appropriateness, rather than the 
logic of consequentiality, the contextual environment for Turkey and Greece to 
develop cooperative relations on the basis of non-realpolitik security culture would 
have been created. In such a case, the EU would have justified Turkey's possible 
entry into the EU on the basis of its international/security identity/culture and 
adopted a credible socializing strategy by teaching its norms to Turkey or persuading 
her to the legitimacy of the EU's norms and constitutive principles. Such kind of an 
EU action would have been in conformity with the oft-repeated view that the 
European Union evolved into a post-modern security community in the 1990s.  
A post-modern European Union would foresee the widening and deepening 
processes as constitutive of each other; define its identity on the rejection of its 
realpolitik past, rather than in reference to particular territorial conceptualizations; 
try to secure its identity through the projection of its non-realpolitik security culture 
to the peripheries of the continent; and adopt a particular enlargement strategy that 
foresees the accession of aspirant countries if they met the technical requirements of 
membership.     
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However, as the 1990s unfolded, it became crystal clear that the European 
Union behaved as a post-modern security community only towards the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Its logic towards Turkey has 
been based on the logic of consequentiality in the sense that the EU did simply ask 
Turkey to meet the membership criteria on its own. It did not actively try to socialize 
Turkey into the security norms of the Union. Depending on Turkey's performance, it 
would either let her in or close the door forever. Such an approach towards Turkey 
emphasised the costs and benefits of Turkey's accession and the EU undertook this 
task in terms of the compatibility of Turkey's security culture with that of the 
European Union.      
When the EU found it difficult to admit Turkey as a member due to the 
incompatibilities of her security culture, it adopted a constructively managed 
deliberate ambiguity policy towards Turkey whose main goal was to effectively 
reduce Turkey-induced costs to the EU's twin processes of deepening (ESDP) and 
widening (Cyprus). In response to such an ambiguous EU approach, the Turkish 
elites have gradually adopted critical attitudes towards the ongoing accession process 
and most of the time tended to interpret it as a threat generating exercise. In the face 
of the EU's reluctant attitude towards Turkey's accession and its inefficient 
socialization strategies, both Turkey's non-European character has become more 
visible and the pro-EU circles in Turkey found it difficult to convince the public 
opinion to the idea that the ongoing accession process would in fact be the best 
strategy for Turkey to cope with the security risks and challenges of the globalization 
process.    
Within the context of such negative EU-Turkey relations, the realpolitik 
character of Turkey-Greece relations have been re-constituted, particularly by the 
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efforts of the successive Greek governments to prove their European identity on the 
basis of Turkey's non-European identity. The Greek efforts to hamper Turkey's 
relations with the EU and contribute to Turkey's exclusion from the EU became 
possible within the context of deteriorating Turkey-EU relations. If the European 
Union had given credible signals with respect to Turkey's European identity, for 
instance by approaching Turkey from the logic of appropriateness, Greece would 
have been denied any legitimate ground for her exclusionary attitude towards 
Turkey.  
On the other hand, when Greece's partners within the EU seriously 
challenged Greece's European identity by using Greece as a pawn in their relations 
with Turkey, Greece's view of the EU as a security alliance has been further 
reinforced. In the face of Turkey's growing hard-core military capabilities and 
increasing regional power status and in the face of its marginal status within the EU, 
Greece continued to see Turkey as a threat and the EU as an external security 
alliance to balance Turkey. The important point is that Greece's view of the EU as a 
security alliance was made easier when Turkey's European status was being 
challenged by Greece's partners within the EU.   
Thought of this way, Greece's efforts to Europeanize its national identity 
through her federalist and pro-integration approach since the advent of the Simitis 
government has not generated the context conducive to the transformation of 
realpolitik security relations in and around the Aegean Sea into non-realpolitik one. 
The main reason for this was that the Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy vis-
à-vis Turkey did not mean anything more than Greece's internalization of the EU's 
'constructively managed deliberate ambiguity' policy towards Turkey. Besides, 
Greece's decision to Europeanize was to a great extent caused by the dynamics of the 
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EU's enlargement and deepening processes. If Greece continued to remain as a 
Balkan country within the EU with strong nationalistic and unilateral undertones in 
its foreign and security policies, both she would get further marginalized within the 
ever-enlarging and deepening EU and find it extremely difficult to secure EU's help 
against Turkey.  
Seen against this background, I argued that Greece's pro-engagement policy 
towards Turkey since 1999 has contributed to the regional stability only in realpolitik 
terms. Even though one can claim that this regional stability and the ongoing 
Turkish-Greek cooperation process might have been casued by Greece's increasing 
bargaining power vis-à-vis Turkey (a neo-realist outcome), the fact is that such an 
outcome has been made possible by the way the EU has viewed Turkey and been 
involved in the Turkish-Greek relations (a social constructivist process). The more 
Europeanized Greece could find it easier to adopt a pro-engagement policy towards 
Turkey because Greece's further Europeanization has brought with itself the EU's 
involvement in the Turkish-Greek relations in favour of Greece. The EU's Helsinki 
summit conclusions and the EU's Accession Partnership Document tailored for 
Turkey are the best indications of this reality. However, unless the European Union 
views Turkey within the EU project and offers her credible membership prospects, 
Turkey and Greece would not be able to develop a stable and cooperative relations in 
their region on the basis of non-realpolitik security practices.  
I also argued that the EU's involvement in the Cyprus dispute has so far not 
produced any cooperative outcome on the island based on the non-realpolitik 
security understanding. The way the EU approached the dispute has contributed to 
the further securitization of the conflict, as well as the perpetuation of the realpolitik 
identities of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Unless the identity-related 
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security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots are taken into consideration and unless the 
EU offers Turkey a credible membership prospect, it seems that only the Greek 
Cypriot Administration will join the EU in 2004. Their admission to the EU as 
representing the whole island, regardless of the fact that EU's Community Law 
would not be applied in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, would bode 
dangerous for future.   
Given that a long-term cooperative relationship based on non-realpolitik 
security identities and practices is difficult to take place, this dissertation suggests 
that Turkey and Greece should develop appropriate mechanims with the help of the 
European Union and NATO in order to sustain their ostensibly cooperative 
interaction in the years to come. In this regard, the European Union and NATO 
might play facilitative functions. For example, it is a promising sign that these two 
countries put into place some confidence building measures with the help of the 
Alliance. The new command structure of the Alliance, in which Turkish and Greek 
military officiers would work together in Larissa and Izmir, and NATO's emerging 
response force might provide useful avenues for Greece and Turkey to cooperate 
miliatrily and develop a climate of mutual confidence.       
The European Union might also contribute to the bilateral cooperation by 
financing joint projects, as well as including Turkey and Greece within its regional 
cooperation schemes.   
 Even though a bilateral cooperative interaction of realpolitik kind would be 
preferred to a bilateral conflictual interaction of realpoitik kind, a lasting Turkish-
Greek stettlement would be significantly enhanced if the security identities of these 
two countries get transformed into non-realpolitik kind. Rather than rendering any 
bilateral military conflict costly and undesirable, as has been the case since 1999, the 
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institutional links with the EU and NATO will prove more beneficial if they help 
these two countries converge their security identities and interests on the basis of the 
non-realpolitik security norms. For this to happen, the following points should be 
materialized:    
• the EU approaches Greece and Turkey mainly from an 'ideational' 
perspective believing that their joint memberships in the EU would be 
legitimate and necessary for the re-construction of the EU's post-Cold 
War era international/security identity;  
• the European Union gives up its deliberate ambiguity policy and  devises 
a credible conditionality and socialization policy backed by promising 
rewards and costly punishments;  
• the European Union stops treating Greece as a pawn in the overall EU-
Turkey relations by engaging in strategic bargains with Turkey over the 
dynamics of bilateral Turkish-Greek relations;  
• Turkey and Greece approach the European Union from an 'ideational' 
perspective believing that their EU membership would certainly 
constitute their prime national interest as well as be in accordance with 
their security identities;  
• Turkey thinks that the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes along her 
accession process with the EU would be legitmate;  
• Greece values Turkey's EU membership more than the resolution of 
Turkish-Greek problems within the EU framework in favour of Greece;  
• Greece and Turkey cease approaching each other from an 'instrumental' 
perspective whereby they view their links with the European Union as 
strategic instruments to be utilised against each other;  
 258
• And finally both believe that their simultaneous 
Europeanization processes create significant 'windows of opportunities' 
for them, rather than 'windows of vulnerabilities', to be able to develop 
'win-win' settlement frameworks.    
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